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Reviews

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in association with

THE FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY
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VOLUME XVI	FALL 1972	NUMBER 3
------------	-----------	----------

Reflections on the Quarter	599
Brazil's Future World Role <i>Lincoln Gordon</i>	621
Ending the Viet Nam Conflict: Expectations in Hanoi and Saigon <i>Allan E. Goodman</i>	632
Some Insurgency Lessons from Southeast Asia . . . <i>George K. Tanham</i>	646
Implications of the Nixon Doctrine for Military Aid Policy <i>Stephen P. Gibert</i>	660
Deterrence, Assured Destruction, and Defense . . . <i>Martin J. Bailey</i>	682
The Future of America's Commitments and Alliances <i>Andrew J. Pierre</i>	696
Scandinavian Security in Transition: The Two-Dimensional Threat <i>Nils Ørvik</i>	720
Britain, the Common Market, and the Forces of History <i>Paul Taylor</i>	743
Economic Integration in the COMECON <i>Stanislaw Wasowski</i>	760
The Changing Patterns of Military Participation in Chinese Politics <i>Parris H. Chang</i>	780
Reviews:	
Subversion as a Tool of Statecraft <i>Eugene H. Methvin</i>	803
Strategy, Arms, and the Third World <i>Geoffrey Kemp</i>	809
Perceptions of Soviet Foreign Policy <i>Robert C. Horn</i>	816
Revolution and Economic Growth: The Mexican Case <i>Edward H. Allen</i>	820
Books Received	823
Contributors to this Issue	832



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598

Reflections on the Quarter

The President and the Emerging International System

AMERICAN Presidential election campaigns, at least in theory, are supposed to furnish an occasion for contending candidates to cross mental swords on the great issues, foreign and domestic, that confront the democratic public. Since the 1972 challenger, in his projected reordering of national priorities, promised to finance a substantial portion of his welfare objectives by slicing \$32 billion from the defense budget during the next three years, he was not in a strong position to stimulate an intelligent debate over this nation's role in world affairs during the 1970's. When Senator McGovern averred that he would never allow the United States to become a second-class military power and that Israel would have no reason to worry about U.S. support during his administration, he may have been quite sincere. But in making such brave statements of intention while at the same time calling for sizeable reductions in American military force levels and R&D efforts, he sounded somehow like the man who, purely for sentimental reasons, preferred to hear Beethoven played by his high school band than by the Philadelphia Orchestra.

Receiving no real stimulus from McGovern, the President was content to run on the record of his deeds in foreign policy. That record

was impressive, especially in respect to the U.S. diplomatic stance toward the two leading communist powers and Dr. Henry Kissinger's jet travels in quest of a negotiated settlement of the Viet Nam war. Unfortunately, however, there was no crisp intellectual debate over what the unusual international developments of the previous year and a half really meant, and what they portended for the direction of U.S. foreign policy in a world generally assumed to be in transition from Cold War bipolarity to an emerging multipolar balance. Perhaps President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger had a clear idea, from their various meetings at the summit, of where the world and the United States are heading. If so, they did not effectively communicate their knowledge to the American people. Senator McGovern failed to help matters by referring to the Administration's international activities as mere deceptions calculated to produce an electoral victory. The discussion of foreign policy in 1972 could hardly be called thoughtful.

Perhaps the explanation is to be found partly in the unquestioned necessity under which the Executive labors to maintain strict confidentiality while delicate and complex negotiations are in progress. (It was Hanoi that forced the United States to break diplomatic silence in late October and reveal the outlines of the agreement which was being worked out, with conse-

quences that may have been both good and bad for the prospects of peace, but which nevertheless made diplomats of the Harold Nicolson school shudder with horror.) The problems of reconciling the demands of quiet diplomacy with the requirement of full disclosure in democratic societies are well known, and cannot be solved with satisfactory finality. But the need to withhold detailed facts should not be taken to mean that there can be no intelligent debate over the broader political conceptions and assumptions that now inform emerging national policy in the world arena. It was this latter that was lacking in the recent Presidential campaign.

Part of the blame must be assessed to the characteristic behavior of the American political system in what has come to be regarded as the "off" Presidential election in the modern cycle of White House administrations, which usually last for eight instead of four years. At the halfway or four-year mark, centrist candidates who might have a chance of appealing to a majority or near majority of the voters seem unable to work out a centrist compromise, as if they were reluctant to run in that particular year. Consequently they either allow, or prove unable to prevent, the capture of the party by its more extreme elements. Thus the 1964 election was a disaster for the Republicans and a one-sided victory for an incumbent President who probably could not have won the nomination and election on his own four years earlier. In 1972, enthusiasts of the left similarly

captured the Democratic Convention from the party "pros." Again, the result in November was a disaster for the Democrats and a landslide majority victory for a President who had won with only 43 per cent of the popular vote four years earlier.

An incumbent President, provided that he manages to avoid egregious blunders, enjoys natural psychopolitical advantages. In modern times it seems that the opposition party, recognizing this fact, seeks in the "off year" to purge itself of old impurities by taking a cathartic of traditional first principles, calculated to revive that "old-time party spirit" preparatory to the real fray four years later. In the long run, this may be a sensible pattern both for the health of the two-party system and for the stability of government. But the absence of two centrist candidates for the Presidency in the "off year" also makes for a campaign marked by a deterioration in the quality of public debate, by strident rhetoric on one side and by a too frequent resort to forensic clichés on the other.

Still another explanation is to be sought in the essential ambiguity of the international system at the present time. Politicians in a democracy are known to be reluctant to make their stands on particular issues too clear, for the simple reason that clarity sometimes repels more voters than it attracts. Moreover, the normal paradoxes of international relations have been compounded during the last two years, so much so that even the pundits often find themselves confused as to what is really happen-

REFLECTIONS ON THE QUARTER

ing, or what it signifies. In considerable part, the current uncertainty can be traced back to 1971—a year of “great loosening up” in the pattern of world politics, a year of shifts, reversals and unexpected openings, a year when old rigidities dissolved and “things became unstuck.”

In Europe, France ended a decade of opposition to British entry into the Community. Bonn signed treaties with Moscow and Warsaw recognizing the inviolability of post-war boundaries, and a quadripartite agreement was reached on Berlin, giving rise to the impression that at last, more than twenty-five years after the end of World War II, a comprehensive settlement for Europe was beginning to take shape through a series of interlocking diplomatic pieces, with other pieces to fall into place later.

In the Middle East, 1971 brought a faint hope that the basis was being laid, if not for a negotiated peace, at least for an adjustment of the danger level downward.

In Asia there was movement on several fronts. Japan appeared to be embarking on a new course by announcing an intention to more than double defense expenditures in the next five years, while observers were noting that the Japanese people were losing their aversion to the idea of nuclear arms. Following the conclusion of the Soviet-Indian Friendship Treaty, the precarious equilibrium that had prevailed on the subcontinent for more than twenty years was shattered by the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan with Indian military support.

Most startling of all was the adoption of a new U.S. posture toward the People's Republic of China. This, along with the tightening up of U.S. trade policy, sent shock waves through Japan.

Is it now possible to draw up a balance sheet that would show us where things stand after more than a year of what has probably been the most intensified transcontinental bilateral summit diplomacy the world has ever seen? Actually the task may be impossible at present because of its complexity. It is to be doubted that even Dr. Kissinger, who possesses the necessary perspective and knowledge based on experience, has had time to assess in a comprehensive manner the meaning of the changes that have been occurring.

So far as Europe is concerned, no one can yet predict the outcome of the interaction between the Brandt Government's *Ostpolitik* and the Soviet Union's *Westpolitik*. Moscow's desire for expanded trade with the West may make Party Secretary Brezhnev reluctant to do anything to jeopardize the current *détente*, and the Kremlin may be amenable to negotiating European security and MBFR as ways of modulating the political-military environment to its western rear as it continues to build up military forces along the Chinese border. Brandt's electoral victory will strengthen his hand in determining the future of West German-East German and East-West relations in Europe.

If the admission of Britain, Ireland and Denmark to the EEC is likely to cause the United States

some economic problems in the years ahead, their entry is in conformity with the long-range policy objectives the United States adopted toward the unification of Europe twenty-five years ago. On the other hand, whereas the East Europeans are likely to favor the expansion of the EEC as auguring well for trade liberalization, the Soviet Union is probably more inclined to take into consideration its political-strategic implications for the ultimate strengthening of Europe, and thus to be unenthusiastic.

The Soviets are astute enough to realize that their ideology has not proved attractive to West Europeans, not least because that ideology has been imposed by repressive force in Eastern Europe. But they know that their military and purchasing power command a good deal of respect in Western Europe. Not a few thoughtful analysts are still vaguely apprehensive over the possibility of a gradual "Finlandization" of Western Europe, particularly if the American presence should be reduced in the future, whether through the Mansfield Resolution or MBFR. In Norway, political opinion leaders have already begun to feel that their country is being outflanked by the westward expansion of Soviet naval capabilities. In their eyes, the United States is becoming an uncertain guarantor because it has failed to demonstrate a determination to keep pace with the growth of Soviet local power in Europe and Soviet strategic power on the oceans. As a nation heavily dependent upon shipping, Norway may drift increasingly toward a

neutralism that will avoid giving offense to the USSR. (This factor, incidentally, was seldom included in the inventory of reasons for Norway's vote against joining the EEC.)

Soviet leaders, when they try to evaluate the fluid world situation, cannot be confident that everything is going as they would like. They look at President Allende in Chile demonstrating to the world that it is extremely difficult to create a Marxist-Leninist society within a democratic constitutional framework. They see the Chinese breaking out of their prolonged diplomatic isolation, welcoming the U.S. President in Peking, preparing to establish relations with Japan and West Germany, and making speeches at the United Nations which indicate rhetorically that the Soviet Union has replaced the United States as China's No. 1 "imperialist enemy." In order to avoid the danger of becoming diplomatically isolated in a rapidly changing international environment—a danger to which Russia is, geographically speaking, peculiarly vulnerable—the Soviets have been compelled to intensify their own communications with the United States, Western Europe and Japan. It would seem that one of Moscow's major objectives would be to make sure that China will not obtain from Western Europe technological aid in sufficient quantity (e.g., Concorde) to pose a danger to the security of Russian territory.

The political map of Asia is undergoing profound changes. The movement in that region seems to be primarily a function of the Sino-

REFLECTIONS ON THE QUARTER

Soviet dispute. It is reported that since 1968 the Soviets have increased the number of their divisions along the China border from fifteen to forty-nine—although almost two-thirds of the USSR's forces are still deployed on the western front. The assumption is that Chou En-lai has felt constrained by the Soviet buildup to enter into the world balance-of-power act while deploying liquid-fueled missiles of varying ranges. By coming out of isolation, Chou has managed to fragment the former solidarity of the noncommunist states in Asia. Suggestions have been heard that Taiwan may in the future look to the Soviet Union for support, and that the Soviets are now under mounting pressure to arrive at a settlement with Japan. On the Indian subcontinent, the United States and China appear to have suffered a setback, while the Soviets have gained. India, with Soviet backing in Bangladesh, has achieved a new self-confidence at a time when the entry of China into the United Nations as a privileged member might otherwise have increased incentives in New Delhi for acquiring nuclear weapons. China, which did not come to Pakistan's assistance in late 1971, finally came to the aid of her ally with a veto on the admission of Bangladesh to the United Nations. While the Soviets chided the Chinese for their stand against a new developing nation, the Chinese gained satisfaction over Sadat's decision to drive Soviet technicians from Egypt.

To be sure, the emerging international system makes necessary a

greater degree of pragmatic flexibility from the leaders of the great powers than they had to show ten or twenty years ago. Hence, more than ever today, the American people need to be protected against a neo-isolationist tendency to forget about the not always pleasant realities of the world in which they live. Throughout the Presidential campaign, the American public heard no significant debate about the future of the Atlantic Alliance, or Phase II of the SALT, or the rise of organized international terrorism, or the role the United Nations can and cannot be expected to play in the international system of the 1970's, or U.S. policy toward Latin America and Africa. It is to be hoped that President Nixon in his second term will correct this deficiency of the campaign and help to educate the youth of the United States to their future world responsibilities by carrying on a regular public discourse concerning those fundamental issues of foreign policy which need to be debated.

Viet Nam: The October Proposal

SEVERAL converging factors have spurred Hanoi's interest in a settlement of the Indochina war and an end to U.S. military participation. The massive North Vietnamese invasion in the spring failed to achieve either major military objectives or important psychological or political goals, and its great cost will probably preclude a comparable effort for at least two years. Meanwhile, the U.S. mining of

North Viet Nam's harbors and the intensified bombing of the North's logistics and infiltration network have weakened Hanoi's capacity to maintain a high level of military activity in the South.

Hanoi must now be aware that Vietnamization has strengthened Saigon's forces, enabling them, with the aid of American airpower, to contain the North's Soviet-equipped invasion. Assuming that the retraining and re-equipment of the South Vietnamese air force is accelerated, continued Vietnamization will likely produce an even more effective defense effort in the future. Moreover, the side effects of the U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Chinese rapprochements and the evident Soviet and Chinese unwillingness to challenge the American blockade have convinced Hanoi of the limitations of external support. And, during the weeks before the U.S. Presidential election, the North Vietnamese leadership apparently concluded that the Nixon Administration would be returned to office and might stiffen its conditions for a settlement after November 7.

By early October the pace of diplomatic negotiations and maneuvering had been accelerated, aided by the speed of transcontinental jet flights. Dr. Kissinger held a prolonged series of secret meetings in Paris with North Vietnamese negotiators which on October 8 produced a crucial change in the North Vietnamese position: no longer did Hanoi demand that the United States impose a new government on Saigon which would automatically exclude President

Thieu or others similarly opposed to communist rule. This concession eliminated the major roadblock of the past four years to a realistic settlement and led to fruitful negotiations. In accordance with Kissinger's suggestions, a settlement emerged which (1) seeks to separate the military terms of the conflict from the more difficult political questions of ultimate power in Saigon and in the countryside, and (2) divides the conditions of settlement into phased stages.

A Hanoi radio broadcast on October 26 divulged the terms of the "Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam" that had been reached in Paris. In his press conference following the surprise Hanoi broadcast, Kissinger confirmed that the nine points outlined in the North Vietnamese broadcast were essentially correct. The terms are: (1) Respect by the United States for "the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam as recognized by the 1954 Geneva agreements."

(2) Twenty-four hours after the agreement is signed, a cease-fire will go into effect in South Viet Nam and all U.S. military activities, including the mining of North Vietnamese waters, will cease. Within the next sixty days all American and allied troops and military personnel will be withdrawn from South Viet Nam. No new infusions of troops or war matériel will be "accepted" into South Viet Nam by "the two South Vietnamese parties" except for periodic replacement on a one-for-one basis of armaments previously in place.

REFLECTIONS ON THE QUARTER

(3) "The return of all captured and detained personnel of the parties shall be carried out simultaneously with the U.S. troops' withdrawal."

(4) The principle of South Vietnamese "self-determination" through "genuinely free and democratic general elections under international supervision" was affirmed and the United States agreed to remain neutral toward the outcome. A "National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord" of "three equal segments" will be set up to implement accords between the Viet Cong and the Saigon government and to organize general elections. The Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) and Saigon "will do their utmost," in a spirit of "national reconciliation and concord, equality and mutual respect," to arrive at an agreement within three months "on the internal matters of South Viet Nam," including the disposition, reduction and demobilization of the armed forces of both sides.

(5) "The reunification of Vietnam shall be carried out step by step through peaceful means."

(6) A "four-party joint military commission, and a joint PRG-Saigon military commission" are to be established. Within thirty days of signing the agreement an international guarantee conference on Viet Nam is to be convened and an international commission of control and supervision is to be established.

(7) North Viet Nam, the People's Republic of China, the United States and South Viet Nam are to "respect the Cambodian and Lao-

tian peoples' fundamental national rights as recognized by the 1954 Geneva agreements on Indochina and the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos," and to refrain from using the territory of Cambodia and Laos for military purposes. Foreign military forces are to be withdrawn from Cambodia and Laos and all military activities ended in the two countries.

(8) The United States is to contribute to the reconstruction of Indochina, including North Viet Nam.

(9) "This agreement shall come into force as of its signing. It will be strictly implemented by all the parties concerned."

In the agreement the minimal U.S. negotiating points outlined by President Nixon last May 8 have been maintained. All American prisoners of war are to be returned. The cease-fire is to be internationally supervised and is to precede a political settlement. The United States is not committed to impose a change of government in Saigon. A military settlement is separate from the political settlement, and the political terms are open to negotiation among the Vietnamese.

However, the agreement leaves several important problems unresolved. Kissinger has indicated that doubt remains as to which clauses of the 1954 Geneva accord are applicable. The ambiguity of the North Vietnamese term "accepts" in regard to new infusions of troops or war matériel contrasts with his statement that "There would be a total prohibition on the reinforcement of troops—that is to say that

infiltration into South Vietnam from whatever area and from whatever country would be prohibited." In the Hanoi summary, the agreement calls for the "return of all captured and detained personnel," while Kissinger pointedly excluded the release of South Vietnamese political detainees. According to Kissinger, provisions on international supervision are "very long and complex." The chances for conflicting interpretations are considerable.

Besides procedural problems, there are areas of the agreement that raise major substantive issues. There is no provision for inspection or enforcement of the cease-fire during the period between signing and the formation of a control commission. Moreover, the international composition and powers of the control commission will determine its effectiveness. It would require a large mobile force, equipped with helicopters and modern electronic surveillance equipment and capable of monitoring the movements and activities of the opposing sides in every region of the country down to the hamlet level. Such a supervisory force, especially if it lacks enforcement powers, would find it difficult to carry out its tasks effectively.

Furthermore, the control commission mentioned in the agreements will operate only in South Viet Nam, not in Laos and Cambodia. Therefore, the provisions of the agreement relating to infiltration and the presence and activities of military forces in Laos and Cambodia are of considerable concern. Given the covert nature of

communist operations throughout Indochina following both the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements, it may be assumed that the impact of whatever inspection there is will affect Saigon's and Washington's activities rather than those of Hanoi or the Viet Cong.

In turn, there appears to be no provision for the withdrawal of the estimated 145,000 North Vietnamese troops in South Viet Nam and along the Cambodian borders. This is consistent with Hanoi's long-standing refusal to admit that its troops are in the South; if the allies acquiesce in this fiction, they would, in effect, legitimize the continued occupation by North Vietnamese forces of the border zones and sparsely populated regions of South Viet Nam, particularly in the eight northern provinces. In this position, especially because of the prospects for loose international supervision, Hanoi's troops would continue to constitute a serious threat to South Viet Nam. In effect, the settlement as currently outlined provides for the withdrawal of American forces and the end of U.S. action against the North in return for the release of U.S. prisoners held in North Viet Nam, while allowing the DRVN a respite to prepare for a possible new offensive.

It is precisely to this unsettled military question of the status of North Viet Nam's combat forces and advisers currently operating in South Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia that the Saigon government has objected, stating that unless these forces are withdrawn, it will not abide by the settlement.

REFLECTIONS ON THE QUARTER

The political provisions of the agreement are sufficiently vague and dependent on the good behavior of the South and North Vietnamese that the chances for their successful implementation are extremely low. The result could be either a prolonged and debilitating struggle in the South over government participation, administrative control and negotiating terms, or the breakdown of the cease-fire and a return to conflict. Meanwhile, there is opportunity for the North to exacerbate latent divisive situations in the South. Not surprisingly, Saigon objected to the vagueness of the settlement provisions, especially those concerning the communist proposal of a tripartite "National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord." In Vietnamese, the phrase for "government structure" and "administrative structure" is the same, and this contributed to Saigon's apprehension that the communist proposal was simply a coalition government in disguise. The communists cling to the thesis that there are two legal governments and two armies already in existence in South Viet Nam and that they are "equal." The Thieu Government and the noncommunist majority in South Viet Nam know that this is a fiction and they have balked at accepting an agreement that would give legitimacy to Hanoi's design.

Even assuming that these problems could be solved and a cease-fire implemented, there remains the fundamental question of how South Viet Nam would be administered at the lower levels, given the crazy-quilt pattern of military and politi-

cal control shared by both sides. Herein lies the ultimate dilemma of peace in Viet Nam and Indochina. In such a situation, how would control of the armed forces, police and tax responsibilities in each locality be apportioned, and how far down would this division of responsibility go? Would free access for both sides through territory controlled by one to population centers administered by the other be possible? Would the cease-fire occur all at once or would it be staggered by regions and localities as was true in 1954? Between the time of the cease-fire and the assembly and activation of the international supervisory force, how much lateral movement into contested areas would each side attempt—and using what kinds of forces? Could the normal functions of the country—schools, hospitals, health, mails, and road repair—continue during such a period? Indeed, how would "local control" be validated: by flying flags, by "votes," by intelligence reports? Finally, could a meaningful local redistribution of power including both Viet Cong and Saigon personnel ever be possible in the hamlets and villages of South Viet Nam? The answers to these questions, and the degree of trust needed among all Vietnamese parties if workable solutions are to be found, suggest the difficulty of bringing a lasting peace to Viet Nam. As Dr. Kissinger stated in the January 1969 issue of *Foreign Affairs*: "It is beyond imagination that parties that have been murdering and betraying each other for 25 years could work together as a team giv-

ing joint instructions to the entire country. The image of a line of command extending from Saigon into the countryside is hardly true of the noncommunist government in Saigon. It would be absurd in the case of a coalition government. Such a government would possess no authority other than that of each minister over the forces he controlled either through personal or party loyalty."

Without question, the military participation of the United States in the Viet Nam war would be effectively ended by the October proposal. South Vietnamese problems, however, threaten to multiply. Consequently, additional safeguards have been sought by Saigon, and the danger of a continuing large-scale North Vietnamese presence in the South has been foremost in President Thieu's calculations.

Given Saigon's dependence on the United States, the settlement that finally emerges will probably not differ greatly from the draft settlement. Under the cease-fire, Hanoi and Saigon will continue to jockey for power. Frequent localized clashes will occur and the resurgence of major conflict will always be a possibility. Both sides have attempted to capture as much territory and to stock as much military equipment and munitions as possible before the signing of a settlement. The United States is torn between its desire to extricate itself as early as possible from Indochina and its desire to secure terms that would strengthen the prospects for a viable South Viet Nam after U.S. withdrawal. Whatever the exact terms of a final settle-

ment, the prospects for U.S. disengagement early in the new year remain good, but the future of Viet Nam is no more predictable than it was five, ten or twenty years ago. No formal peace agreement is likely to restore peace. Perhaps the most optimistic statement that can be made is that Vietnamization, however imperfect, will give South Viet Nam a better chance to survive as an independent nation than it has had at any time during the past generation.

The EEC Summit Conference

THE heads of government of the nine states of the enlarged European Common Market held a summit conference in Paris on October 19 and 20. They agreed to establish a European Fund for Monetary Cooperation by April 1973 and a fund for regional development within the Community by December 1973. The Community leaders also called for the creation by 1980 of a European Union providing for coordination of economic, social, political and foreign policies among the member states.

It was the Hague Summit Conference of the original six EEC states in December 1969 that gave impetus to increased political cooperation among the Six (the Davignon Group) and to eventual monetary and economic unification in the Community (the Barre Report and subsequently the Werner Plan). At the recent summit, in contrast, the issue of political cooperation received secondary con-

REFLECTIONS ON THE QUARTER

sideration; economic and monetary union provided the central focus of discussion. In addition to reaching agreement on a monetary fund, the nine Community members called for movement to the second stage of economic and monetary union by January 1974. The major goal of the first stage is to achieve stable parity relationships among the currencies of the various Community states. The principal objective in the second stage will be to pool the monetary reserves of EEC countries. If the target date is met, the economic and monetary union would be progressing at the pace envisaged in the Hague Declaration of 1969.

French President Pompidou's suggestion for convening a summit meeting at Paris was prompted by the American economic and monetary initiative of August 15, 1971. When his suggestion met with favorable responses in other European capitals, he clarified it by stating that such a meeting should not be "a conference for information, but a conference for decision." This was to be Pompidou's theme during the months of preparation for the summit—French action for postponement might be expected, should French interests not be taken adequately into account by other Community members.

The summit idea lay dormant while the Europeans, Japanese and Americans worked out a temporary *modus vivendi* among themselves on trade and monetary issues. Then, in early 1972, it once again became a topic of major importance in European capitals. On

February 28 and 29, Community foreign ministers reached agreement on three categories of substantive issues to be explored in developing a summit agenda: (1) economic and monetary union and social progress in the Community; (2) the strengthening of institutions and progress in the political field; and (3) external relations of the Community and its responsibilities in the world.

Subsequently they suggested that: (1) priority should be given to the discussion of further steps toward economic and monetary union; (2) the summit should be used to evolve a Community-wide regional development policy as well as a social policy; (3) in any discussions at the summit or in preparatory meetings about the means for institutional strengthening, the EEC Commission should take a full and active part; and (4) "progress in the political sphere" was an area of national prerogative and should be discussed, therefore, apart from measures designed to strengthen Community institutions.

This insistence on separating "political cooperation" from "institutional strengthening" was of French and British origin and presaged some of the problems that were to threaten postponement of the summit. In early June Pompidou reiterated his intention to withdraw support for the meeting if concrete results and key agreements appeared unlikely to issue from such a conference. To him "concrete results and key agreements" meant establishment of greater cohesion in the Community on economic and monetary matters in

order to present a common front to the United States; he wanted to prepare against future periods of crisis similar to the one that had led to the December 1970 Smithsonian agreement for the realignment of currency parities. Also sought by Pompidou as minimum conditions for the convening of the summit were a coordinated Community assault on inflation, a common European policy toward the Third World, and acquiescence in the French proposal that any permanent Political Secretariat be located in Paris.

At the same time Pompidou refused to contemplate the "democratization" of the European Parliament through the direct election of its members, an idea advocated strongly by the Netherlands and supported, tacitly at least, by other Community members, including Great Britain and the German Federal Republic. He further set himself against the Dutch and German suggestion that the summit be used to formulate a European approach to discussions with the United States. Supported by Prime Minister Heath, the French President maintained that such a move would be premature and that Atlantic relations should remain on a bilateral nation-to-nation basis.

The French were also at odds with other Community members with respect to the location of a Political Secretariat designed to facilitate foreign policy coordination among the Community states. Pompidou argued for its establishment in Paris, while his partners held that it should be located in Brussels with other Community in-

stitutions, even though it might remain constitutionally a separate entity. Unable to reconcile this difference of opinion, the Community states agreed to eliminate the Political Secretariat issue from the summit agenda.

Additionally, the French and the British were somewhat at loggerheads over the British decision in June to float the pound in contravention of the fixed parity agreements negotiated at Basle and Washington. In July, Pompidou stated the need for sterling to return to a fixed parity with other currencies before Britain officially entered the Common Market on January 1, 1973. While some observers interpreted this to be a veiled threat, most felt that it was merely a restatement of a principle that had been acknowledged officially by London. Nevertheless, fears were expressed that the French might use the situation as an added excuse for postponing the summit.

In sum, the French, after having proposed the summit, found themselves disagreeing with their Community partners over several key issues. The problem for France was whether or not the other members would allow the summit to focus on economic and social issues—the main French concern—without also insisting on equal and substantive discussion with regard to strengthening Community institutions and coordinating Community approaches to relations with the United States. For the French a summit meeting would be a questionable enterprise if agreement on economic and monetary issues could

REFLECTIONS ON THE QUARTER

be achieved only by sacrificing the long-held Gaullist objective of limiting the powers of Community institutions.

Domestic considerations also motivated French equivocation on the summit. The March 1972 referendum in France on the expansion of the Community, while positive (67.9 per cent for, 32.1 per cent against), provided evidence of French apathy on European issues—39.6 per cent of the registered voters did not participate in the referendum. According to some observers, President Pompidou interpreted this apathy to mean that his more positive approach to “Europeanism” had failed to increase his domestic support. Moreover, there was growing discontent in the Gaullist ranks over what was perceived to be movement away from Gaullist ideals. This discontent focused on the “liberalism” of Premier Jacques Chaban-Delmas’ internal social policies and France’s conciliatory approach to relations within the EEC. The replacement of Chaban-Delmas by the staunch Gaullist Pierre Messmer appears to some to have been an attempt to placate Gaullist sentiment. Pompidou’s adoption of a more strident attitude in reference to summit preparations may have had the same purpose.

Among other Community members there was unanimous support for a summit. In the German case a dominant consideration was Chancellor Brandt’s desire to undercut domestic opposition charges that his *Ostpolitik* had substantially weakened the Federal Republic’s linkage to the West. A successful

summit in which Brandt played a leading role would enhance his stature on the eve of the November parliamentary elections in the Federal Republic.

French doubts, lingering into mid-September, about the “wisdom” of convening the summit on the appointed date, were largely dispelled by the Norwegian electorate’s rejection, by a 53.6 majority vote, of the proposed entry into the EEC. Whatever its negative effects, the Norwegian decision heightened the importance of convening the conference and using it to provide evidence of unity of purpose among the nine states. The leaders of the Community of Nine perceived the Norwegian vote as a warning that the Community had thus far failed to evoke widespread popular support and interest. It was suggested, throughout the summit meeting, that the image of the Community be made more attractive than that of an impersonal, bureaucratic structure, far removed from immediate concerns of European populations.

The conference itself was largely anticlimactic, as the results reflected the bargaining process that had occurred in the preparatory stages. The French secured agreement on the establishment of a European Fund for Monetary Cooperation to give the Community states a tool to intervene in intra-European short-term monetary crises, and won adoption of January 1, 1974 as the target date for beginning the second stage of economic and monetary union. Britain achieved agreement on the formation of a regional development

fund to be financed from Community reserves for the "correction of regional imbalances," which Italy and the Irish Republic found pleasing because of their substantial areas of underdevelopment. Chancellor Brandt was provided with the stage on which to display his "Europeanness" and commitment to the integration movement. He also received verbal assurances of aid from all states in the fight against inflation, while the more conservative leaders of the other states acknowledged the "justice" of his sweeping proposals for an EEC social policy that would include Community-wide collective bargaining, improved working conditions and consumer protection measures.

The Dutch had greatest cause to feel dissatisfied with the results. French agreement to a declaration to work toward enhancement of the prestige and power of the European Parliament by allowing direct election of its membership eluded them. They were forced to settle for a vague commitment to pay more attention to the European Parliament and to begin to seek ways to create a more democratic Europe.

In the external relations of the Community the summit heralded no fundamental departures from the past. While the intimate European relationship with the United States was reaffirmed, there was no commitment to a framework for a transatlantic dialogue. The heads of government of the Nine called for a common approach to GATT negotiations likely to take place in 1973. Studies were commissioned

to seek an overall policy of development cooperation on a worldwide basis. In essence, there was agreement to seek agreement, without substantive commitments by Community members.

Several issues were studiously avoided. No mention was made in summit communiqués of the Political Secretariat or of any immediate intention to institutionalize in some form the *ad hoc* foreign policy coordinating function now performed by the Davignon Committee. Abstaining from discussion of these matters represented acknowledgment that political cooperation remains beyond the capacity of the Community operating as a unified group.

Defense concerns also were taboo, a development that surprised no one, since the Community states lack institutionalized political cohesion and are fearful of precipitating a premature withdrawal both of the American troops and the extended American nuclear guarantee. As Michel Tatu wrote in *Le Monde*: "One problem the EEC Nine are unlikely to have discussed in Paris last week, if only because a mere reference to it would have been enough to topple their summit, is European defense policy."

In sum, the results of the summit, while greater than had been anticipated in some quarters, kept to the restrictive bounds the large states of the Community had agreed upon in pre-summit bargaining. The absence of discussions on defense and the minimal "lip service" paid to the political integration issue were reflections of

REFLECTIONS ON THE QUARTER

the jealous guarding of national prerogatives in these areas by the major powers, especially Great Britain and France. In a more positive vein, the substantive agreements on monetary and regional funds and the vague commitment to seek European Union by 1980 indicate a recognition by national leaders that the "marriage" of the states of the Community has become a binding reality of which each Community member must take cognizance in policy planning and implementation.

The summit results had important implications in the wider context of European-American relations. The emphasis on progress toward economic and monetary union highlighted once again the basic dilemma of the United States vis-à-vis the European integration movement. The United States continues to support the idea of integration in Europe almost as a reflex action, even though economic and monetary integration will result in increased transatlantic friction on economic issues. Any substantial weakening of the defense linkage would serve to exacerbate economic and monetary cleavages.

Directly related is the danger, certainly not decreased by the results of the Paris summit, that Europe, preoccupied with achieving monetary and economic union, may neglect defense requirements. Some form of European cooperation on defense cannot be postponed without great cost. Failure to make substantive progress in political and defense integration simultaneously with anticipated progress toward economic and monetary union may

serve to foreclose future options preserving the independence of action desired for Western Europe.

Egypt's Limited Options

IN the autumn of 1972 Egypt faced an uncertain future and limited diplomatic options. As the editor of the influential semi-official newspaper *al-Ahram* stated bluntly on September 29: "The United States is against us. The Soviet Union is not with us. Western Europe is occupied with itself. World public opinion is mobilized against us. The Arab nation is weak. . . . We are moving toward war, or even a solution, half naked. I do not believe . . . that this is an ideal position for facing an inevitable clash with danger."

Although President Sadat's announcement on July 18 of the expulsion of Soviet pilots, technicians and advisers came as a surprise, tensions between Cairo and Moscow had been building up for at least a year. Kremlin leaders were irritated by Sadat's purge of pro-Soviet groups in the military and security forces and the ruling Arab Socialist Union in May 1971. These groups had conspired to seize power in the internal struggle following President Nasser's death. The Soviets were further annoyed when Sadat agreed to unite with Libya, which was now headed by the strongly anti-communist Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi. When Sadat and Qaddafi helped to suppress a communist-connected coup in the Sudan in July, Soviet-Egyptian ties frayed again, despite the fifteen-

year treaty of friendship and co-operation signed in late May.

Sadat had signed the treaty to reassure Moscow that the internal purge had not affected Egyptian-USSR relations. But Soviet unwillingness to supply the MIG-23 fighter-bombers that Sadat felt Egypt needed in order to achieve military credibility, and Soviet preoccupation with the Indo-Pakistani conflict in the fall of 1971, just at the time Sadat hoped for a major diplomatic breakthrough, forced him to question his reliance on Soviet support and good offices. By the spring of 1972 the Soviet Union had clearly given priority to a relaxation of tension with the United States over all-out support for Egypt.

Influential groups within Egypt articulated the opposition to the Soviet presence which had produced no compensatory pay-off. Military officers felt hostile to overbearing Soviet advisers who derided the army's inefficiency. They also resented the extraterritorialization of the airfields and ports under Soviet control, a sharp reminder of the old days of British imperialism. High-level officials in the Foreign Ministry began to speak out against the no-war, no-peace deadlock. They noted that so long as the Soviet Union was unwilling to work actively on Egypt's behalf and to convince the United States to join in imposing a peace settlement on the region, the Soviet presence had little strategic value. Leading diplomats expressed their concern at a symposium held by *al-Ahram* in the spring, and its influential editor, Muhammad Hasa-

nayn Haykal, also spoke out against the diplomatic "stranglehold." By June he openly criticized the Soviet Union for its direct influence, along with the United States and Israel, in maintaining the status quo.

Opposition from these groups crystallized after the Moscow summit conference in May. Although Sadat made token gestures against the dissidents, he seems to have encouraged their moves. His trip to Moscow in April had failed to wring military or diplomatic concessions from the Soviet leaders. A peremptory Soviet message on July 7, requesting the removal of Minister of War Muhammad Ahmad Sadiq and *al-Ahram* editor Haykal without promising any qualitative change in weaponry, marked the breaking point. Faced with a virtual ultimatum, Sadat rapidly carried out his decision to reduce the Soviet presence.

Once the Soviet personnel had been expelled, Egyptian leaders confronted difficult problems. Egypt's military credibility was undercut and any possibility of exerting military pressure on Israel was removed. However, Egyptian technicians could man the SAM-3 missiles, as they had been doing along the Suez Canal since late 1970, and the government could assume that Israel would be deterred from striking Egypt's interior by the possibility of Soviet pilots returning in force.

The diplomatic option was also uncertain, at least in the short run. Soviet leaders, smarting from the precipitant withdrawal, might abandon supportive efforts and try to fashion a counterweight in Sy-

REFLECTIONS ON THE QUARTER

ria and Iraq, where they had extensive military and economic ties. The United States could not be expected to take any initiative until after the Presidential election. The only possibilities appeared to lie in Western Europe and in the UN General Assembly, which would reconvene in mid-September. Egypt had restored relations with the German Federal Republic in June, and had been quietly cultivating economic ties with Bonn, Paris and London. These ties might induce the governments to express support for Egypt at the UN or try to influence the United States.

Any such plans were torpedoed by the Black September carnage at Munich on September 5. Israel asserted that it must root out terrorism before it could consider negotiations, and underlined this assertion by air strikes against Lebanon and Syria on September 8-9, a land invasion of Lebanon in the next week, and further air strikes in October. At the UN, Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban emphasized that terrorism raised "a new and massive barrier to peace" and explicitly blamed the Arab governments of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Libya for harboring and assisting terrorists.

Recriminations between Egypt and West Germany over responsibility for the deaths at Munich soured relations. Bonn's crackdown on Arab residents led to threats of retaliation against German interests in the Arab world and to student demonstrations in several Arab capitals. In any case, Western Europe was preoccupied by discus-

sions arising from the expansion of the Common Market.

The General Assembly session was dominated by the issue of international terrorism. U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers submitted a draft convention to the UN which sought to impose sanctions against countries that do not punish or extradite hijackers or saboteurs of civil aircraft, and pressed for rapid action on it.

The United States vetoed a Security Council resolution that called for the cessation of hostilities, following the first Israeli air raids, on the grounds that the resolution should also condemn the prior act of terrorism at Munich. The veto appeared to seal the U.S.-Israeli alliance and support the Israeli policy of retaliatory raids. However, further air raids in mid-October prompted critical reactions from the U.S. government; Washington felt that Lebanon was already trying to curb *fedayeen* activities and doubted that such raids would deter individual letter-bombers or small bands of hijackers.

The Israeli raids underlined the Arabs' military weakness and reaffirmed their dependence on Soviet arms. A four-day airlift of military supplies from the USSR to Syria confirmed the Arabs' plight, and the Syrian President accelerated his efforts to mend the Soviet-Egyptian breach.

By late September, Egypt's options had been sharply limited. Despite the unfavorable outlook, Sadat sent Foreign Minister Muhammad Hassan al-Zayyat to Western Europe and the UN for high-level

consultations. Haykal also conferred with European leaders, and a seasoned diplomat who had criticized the Soviet presence was nominated ambassador to Bonn. The government even appealed to India and Yugoslavia for diplomatic support and military equipment, recalling the nonaligned bloc sentiment of the mid-1950's.

Sadat tried to curb the *fedayeen* by proposing a Palestine government-in-exile which would affirm the Palestinians' national existence but would discipline splinter terrorist groups and operate under his moderating influence in Cairo. Meanwhile, Egyptian and Lebanese intelligence services tracked down terrorist cells in order to abort further plots designed to sabotage Arab diplomatic efforts. The *fedayeen* rejected Sadat's proposal, but rapidly disintegrated under military pressure from Israel and political pressure from Lebanon and Syria. Units of the main force, Fatah, clashed with each other after they were pushed out of the Lebanon-Israel border region. Members of the Marxist Popular Front fled from Lebanon to South Yemen, ostensibly to support the regime against North Yemen.

The disintegration did not, however, stop the random terrorism. Letter-bombs to Israeli leaders from Malaysia appeared to be answered by package-bombs to Fatah spokesmen, mailed in Yugoslavia. At the end of October, two hijackers armed with grenades won the release of the three terrorists held in Munich; they were welcomed in Libya, to Israel's intense anger and Sadat's embarrassment.

In public, Sadat continued to reject either direct negotiations with Israel or an interim settlement, arguing that the former would mean capitulation and the latter would freeze the situation at an unacceptable point. However, he himself had proposed such an interim agreement in February 1971, and had welcomed the positive American response at that time.

Strong internal pressures operated on him to break the status quo: the Soviets had been rejected in the end for failing to break the stalemate, and Sadat himself might be overthrown if no diplomatic moves improved the Egyptian situation. He received support from political leaders and the Foreign Ministry for a cautious rapprochement with the Soviet Union, following the trip of Prime Minister 'Aziz Sidqi to Moscow on October 16. When General Sadiq opposed such a reconciliation on the grounds that the USSR would still refuse to provide advanced weapons, he was replaced as Minister of War by General Ahmad Isma'il, the former Intelligence Chief, who had accompanied Sidqi to Moscow. Sadiq may also have been the scapegoat for popular discontent which surfaced in late September and October, largely as a result of the military's frustration at being unable to help Lebanon and Syria ward off the Israeli raids.

Even the restoration of a measure of Soviet military support could not provide Egypt with military credibility vis-à-vis Israel, and therefore the reconciliation with Moscow appeared aimed at improving Egypt's diplomatic lever-

REFLECTIONS ON THE QUARTER

age rather than facilitating military action. Such leverage might persuade the United States to reactivate its diplomatic efforts, in the expectation that Israel would be reassured by the diminished Soviet role and military threat.

At the UN in September, Secretary of State Rogers had reiterated American support for an interim solution: "... in our view the most promising first step would be proximity talks leading to an interim Suez Canal agreement. This would separate the combatants, restore to Egypt operation of and authority over the Suez Canal, involve some Israeli withdrawal, preserve the ceasefire, and provide momentum for further efforts toward an over-all settlement."

A concerted U.S. effort could not begin until midwinter, after the Presidential election and after strenuous efforts had been made to curb acts of international terrorism. An interim agreement would relieve internal pressure on Sadat and would represent a tangible step toward a constructive settlement of one part of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It would signify neither capitulation nor adventurist self-destruction for Egypt, and would therefore be the one constructive action that Sadat could take. It would not weaken Israel's security, but it would break the destructive cycle of action and reaction in which Egypt and Israel were locked.

Asian Summitry

SUMMITRY has become a major feature of international politics since President Nixon's visits

to Peking and Moscow in the first half of 1972. These talks, the subsequent agreements and a relaxation of tensions have clearly influenced recent events in Asia, such as the increase of contacts between North and South Korea; a Chinese-Japanese rapprochement and steps toward normalization of diplomatic relations; and a concerted effort to achieve a settlement of the Indochina war.

The Korean "thaw" probably began as early as August 15, 1970 when South Korean President Park Chung Hee proposed peaceful competition between North and South. In turn there were indications during late 1970 and early 1971 that North Korean Premier Kim Il-sung had ordered a substantial reduction in guerrilla raids and incidents against the South, reversing a North Korean policy that had been in effect since 1966. There is also evidence that in the spring of 1971 UN Secretary General U Thant acted as an intermediary between North and South Korean Red Cross officials in Geneva. On April 12 North Korean Foreign Minister Ho Tam announced Pyongyang's willingness to discuss peaceful reunification with Seoul, and on April 15 President Park elaborated on his earlier offer and implicitly alluded to Ho Tam's proposals. A month later formal talks between the two Koreas were initiated under Red Cross auspices.

Since then there have been twenty-five preliminary, open sessions and sixteen closed, working-level sessions of the Red Cross talks. In May 1972 high-level visits were exchanged between Pyong-

yang and Seoul. On July 4 a joint Korean communiqué stated that both sides had reached full agreement on (1) peaceful reunification through "independent" Korean efforts, and (2) an easing of tensions between the two countries by restricting propaganda directed against each other, avoiding armed provocations, continuing to cooperate with the Red Cross, installing a direct telephone line between Seoul and Pyongyang, and establishing and operating a joint North-South "coordinating committee." On November 4, the two Koreas agreed to organize joint political, economic and cultural exchanges and to end propaganda broadcasts. Thus a Korean *détente* of limited scope is unfolding.

An important related set of developments began on October 17 when President Park placed South Korea under martial law, dissolved the National Assembly, suspended all political party activity, imposed press censorship and closed the universities. Park announced that he took these measures in order to revise the South Korean Constitution so that he could pursue more effectively the dialogue with North Korea. However, it is also clear that Park has moved to ensure an extension of his own tenure past this current term and may attempt to remain in power at least another twelve years. On October 27 the South Korean government made public the proposed constitutional amendments for which it sought support in the national referendum scheduled for November 21. On that date more than 94 per cent of the nation's

voters approved the amendments, the effect of which is to alter the South Korean system from its current mixed democratic and authoritarian style to a potentially more authoritarian system.

A second major summit event was Premier Kakuei Tanaka's visit to Peking in late September, highlighting the Japanese-Chinese rapprochement. Tanaka's journey was preceded by his two-day meeting in Hawaii with President Nixon on August 31 and September 1, and his preliminary discussions, two weeks earlier, with Dr. Kissinger, at which time he had outlined his government's proposals for restoring official relations with Peking. Tanaka appears to have received U.S. support for his proposed action. At the same time, the United States suggested that Japan take action to rectify, at least in part, the trade imbalance between the two countries. With agreement in principle on both sides, officials drafted a joint communiqué for Nixon and Tanaka to issue at Hawaii.

When they met, the two leaders still had to iron out the details of the two basic issues: (1) What specific measures would Japan take to reduce the huge trade surplus she enjoys with the United States, which may exceed \$3.8 billion in 1972? (2) Given Japan's decision to normalize relations with China, what would be the implications of this action for U.S. and Japanese relations with other important countries in the Pacific? It was essential for Japan and the United States, as close allies, to be in the fullest possible accord on the major

REFLECTIONS ON THE QUARTER

diplomatic issues before them. These included Tokyo's future policies toward Taipei as well as Peking, Japan's role in the postwar rehabilitation of Indochina and other parts of Southeast Asia, Tokyo-Moscow relations, and Japan's view of the emerging Korean *détente*. Of these, the ramifications of a switch in Japan's diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Peking were the most critical matter for discussion.

In the joint communiqué issued at the end of the talks on September 1 in Honolulu, (1) the Japanese agreed to take short-term measures to reduce the U.S. trade deficit by buying during the next six months about 1.1 billion dollars worth of American agricultural and fishery products, together with helicopters and uranium enrichment services, and to enter into more joint research projects, and (2) Japan and the United States agreed in general on their respective roles in Pacific affairs. The communiqué also referred to the continuation of close ties between the United States and Japan and expressed support for their respective summit meetings in Peking as contributing to the "relaxation of tension in Asia." However, significantly omitted was the matter of the defense of Taiwan, which had been a central point of the Nixon-Sato communiqué in 1969. The Tanaka Government obviously did not want to be restricted in its diplomatic maneuvering with Peking by a prior public mention of Taipei.

Japan and the United States have, at least for the time being,

resolved some of the problems that grew out of the U.S. decision to seek improved relations with Communist China. The new Japanese government is adopting policies based on an assertion of greater independence in a less bipolar world.

The Peking meetings between Tanaka and Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung at the end of September ushered in a new era in Sino-Japanese relations. The turnabout in Tokyo's China policy, which in part represents a response by the Tanaka Government to Japanese public opinion, is generally believed to be the design of Tanaka's Foreign Minister, Masayoshi Ohira. Ohira has long advocated the opening of relations with Peking—largely on China's terms. One of Tanaka's first acts in Peking was to offer apologies to the Chinese on behalf of his country for the devastation Imperial Japan had inflicted on China in the 1930's and 1940's. In response, China withdrew its demand for war indemnities from Japan. Following five days of far-ranging discussions, the two Asian leaders signed an agreement to establish formal diplomatic ties between their countries.

The final communiqué issued in Peking on September 29 reaffirmed China's and Japan's traditional friendship and pledged them to a full normalization of relations and to pursuit of "peaceful coexistence." Both countries agreed to hold negotiations on a "treaty of peace and friendship." Most importantly, Japan stated that she "proceeds from the stand of fully understanding" China's three tra-

ditional preconditions for the restoration of diplomatic relations, namely, that the regime in Peking be recognized as the "sole legal" government of China, that Taiwan be recognized as an "inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China," and that the peace treaty between Japan and the Republic of China, signed in 1952, cease to exist.

Although both the Tanaka Government and the Nixon Administration wanted to preserve Japan's relations with the Chinese Nationalist government on Taiwan, Taipei immediately reacted to the Peking communiqué by severing formal diplomatic relations with Tokyo and calling the Peking accord a "perfidious action" in "total disregard of [Japan's] treaty obligations." Those Chinese who fled to Taiwan in the late 1940's are upset at the reversal in Japan's policies; they point out that, if it had not been for the Japanese invasion of China and Japan's atrocities, the communists would not have won the civil war. Thus, in the face of great-power realignments, Taiwan is gradually becoming isolated diplomatically, even though its trade and cultural ties with both Japan and the United States are substantial. Taiwan and Japan have already taken steps to

open informal channels by which to maintain their economic and trade relations, and their preferential tariffs and import quotas will be continued. A Far East Trade Center, which opened in Tokyo last April, is expected to assume the function of the Nationalist Chinese embassy and consulates.

Historically, shifts in alignment among major powers have led to a reassessment of relationships among lesser states. It has proven difficult, and often impossible, to sustain alliance systems whenever the principal member moved toward a *détente*, or entente, with the power against which the alliance was originally aimed. This raises a problem for the United States in the 1970's. The Nixon Doctrine provides for the strengthening of U.S. partnerships with allies while the United States engages in negotiations with adversaries. Washington's rapprochement with Communist China has created problems for American relations with such allies as the Republic of China on Taiwan and Japan. Thus, in its diplomacy the United States faces the challenge of reconciling alliance "partnerships" with adversary "negotiations" in a complex world of convergent and divergent U.S. interests.

BRAZIL'S FUTURE WORLD ROLE*

by Lincoln Gordon

A USEFUL starting point in considering Brazil's possible international role in the 1970's is a *New York Times* opposite-editorial-page column on May 5, 1972 by Anthony Eden, Lord Avon, entitled "Getting the Free World Together." In recommending a new organization of what he called "leading nations" of the Free World to discuss and deal with worldwide political problems, Eden said that it might be invidious to set forth a membership list for this club, but some countries "nominate themselves: four western European powers [which he did not name, but presumably they are Britain, Germany, France and Italy], the United States and Canada, Brazil, Japan, and Australia."

Without attributing special prescience to Anthony Eden as a sage of global policy, one is struck by his inclusion of Brazil in this short list in 1972. In 1962, or even 1967, he almost certainly would not have done so. All the other countries named are members of the OECD, sometimes known as the "rich men's club." In economic terms Italy is the poorest of the others, with per capita GNP of about \$1,450 — Brazil's is \$400, less than one-third of Italy's and less than one-tenth of our own.

Why does Brazil figure in such a list? Mainly because of the vigorous economic thrust of the last eight years, and especially the last five, combined with apparent political stability (even if that stability reflects some unpleasant aspects). Together these factors appear to provide enough weight so that Brazil's 100 million people count for something on the world stage. Eden may also have been impressed by the energy of Brazil's diplomacy at the United Nations, including its early leadership at UNCTAD and its strong voice in preparations for the 1972 environmental meeting at Stockholm. Within the last two years Brazil has emerged as the largest single client of the World Bank. It appears to have the will and unquestionably has the basic capacity to make that important change in status summarized in the phrase "getting out of the Third World and into the First."

*Ambassador Gordon delivered the opening address at the Foreign Policy Research Institute Conference on Brazil's International Role in the 1970's, held in New York in May 1972. This article has been adapted from his address.

As a basis for speculating about Brazil's possible international role through this decade, it is essential to make some analysis and some prognosis concerning both the political regime and the economic outlook.

THE BRAZILIAN POLITICAL REGIME

Brazil's political regime is manifestly authoritarian and military-dominated. Yet it does not fit readily into conventional categories. Compared with Peru's, for example, the administration is far more civilian, with only one active-duty officer in the cabinet except for the Service Ministers. It is true that three others are what the Brazilians call "amphibians," meaning former officers who have resigned their commissions and assumed civilian status, but that is an old story in Brazil and such men lack the typical military cast of mind. Above all, the regime is not a personal military dictatorship in the older Latin American military mode.¹

Samuel Huntington, a leading political scientist concerned with political regimes in developing countries, said in a discussion of this issue in the summer of 1971 that the Brazilian regime did not possess and could not achieve legitimacy because it was based neither on freely given popular consent, nor on charismatic personal leadership, nor on revolutionary ideology, nor on a successful development ideology.² I am not persuaded that the concept of legitimacy has as much objective content as Huntington would like us to believe. That general question aside, however, Brazil has a remarkable way of confounding analysts and prophets. As the economic boom continues into its fifth successive year and is coupled with nationalist pride in certain specific policies, Huntington's claim that military leadership is incapable of achieving broad-based developmental success seems increasingly disputable. In the matter of popular support, some shrewd observers of the Brazilian scene, both native and foreign, contend that President Médici today has acquired a mass following not unlike that of Dwight Eisenhower in this country in the 1950's. That is not precisely charismatic leadership, but rather fondness for a father-figure, enormously enhanced in the Brazilian case by the President's identification with soccer football.

In any event, however it may be characterized, the regime gives every appearance of being firmly entrenched. There is still

¹Fidel Castro is perhaps the closest contemporary parallel.

²Unpublished discussion paper for the Overseas Development Council.

BRAZIL'S FUTURE WORLD ROLE

sporadic urban guerrilla opposition, but it has not been a serious threat at any time since 1964 and today is quite limited in comparison with three years ago when U.S. Ambassador Elbrick was kidnapped. The rural guerrilla opposition scarcely deserves mention. As to nonviolent political opposition, there is a good deal which is overt and more that is latent. It is widely believed, for example, that if there were free popular elections for the state governors two years hence, the opposition *Movimento Democrático Brasileiro* (MDB) party would certainly win Guanabara and Rio Grande do Sul, possibly also Minas Gerais, Goiás, Rio Grande do Norte and the State of Rio, and maybe even São Paulo. The regime would regard such an outcome as a dangerous regression into the evil politics of 1945-1964. That is why it secured from the Congress this spring a constitutional amendment shifting the 1974 gubernatorial elections to the legislative assemblies dominated by the pro-government *Aliança Renovadora Nacional* (ARENA).

Nor is it at all clear that the bulk of the MDB favors a restoration of the *status quo ante* of the early 1960's. They would like broader political participation, a degree of redemocratization, and especially greater opportunity for office for themselves. But they have not the capacity, and probably in the mass not the desire, to overthrow the regime either by forceful attack or by the kind of passive resistance with which the Peronistas have toppled a number of military governments in Argentina.

At the same time, the regime should not be viewed as frozen in the present patterns. Evolution toward greater respect for individual human rights is called for, and there seems to have been a slight movement in this direction since 1969. We could wish for its acceleration. That is not the same, however, as broader participation in the selection of rulers or the determination of governmental policy. On that front nothing points to early restoration of genuine political party competition or democratic government as we know it in North America, Western Europe, Japan, and the southern Dominions. Short of this, there could be greater effort than heretofore toward institutionalized linkages between government and other important organized groups in the society, functional and regional. But this is a slow process in contemporary Brazil, and as yet no clearly marked directions for such political evolution are apparent.

What about the problem of succession and the possibility of a major split within the military officer group? Three years ago

there was a cleavage between the "Sorbonne" group which had controlled the reins of power under Castello Branco and the "nationalists" led by Albuquerque Lima. But on this sort of issue appraisal at a great distance is shaky. The impression gathered is that the continuing success of the government's economic policies has taken most of the stuffing out of the nationalist group, an important fraction of which has been co-opted by Médici. He himself was not sharply identified with either group and probably owes his office to that fact.

That the prospects for political stability depend heavily on continued economic success is recognized. It was the danger of interfering with that success that President Médici cited explicitly as the reason for eliminating the popular election of state governors in 1974.

THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

The informed American public is becoming increasingly familiar with the almost-five-year-old sustained boom which is now often referred to as the Brazilian economic miracle. There is only limited truth in Finance Minister Delfim Netto's witticism to the effect that the Japanese economic miracle was attributable to American occupation reforms and Japan's highly disciplined and educated labor force, and the German economic miracle to a national phobia about inflation and the great opportunities afforded by the European Common Market, whereas in Brazil's case it is just a miracle — *é milagre mesmo!*

Let us pass in review the salient facts. Since 1968, Gross National Product has been rising in real terms at 8.5 to 11 per cent per year. Preliminary indications for most of 1972 show no faltering in this rate. With population expanding at about 2.5 per cent a year, this means a per capita annual increase of 6 to 8 per cent, enough to double average incomes in a decade. In terms of 1968 dollars, per capita incomes have risen from \$305 in 1964 to about \$420 today, and could reach over \$700 if the boom is sustained through the 1970's.

Inflation has been reduced from over 80 per cent in 1963 and 1964 to the range of 20-25 per cent per year. This is still far too high, but it has proven manageable within the ingenious institutional arrangements devised to cope with it. On this front, 1971 did not show improvement from 1970, and President Médici has instructed his economic team to attack the inflationary problem with more vigor. The new agricultural policies are aimed

BRAZIL'S FUTURE WORLD ROLE

partly at this problem, as well as at the broader issues of low productivity and severe disparities between rural and urban living standards.

Since 1968, after several years of reduction, real wages have risen by 2 to 3 per cent a year. Although unemployment statistics are poor in Brazil, it looks as though job creation during the past five years has kept pace with the expansion of the labor force or somewhat exceeded it. Back in 1963, the national budget deficit amounted to over half of the total revenues, and was financed by massive currency emissions and borrowing from the official banks. That deficit was the great engine of classic monetary inflation. Today the budget deficit is less than 4 per cent of revenues and is easily financed through genuine borrowings from the public.

Exports rose from \$1.4 billion in 1963 to \$2.9 billion in 1971 and a current annual rate of over \$3.5 billion. Coffee accounted for less than 30 per cent of this total, while minerals and manufactured goods are rapidly increasing their share. Official gold and foreign exchange reserves rose from \$219 million at the end of 1963 to \$1,746 million at the end of 1971 and \$2,038 million by April 30, 1972, by far the highest figures in Brazilian history.

Notwithstanding Finance Minister Delfim's modesty, these economic achievements, which rival or surpass any others in the developing world, are attributable, not to Divine Providence or mere good fortune, but to the integrated series of economic policies originated by Roberto Campos and Octavio Bulhões in 1964-1967 and amplified with singular skill by Delfim himself during the past five years. They include macro-economic policies dealing with fiscal, monetary, price, wage, foreign trade and foreign exchange factors; micro-economic policies applied to specific industries and projects; and institutional reform in key sectors such as the banking system, housing finance, the capital market, the machinery of public administration and tax collections, and more recently in vital social sectors such as secondary and adult education. A flexible fiscal policy has been especially noteworthy, and might well be envied by economic policymakers in the United States.

The confidence inspired in the World Bank by these policies is reflected in Brazil's emergence as the bank's largest borrower. Similar confidence has been shown by a host of foreign private investors, not only American, but Japanese and European as well. It is sometimes mistakenly thought in business circles that Brazil is now a kind of "happy hunting ground" for rapid pay-out in-

vestment projects. There is also Osvaldo Sunkel's interpretation³ that the Brazilian leadership has

accepted *dependencia* and marginalization as inevitable and necessary ingredients of the process of development and modernization. An increasing share of the ownership and control of national resources and activities is being turned over to foreign firms and the government apparatus is being put at their disposal. . . . This development could perhaps best be described as Dependent State Capitalism.

I believe both interpretations to be quite wrong. Although Brazil has rejected the kind of formal and rigid foreign investment policy laid down in the Andean Code, joint ventures — in many cases with predominantly Brazilian private or public ownership — are encouraged in the more important industrial sectors; local credit facilities are reserved primarily for Brazilian borrowers; and the foreign investor seeking a “quick cruzeiro” is likely to find himself disappointed. The continuing boom and the strong record of the foreign investors in generating exports have meanwhile greatly reduced the outcry of a few years back against “denationalization takeovers.”

There are, of course, formidable continuing economic problems in Brazil. The poverty of the northeast is probably the worst. While the tax incentive schemes and differential public investments are now moving capital from south to north in considerable volume (in dramatic contrast to the effects of the Kubitschek policies), and social services have been somewhat improved, little has yet been done to reform the inefficient sugar estates or to relieve population pressure on the miserably poor *agreste*. Nor is it easy to take seriously the notion that the trans-Amazonian highway will contribute much to relieving population pressure in the northeast.

Second only to this regional economic cancer is the more general problem of uneven income distribution. World Bank President McNamara, in his speech at the opening of UNCTAD III in Santiago last April (1972), cited Brazil and Mexico by name as countries where income disparities were becoming greater rather than smaller, and a statistical study based on census samples in 1960 and 1970 seems to bear out this conclusion. On the other hand, President Médici and the economic team are showing increasing concern with this issue and will almost certainly respond to it if the overall rate of growth can be sustained.

³Osvaldo Sunkel, “Big Business and ‘Dependência’: A Latin American View,” *Foreign Affairs*, April 1972, pp. 517-531.

BRAZIL'S FUTURE WORLD ROLE

How durable, then, is the economic boom? On the statistics, it has already gone farther than the savings and investment rates would justify, but those magnitudes may well be understated. The government does not expect to sustain 10 or 11 per cent annually, and would be content with 8 per cent. Two possible blocks to its continuation are: (1) strangulation of external markets, which might curtail the export boom in manufactured goods and minerals, the leading sectors in the last five years, and (2) curtailment of effective internal demand because of a failure to bring sufficient numbers of additional workers and peasants into the middle classes.

An external collapse would have the added feature of making Brazil's middle-term debt service charges an excessively high proportion of current export earnings. To this extent, Sunkel's allegation of conscious *dependencia* contains a grain of truth, but it is the kind of interdependence to which all the OECD countries are becoming increasingly accustomed, and is a necessary consequence of "getting into the First World." A massive resurgence of protectionism in the industrialized country markets or in the rest of Latin America could do grave damage to the Brazilian economy, and it cannot be ruled out, but the chances are good that it can be avoided. The stakes of the OECD countries in its avoidance are evidently high.

On the domestic side, if one accepts the neo-Marxist interpretation of the Brazilian regime as an upper-class reaction, the danger of insufficient domestic demand has to be taken seriously. In my own view, however, the regime at no time since 1964 has been the creature of an economic oligarchy. In its early years the tension between Roberto Campos and leading São Paulo industrialists was notorious. Delfim, perhaps because of his Paulista background, deals with them more effectively than the former divinity student from Mato Grosso, but he is certainly not putty in their hands.

BRAZIL'S INTERNATIONAL ROLE

Whether or not Brazil is a natural candidate for a new organization of "leading nations" of the "Free World," as in Anthony Eden's assessment, what kind of role can be envisaged for her on the international stage as the decade progresses?

In a highly publicized speech to the Higher War College in Rio in 1971, President Médici sketched out the concept of Brazil's international role in a series of concentric circles: first considered

were her neighbors in South America and Latin America as a whole; then the Western Hemisphere, including the United States and Canada; then a pair of somewhat divergent alternatives, "Western World" or "Christian World" or "Free World," on the one hand, and the less developed countries as a group on the other; and finally the global world community. This analysis suggests that Brazil wants to be a leader in Latin America, but not a leader of Latin America against the United States or other outsiders; and likewise that Brazil wants to be a leader among less developed countries, but not in a kind of politico-economic warfare against the Free World industrialized countries represented by the OECD. Clearly, however, there is some choosing required between Latin American leadership and a special relationship with the United States, and some choosing between LDC leadership (as at Stockholm) and possibly knocking on the door of the OECD as the first ex-LDC to claim entry.

The desire to keep the latter option open is evident in statements of Brazil's thoughtful Ambassador to Washington, João Augusto de Araújo Castro, for example in his speech entitled "The Freezing of Power," which was reprinted in English in our *Congressional Record* in the fall of 1971.⁴ There is a clear consistency in Brazil's opposition to formal division of the world into first- and second-class powers. Her objection to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty reflected hostility as a matter of principle to the notion of a permanently frozen "nuclear club," in my opinion, more than any desire to acquire nuclear weapons. I would not expect Brazil to seek nuclear armament unless Argentina moves in that direction. A secondary aspect of her nuclear policy is the desire to keep the way open to peaceful uses of atomic energy in any form, from underground mining to river diversion to nuclear-fission breeder power plants. In all likelihood, only the third of these uses will turn out to be a practical proposition.

The same kind of issue arises in Brazil's attitude toward worldwide trade and monetary reform. She can be depended on to combat in every available forum — UN, IMF, GATT, and anywhere else — the monopolization of the role of reformers by the Group of Ten or the OECD.

What of the idea, given some currency by the New Left in Latin America (and supposedly confirmed by the Médici visit to Washington in December 1971), of Brazil as a sort of "American viceroy" in South America or all of Latin America? It is hard to

⁴*Congressional Record*, November 1, 1971, p. E-11593.

BRAZIL'S FUTURE WORLD ROLE

conceive of the United States entrusting to Brazil the management of our interests in Latin America or of Brazil showing any disposition to accept the charge if we offered it. At the other extreme, Brazil would be most reluctant to become the spokesman for systematic anti-Americanism in Latin America. Her national inferiority complex virtually disappeared half a century ago, and any vestiges are rapidly evaporating in the warmth of the economic miracle. For this reason, she is unlikely to adhere to a least-common-denominator approach in dealings with American governmental or private interests of the type reflected, for example, in the Andean investment code.

The Brazilians are confident in their capacity to make American-based multinational companies conform to Brazilian developmental interests. Contrary to the Sunkel thesis, they consider alliance with these companies — generally with the companies in a minority position — to be a guaranty of continuous flows of technology and the best possible safeguard of world market access. They see a strong international reserve position giving them more genuine independence than Chile's post-nationalization experience of lowered copper production and frustrating — even humiliating — periodic negotiations with foreign creditors.

Perhaps the closest approach to the United States viceroy idea was a brief flirtation with the concept of "ideological frontiers" at the time of the Dominican intervention in 1965. A number of Brazilian officers were keen to perpetuate an Inter-American Defense Force for this purpose, and mistakenly believed (perhaps with encouragement from some middle-level American military officers) that the United States endorsed the idea. When it became clear in 1966 that we considered it utterly unviable, it rapidly faded away, and to the best of my knowledge has not reappeared.

Without being in any sense an American viceroy, however, Brazil seems bound in her own interest to construct a *de facto* sphere of influence with the smaller nations on her more settled frontiers, namely, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay. To some extent this has long been the case as regards Bolivia and Paraguay, partly because of their respective quarrels with Chile and Argentina. The signs point to increasing economic interdependence of these smaller countries with Brazil, in some ways analogous to the American relationship with Canada and Mexico. Unless unexpectedly large offshore reserves are discovered, Brazil will be

especially interested in a reliable source of oil imports. On the political side, even closer to the Northern Hemisphere parallel, it is conceivable that Brazil would be unwilling to tolerate actively hostile regimes in any of the three countries. This does not mean that the Brazilians would send their troops across the frontiers, but they may take pains to cultivate friends in the armed forces of those neighbors.

Venezuela, the Guianas, Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia are also neighbors, but they border on remote and wild frontiers, far from the Brazilian population centers, and therefore offer slight threat of subversion. While in earlier years there were indications of Brazilian concern about the possibility of an actively hostile Guyana, this was never a serious issue. Argentina, of course, presents an entirely different situation. It is Brazil's large traditional rival, accounting for the concentration of army units in southern Brazil. In spite of regime fluctuations in both countries, however, relationships have been quite friendly all through the postwar period. Military and civilian governments alike have discovered cooperative coexistence to be much easier than might have been suggested by early-twentieth-century doctrines of an inherent Argentine-Brazilian rivalry.

On the broader world stage, I suggested earlier that there might be some potential tension between the role of Third World leadership and the idea of joining the First World. Brazilian nationalism, which is a powerful undercurrent in public sentiment, could work in either direction. As the World War II generation of senior officers departs the stage (and the calendar makes that an early prospect), the presumption of automatic harmony between Brazilian and American interests in the world will win fewer adherents unless it is based on a present and future community of interest more substantial than mere memories of wartime camaraderie in Italy. The 200-mile ocean jurisdiction claim is a portent of things to come. If Brazilian nationalism comes to take the form of systematic anti-Americanism, a large potential for sheer nuisance value might be exploited, in the manner so skillfully displayed by General de Gaulle both during the war and after his return to power in 1958.

Could Brazil become a form of bridge between the First and Third Worlds? This is a tempting conception, which might have real appeal to Brazilian leadership. It should not be confused with the "viceroy" idea, which is unidirectional; a bridge would seek to mediate in both directions between rich and poor nations. The

BRAZIL'S FUTURE WORLD ROLE

concept needs more elaboration. Quite possibly it might evaporate in the light of close analysis.

If Brazil must choose between Third World leadership and First World entry, I believe American interests would be much better served by the latter than by the former. Here much depends on one's global philosophy of international relations. One popular conception today is that international politics consists essentially of a dynamic equilibrium among five power centers, with fluid alliances directed against any one of the five that threatens to become dangerously aggressive. In this model, the rest of the world figures only as a battleground on which interests of the five may be engaged, and is to be taken seriously only as it represents potential theaters of confrontation between two or more of the five. According to this view, Latin America, including Brazil, is of no consequence now or for the visible future.

I see a much more complex system, in which there are long-term secular forces of growing technological and economic interdependence, and in which economic, attitudinal and non-military political relations are major components of foreign policy along with raw military power and physical security. In this view, Latin America has substantial importance today and that importance will grow. Trends in raw materials resources of the kind being studied by the National Commission on Materials Policy are one significant element — but only one — in the overall picture. Without endorsing the now-famous phrase, "as Brazil goes, so goes the rest of Latin America," I believe we should search diligently for ways of facilitating Brazilian entry into the First World, both in the continued effectiveness of her own economic development and in institutional adjustments.

Does it make sense, for example, for Greece and Turkey and Portugal to be members of the OECD but not Brazil? True, the Mediterranean nations are there as a historical legacy from the Marshall Plan, but Spanish membership, and now Australian, have no Marshall Plan antecedents. The OECD is simply one symbol of many possible institutional adjustments.

The worst error we could make would be to take Brazil's like-mindedness and cooperation for granted. It is worth seeking. We should lose no time in learning to listen to Brazilian ideas with respect. We should meet with Brazilians on equal terms and solicit their active participation in the kind of co-leadership an increasingly consequential upper-middle nation-state can legitimately expect in a world of multipolarity and growing dispersion of power.

ENDING THE VIET NAM CONFLICT: EXPECTATIONS IN HANOI AND SAIGON*

by Allan E. Goodman

THE October 1972 proposal for peace in Viet Nam, arrived at between representatives of the United States and North Viet Nam, would not end that war along any of the lines suggested in the intense public and private debate of the past several years.¹ Rather, it would end the war much as Saigon and Hanoi expected, reversing Dr. Henry Kissinger's dictum that a "ceasefire is not so much a step toward a final settlement as a form of it."² The ceasefire would permit the United States to exit from the conflict. The level of violence would be scaled down, but as Saigon and Hanoi anticipated, a political settlement and peace are by no means certain. This is so largely because the cease-fire proposal commits neither government to resolve the conflict over power in the South. The proposal is premised, in fact, on the recognition that a political settlement could not be prescribed by international diplomacy or American intervention. So, while the large-unit fighting and air war would end, the political struggle would intensify.

Surprisingly, there has been little official or informed discussion of what Saigon and Hanoi have been consistently saying for nearly a decade about the consequences of a cease-fire. Yet, as this analysis is intended to reveal, both sides have accurately anticipated the conditions under which the war would end as these are now specified in the October proposal. What each side expected would happen, did happen. But more important, the future each side expected is coming to pass.

*This article, completed on November 6, 1972, discusses the proposal made public by Hanoi on October 26. It does so by exploring the consequences expected by Saigon and Hanoi as each approaches the point at which the Viet Nam war will be transformed into a political struggle. The author is grateful to Ithiel de Sola Pool for suggesting a much-needed sense of perspective in interpreting the significance of public pronouncements of communist regimes.

¹See, for example, Robert S. Woito, editor, *Vietnam Peace Proposals* (San Francisco: World Without War Council, 1967); H. Field Haviland, Jr., *et al.*, *Vietnam After the War: Peacekeeping and Rehabilitation* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1968); Douglas Pike, *War, Peace and the Viet Cong* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1969); and Stanley Hoffmann, "Vietnam: An Algerian Solution?," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1971, pp. 3-37.

²Henry A. Kissinger, "The Viet Nam Negotiations," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1969, p. 227.

ENDING THE VIET NAM CONFLICT

COMMUNIST AND NONCOMMUNIST EXPECTATIONS

The most striking feature of current communist and non-communist assessments is that neither views the end of the war as coterminous with its domination of the South or with peace. The prospect of political struggle, from either a communist or a non-communist perspective, is the most likely feature of the period ahead. At present, Saigon is considerably less well prepared for political struggle than the Viet Cong. The latter have long believed that, barring any but the most complete devastation of their forces and territory, they are well prepared for political struggle in the South. Although they have acknowledged that the Saigon government has grown stronger,³ they still express deep-seated confidence that administrative and military strength alone will not insure its survival in a political struggle. However badly they may have been hurt by Tet 1968 and the Easter offensive of 1972, they appear not to have lost faith in their political capacity.

Those in power in Saigon, in contrast, have never accepted the need for effective political organization; nor have their supporters, until recently, stressed even the need to develop such a capability. This is remarkable in light of the fact that Saigon's leaders, as this analysis will show, have an accurate picture of the Viet Cong notion of political struggle. Now, both sides face the prospect of a cease-fire in place, the stability of which will depend not on the military capabilities that established control of territory but on the political capabilities required to sustain it.

WHAT HAS HANOI GIVEN UP?

"I recall asking our local party secretary why we were planning for new cities dispersed along the sides of roadways and canals rather than for clusters of hamlets in the traditional way. He said that the dispersal was designed to protect us against United States bombs. This was in 1948." These comments, made by a former high-ranking Viet Cong official now living in the South,⁴ point up the fact that the leaders of North Viet Nam both expected and prepared for war with the United States. They have tried to appear confident of the outcome, and have consistently articulated a single scenario: their revolutionary struggle will succeed.⁵ They

³See Allan E. Goodman, Randolph Harris and John C. Wood, "South Vietnam and the Politics of Self-Support," *Asian Survey*, January 1971, pp. 23-24.

⁴In an interview with the writer in early June 1972.

⁵Documentation and analyses of the communists' view of how the war will end are abundant, publicly available in great detail over time, and singular in the impression they leave. The writings of Ho Chi Minh, Vo Nguyen Giap and Truong

have changed their position periodically only with regard to the length of time it will take. Their belief in a single outcome is also unaffected by the discovery of consistent weaknesses in their political movements (for example, the inability to operate effectively in urban areas), setbacks in military and guerrilla campaigns due to Vietnamization and Accelerated Pacification, or the occurrence of outright military failures (the Tet offensive of 1968, the winter-spring offensive of 1968-1969). But the communists separate "outcome" functionally and chronologically from the concept of "victory." Victory precedes outcome.

To Hanoi, the October proposal marked the achievement of victory and the transition from one phase of the struggle to dominate Viet Nam to another. What takes place *after* the war will determine the outcome of the revolutionary struggle. Consequently, the agreement must be consistent with what Hanoi thinks it requires to dominate the South by political measures.

As used by Hanoi, "victory" does not refer to the final seizure of power from the Saigon government. Rather, the term has two different meanings: first, one or more decisive battlefield triumphs that will bring about a turning point in the war; second, partial annihilation of U.S. forces and near-total disintegration of Saigon forces, leading inescapably to an American withdrawal.⁶

This assessment was based on analysis of communist documents of the mid-1960's. In 1967 Pham Van Dong made clear in private to

Chinh are published in book form in the United States and in pamphlet form in Hanoi. Important captured documents have been translated and released by JUSPAO (Saigon) in its *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes* Series; daily radio broadcasts are monitored and translated into English by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS); news articles are digested and translated by the Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS). The entire body of RAND Corporation interviews of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese army prisoners will shortly be released, and many RAND research monographs are already available. This is in sharp contrast to the evidence available on the expectations of the United States and the government of South Viet Nam (GVN). (The only comparable documentary collection for the U.S.-GVN side would be the Pentagon Papers.) Moreover, the public record of Hanoi's pronouncements has gained them an undisputed degree of credibility over the years; the same, again, could not be said for either the U.S. or the GVN record.

Granted, there is not likely to be anything equivalent to the Pentagon Papers available for analysts of Hanoi's policies. The doubts, disputes and uncertainties that are part and parcel of what ultimately becomes the public record of the American or GVN policymaking process are absent in Hanoi. This is not to say that such doubts or disputes do not exist; but only rarely when a communist regime falls does the analyst catch a glimpse of the confusion, disagreement and conflict that attended policymaking. Nevertheless, the public record for Hanoi is all we have to go on, and as suggested earlier, it has received considerably less attention than it should in analyses of how the war could end.

⁶Melvin Gurtov, *Hanoi on War and Peace* (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, P-3696, December 1967), p. 15.

ENDING THE VIET NAM CONFLICT

the United States that "Ending the war for us has two meanings: (1) an end of bombing which is permanent and unconditional; (2) a withdrawal of United States forces."⁷ Thereafter, Hanoi never deviated from this conception of victory and its confidence in the "fighting-while-negotiating" strategy that brought the October proposal. Even as the agreement was under consideration by Washington during the last week in October, North Vietnamese ground attacks were unrelenting, reaching a level of intensity that exceeded those launched during the offensives of 1968.

Continued military pressure is essential because, from Hanoi's viewpoint, Saigon's forces have not lost the will to fight and are now in the process of consolidating territorial holdings by capitalizing on pacification gains. The Saigon government is credited with being increasingly prepared to continue fighting. As a result, the communists appear to have a well-defined picture of the enemy they face in South Viet Nam after the war. In COSVN Resolution 9 and its addendum, COSVN 14, their view is focused, not on the balances or trade-offs existing between them and Saigon, but on those expected noncommunist actions which will have an adverse impact on the expected political struggle:

. . . [the enemy] still controls all cities and heavily populated areas. Particularly, he is concentrating his force on his pacification program to expand his control over the rural areas and the population, in competition with us. He also consolidates the Puppet Administration and the Puppet Army in order to gradually implement his plan of de-Americanizing the war and maintaining his supremacy.⁸

COSVN 9 assesses the level of anticipated political competition as follows.

Politically . . . in our war theatre, and particularly in Saigon and religious and ethnic minority areas, the enemy will contest with us decisively in order to serve his immediate and post-war objectives. He will maintain and consolidate the puppet administration, strive to preserve its constitutional wrapping, rally the reactionary forces, and at the same time intensify the repression of progressive tendencies and opposition factions, especially the popular uprising movement demanding a better life, peace, independence, neutrality and the establishment of a peace cabinet.⁹

⁷"Reports on conversations with Pham van Dong of North Vietnam held in Hanoi in July, 1967, by Raymond Aubral and Herbert Marcovich, Frenchmen who are friends of Henry A. Kissinger," *New York Times*, June 28, 1972, p. 18.

⁸Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN is Hanoi's military and political directorate for the South), "Resolution No. 14 (30 October 1969)," *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, No. 81, July 1970, p. 8.

⁹COSVN, *Resolution Issued by the 9th Conference of COSVN*, July 1969, (Saigon, mimeo.), p. 15.

Due note is also taken of the role that economic assistance will play as American participation in the war ends.

In the coming period, the Americans will increasingly coordinate actions with their satellites, especially the Japanese monopoly capitalists, to carry out an economic infiltration for the purpose of helping the Saigon puppet regime preserve its facade of false prosperity and realizing their economic domination of South Viet-Nam.¹⁰

While Hanoi thus has expected that the end of American participation in the war would coincide with something less than its complete takeover of the South, it has maintained: "Whether or not the war will resume after the conclusion of agreements [with the Americans] depends upon the comparative balance of forces. If we are capable of dominating the adversary, the war will not break out again; and conversely."¹¹ Viewed from Hanoi's perspective, the October proposal restricts *American* participation in the struggle following the war, *not its own*.

The strategy of political struggle is a comprehensive plan to assure success of the revolution and an important key to communist assessments of politics after the war. The tenets of political struggle were summarized by Giap:

The political struggle is a basic struggle form. It is always a base for the armed struggle to develop and also a formula for attacking the enemy. The political struggle is aimed at mobilizing and organizing the people, at leading the people in struggling against the enemy. . . , and exposing and dooming every deceitful enemy trick, and dispersing and weakening his military forces, at confusing his rear, and at protecting the people's livelihood and production and the revolutionary bases. . . . The combination of the political forces and the armed forces, the political struggle with the armed struggle, and the armed uprising with the revolutionary war is of a universal nature and is a *law* governing revolutionary violence in our country.¹²

An entire section of COSVN 9, moreover, is devoted to the specifics of political struggle: instructions on administrative functions for all levels of the liberation government, guidelines for

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 16. These quotations are drawn from the section of COSVN 9 entitled "Future Enemy Schemes and Our Immediate Tasks: The Enemy's Strategic Schemes," pp. 12-18, a comprehensive assessment of the GVN-Allied side's postwar intentions. The October proposal has neither softened Hanoi's attitude toward the U.S. government nor allayed suspicions of future American assistance programs in Indochina. See Michael Maclear, "Hanoi Is Already Mapping Future Ties with the U.S.," *New York Times*, October 25, 1972, p. 10.

¹¹"Summary of a speech by General Nguyen Van Vinh," *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, No. 8, October 1967, p. 4.

¹²General Vo Nguyen Giap, "The Party's Military Line Is the Ever-Victorious Banner of People's War in Our Country," *ibid.*, No. 70, January 1971, pp. 41-42. (Emphasis in original.)

ENDING THE VIET NAM CONFLICT

counter-terror and counter-intelligence operations, and what amounts to an economic development plan for the areas under its control.¹³

The communists also realize that the Saigon regime (GVN) would not remain idle in the face of such a comprehensive challenge. They must fear that, lacking administrative coherence and stability and effective political organizations, Saigon's first recourse in a worsening situation would be to turn to the army and a renewal of the war. The communist hope is that the combined impact of all elements of the political struggle will have sapped that army's morale and effectiveness, and will inevitably result in the GVN's collapse. To Hanoi, the transition from "victory" to political struggle begins with the withdrawal of American forces and negotiations to establish a government of national concord.

To complete this survey of the communists' postwar expectations, we should note the consistent rhetorical emphasis placed on the role of reconstruction assistance after the war. Whatever may develop subsequently, Hanoi will view such assistance as a reparation owed by the United States. Moreover, its receptivity to postwar multilateral assistance will depend on the bilateral aid relationships it is able to maintain with its communist allies. Current annual communist-country aid to North Viet Nam is estimated at between \$600 and \$750 million, about equal to our economic aid to South Viet Nam. Should this level not be maintained, actual capital requirements would depend largely on Hanoi's postwar development goals, which currently do not appear to require immediate, large-scale capital infusions.¹⁴

If North Viet Nam needs assistance from noncommunist sources after the war, France would be a principal candidate in Hanoi's eyes. France's 1969 offer to assist Hanoi in reconstruction affirmed a tenet of policy announced by General de Gaulle at his tenth press conference in 1964: "... the Delegate General of the French Republic in Hanoi has informed the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam of the desire of France to participate — at the right moment and within its means — in the

¹³See "Endeavor to Develop the Role of the Revolutionary Administration, Strengthen Leadership of the Security Work, Promote the Economic-Financial Front, Endeavor to Expand and Build the Base Area," COSVN 9, pp. 54-77.

¹⁴For an analysis of Hanoi's evolving national priorities, see William S. Turley, "The DRV Since the Death of Ho Chi Minh," in Joseph J. Zasloff and Allan E. Goodman, editors, *Indochina in Conflict: A Political Assessment* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, Lexington Books, 1972).

reconstruction of the country.”¹⁵ Prior to that formal offer, a group of French scholars, deliberating about postwar assistance, had provided a view which, presumably, underlies current French policy and is summarized in the following passage from their report:

The crux of the problem is that if the reestablishment of peace will be accompanied by a radical change in the political and psychological relations between adversaries, such a radical change might be brought about more easily to the extent that the burden of aid to Vietnam in the post-war period is carried by other countries than the U.S. Such an idea is in the interest of both sides: in the interest of the U.S., which would see its own effort reduced by that amount; in the interest of Vietnam, to the extent that the diversification of the sources of foreign aid would be in line with the North Vietnamese desire for independence. Outside of Asia, two countries are in a privileged position in that respect: first of all, France, because of her long experience in Indochina and because of her active relations with the Vietnamese. Secondly, the Soviet Union.¹⁶

Both French participation and the acceptance of such a role by Hanoi depend on an end to the war that leaves the communist movement in a dominant position in the South; the “radical change” referred to above is the success of the political struggle. In that sense, French aid is hardly cast in a neutral light; it would appear to be most compatible with the scenario Hanoi envisions for the period ahead. For its part, the United States — while committed to a reconstruction role since 1965 — has few concrete plans. Only one major study of postwar assistance for North and South Viet Nam has been commissioned by the Department of State, and the recommendations of this report were subsequently embodied in the Aiken-Kennedy amendment to the 1972 Foreign Assistance Act which died in conference.¹⁷ Nevertheless, the vote on the amendment was the first time Congress had specifically defined responsibilities for the reconstruction of Indochina.

The compatibility of the political struggle with international assistance after the war is, of course, untested. The advent of such

¹⁵Excerpted from a message to the Vice President of North Viet Nam by French President Georges Pompidou in September 1969.

¹⁶Groupe d'études du Centre d'études de Politique Etrangère, “Les Conséquences Internationales D'un Réglement De Paix Au Vietnam,” *Politique Etrangère*, No. 5 (1968), p. 428.

¹⁷The text of the amendment can be found in the *Congressional Record*, July 19, 1972, pp. S11128-11129. Also see the report, “Possibilities of an International Organizational Role in the Postwar Recovery and Development of North and South Vietnam,” in U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Post-War Relief and Rehabilitation in Indochina: Documents and Studies Compiled by the Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees* (Washington, forthcoming).

ENDING THE VIET NAM CONFLICT

assistance in the form of reparations for U.S.-caused war damages might make it palatable, since the United States is held responsible for destroying the industrial capacity Hanoi had managed to develop. Revolutionary exigencies, however, could permit Hanoi to accept limited immediate goals if the end of the war were accompanied by an attenuated political struggle for the South.¹⁸ This would mean reconstruction with less industrial development and with considerably less foreign aid than is presently given, and would assure the Communist Party's complete control over the process. In the diplomacy surrounding the October proposal, there is that prospect as well. Hanoi is reportedly willing to drop its demand for reparations in favor of reconstruction aid; as Nguyen Thanh Le noted, "We have made efforts to find the most moderate, soft terms for this help."¹⁹ But communist acceptance of postwar aid is still likely to be determined by reference to North Vietnamese political objectives rather than the magnitude of the economic support required.

WHITHER SAIGON?

Two years ago the Saigon government required all citizens to paint GVN flags on their doorposts. This past June, an executive order required all citizens to have another flag that could be flown atop each house in case a cease-fire was declared. Now, those who do not also carry flags on their person are subject to stiff penalties and possible imprisonment.²⁰ During the course of his October 24, 1972 two-hour radio broadcast on prospects for a cease-fire, President Thieu declared:

The hooligan communists want to show a large number of flags everywhere, to lead the International Control Commission to conclude that they control all the territory and that the people side with them. Therefore we must show not only one national flag but also flags of political parties and religions. The more flags the better, the larger the flags the better, and in as many places as possible.

But such efforts to rally people 'round the flag have never been accompanied by concerted efforts to prepare them for political struggle.

¹⁸Such attenuation, however, could also precipitate long-delayed changes in the Politburo and, consequently, abandonment of military intervention in the South. At least this is the point made in the most recent assessment of the dynamics within the DRV's leadership. See "Bases of Power in the DRV," *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, No. 107, October 1972, pp. 1-20.

¹⁹"Moscow Plans to Assist in Rebuilding Program," *New York Times*, October 29, 1972, p. 26.

²⁰Craig H. Whitney, "Flags Are Blossoming in Saigon Area," *ibid.*, p. 27.

Why, therefore, focus on the Saigon government? Do not its past and present weaknesses and instability rule out its consideration for anything except as the center around which the anti-communist struggle will collapse? First, the alternative to the GVN within South Viet Nam that both communists and *at-tentistes* had hoped for has never emerged, and the latter have now acknowledged this fact.²¹ No neutralist political establishment adequate to foster such a development ever existed. Even had General Duong Van (Big) Minh campaigned in the 1971 presidential election, it was far from clear that he would have organized a neutralist government. His writings and major public speeches are vague on this point.²² But, more important, all the political forces supporting his candidacy had, by 1970, made rather sharp anti-communist declarations.²³ While the Saigon intellectual community and the forces of opposition to the Thieu Government decried the war, they did not view a communist-dominated government as an alternative. This, in part, explains the widespread opposition in South Viet Nam not only to a coalition with the communists but also to one that assumes a three-part division of the government into a Viet Cong segment, a Saigon administration (i.e., pro-Thieu) segment, and a segment for Thieu's opposition. For far too long, Western analysts and diplomats have mistaken opposition to the Thieu Government as support for a neutralist or accommodationist position in the non-communist Vietnamese political spectrum.

Second, no alternative to Thieu is immediately available, and he has refused to resign if that step forces the holding of elections for new national and local assemblies as well as a presidential election. Many of Thieu's sharpest critics — while deploring his myopia — would not prefer the communists, nor do they see any other leader capable of replacing Thieu without plunging the country into the chaos of the mid-1960's. While Saigon may not be prepared for political struggle — despite expecting it — the non-

²¹Like the Viet Cong, the GVN exists both as an administrative and a military force, and it controls substantial portions of the countryside by a combination of loyalty and coercion. Such hegemony probably underlies the communists' recognition in early September that "A solution to the internal problem of South Vietnam [should] proceed from the actual situation that there exists in South Vietnam two administrations, two armies, and other political forces." Text of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam's statement on ending the war, Hanoi radio broadcast, September 21, 1972.

²²See, for example, his statement, "Viet Nam: A Question of Confidence," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1968, and my discussion of it in "South Vietnam: Neither War Nor Peace," *Asian Survey*, February 1970, pp. 121-122.

²³*Ibid.*, "South Vietnam: Neither War Nor Peace," pp. 115-117.

ENDING THE VIET NAM CONFLICT

communists are also not prepared now to dump Thieu and experiment at the national level with new doctrines of political mobilization. Instead, most opposition leaders share his October 24 radio broadcast assessment of the significance of communist demands for a three-part government:

The village and hamlet administrations of the third component do not really exist, but the communists will create them. The communists say that there are three separate components, but according to their arguments they really have two, while we have only one. In fact, the Liberation Front belongs to the communists and the third component also serves as their lackey. Obviously this is a type of coalition government extending from the central to the hamlet levels.

Consequently, Saigon's basic strategy in the period ahead is to negotiate with the communists and then resume fighting.²⁴ It harks back to Thieu's 1968 views:

In the present juncture, facing the future, I believe that communist expansion cannot be checked simply by our appeal to the reasonableness of the aggressors, but rather by clear evidence to them that they cannot win, and will have to pay a high price for their aggressions.

All possibilities for peace should be thoroughly explored. But after a reasonable time, if the communist aggressors remain adamant, *heavier pressure* against them will become necessary.²⁵

The Thieu Government's objective is to end the war as it began, with two Viet Nams. This requires the thwarting of North Vietnamese ambitions and the end of American intervention. To succeed, the GVN must base its strategy on what I have described elsewhere as the politics of self-support.²⁶ Composed of self-defense, self-development and self-government, the policy of self-support comes as close as Saigon has come to an ideology for the political struggle ahead. From the perspective of two Viet Nams,

²⁴Unlike Hanoi's use of these terms, they do not reflect a well-designed revolutionary struggle, but the GVN's *first* strategic conception of the war. President Thieu, for example, observed in June 1971: "... in the past decade of war against the communists we have been beset by one question, and that was that every year, year after year, spring then summer, then autumn, then winter, we all could only anticipate, guess and worry about what the communists might do. . . . Until 1969, we could not, we did not dare to say what we could do the coming autumn, or winter, or spring." (Nguyen van Thieu, "Address at the Graduation of the 3rd Class of the National Defense College," June 30, 1971, p. 3.) This statement reflects a growing belief by the GVN that it is now in a position to use military means to achieve what negotiations in the wake of the October proposal may fail to provide.

²⁵Nguyen van Thieu, "An Address to the Society of Vietnamese Newspaper Editors, 15 January 1968," *Perspectives on Peace in Vietnam* (Washington: Embassy of the Republic of Vietnam, 1968), p. 7. (Emphasis in original.) Thieu has consistently reiterated this position, most recently in his annual address to the graduating class of the National Defense College in July 1972.

²⁶Goodman, Harris and Wood, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-25.

the GVN considers the communist movement now in the process of consolidating in order to continue guerrilla warfare, as Thieu observed:

. . . in 1973 the communists will resume their aggression. There will be a new element then: practically all the Allied troops would have been withdrawn. . . . In 1973 . . . there will be a major confrontation between North and South Viet-Nam in a last bloody battle. Afterwards, the communists will take a military or political decision. A military decision means to disband and let the war fade away. A political decision means negotiation if such formula is not to their disadvantage.²⁷

To Saigon, consequently, the October proposal is deficient because it leaves unclear the status of the military forces that the communists will use in the political struggle. Thieu views the agreement as permitting the Viet Cong to decide which of Hanoi's forces in the South will constitute its army. Contemplating such a military capability, he expressed fear in his October 24 speech that

If a cease-fire solution comes about, the communists will shell populated areas, occupy key points and take control of communications lines to disrupt the economy, and organize disguised sapper and guerrilla units to conduct assassinations and attacks in cities and towns. Immediately after the signing of a cease-fire agreement they will move the masses to create disturbances by conducting illegal activities. . . . They will instigate the masses to start a political struggle . . . spark mutinies and desertions within ARVN ranks, organize secret organs to liquidate RVN civil servants. . . . In 3 to 7 days after the cease-fire agreement has come into effect, taking advantage of this transitional phase, the communists will have the masses disrupt our local administration and security, lead the people to areas under temporary communist control, and eliminate our administrative personnel.

Both sides thus see a protracted political struggle ahead. A major danger inherent in such a scenario is that the war may not be ended at all. The more closely the war approaches a lower level of intensity, the less essential becomes the political settlement proposed in October.

Above all, what Saigon seeks is the stabilization of relations between North and South. According to one government policy declaration:

What we want is the end of aggression and the restoration of the *status quo ante*. Once peace is achieved, we are prepared to coexist peacefully with North Viet-Nam. Going even further, we would consider favourable the gradual development of relations beneficial to both South Viet-Nam and North Viet-Nam, subject only to the essential safeguards against

²⁷Thieu, "Address to the National Defense College," June 1971, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7.

ENDING THE VIET NAM CONFLICT

renewed subversion. Such a course of action would lead to the ultimate reunification of our country, in peace, freedom, and progress.²⁸

The basic elements outlined here have not changed over the years. As Thieu declared in June 1971:

I have clearly explained my opinion about peace. I have made it clear that there are two kinds of peace. First, NVN being communist, we must not nurture the hope of changing its ideology, we must not think of overthrowing the regime in NVN either by military means or by reunification. SVN is SVN. The SVN people want independence, freedom, democracy and progress within the structure of the Free World. We do not demand that NVN accept our ideology. We do not demand of NVN anything which infringes upon its independence, its sovereignty or its right of choosing its own regime. Its dependence upon someone is none of our business. Therefore, when we speak of an equitable peace for both sides, this means that NVN is independent in the communist manner . . . SVN must be independent in the independent manner . . . and live according to its wishes. Thus peace is returned to both countries on a basis of fairness. Fairness means that neither side will demand that the other side yields anything either by political or military means.²⁹

The ability of the South Vietnamese government to sustain itself after the war, however, will depend primarily upon how well it is prepared for *political* struggle. Noncommunist Vietnamese — and the correspondence between the views of supporters and opponents of the Thieu Government is striking — do not use the term “postwar” as a synonym for peace. They do not expect a lack of challenges to the political order and military hegemonies established by the GVN and the Viet Cong. They view the end of the conventional war not as resolving the conflict, but as transforming it into a predominantly political struggle characterized by a lower level of violence.

As one opposition leader observed in a July 1972 interview,

There is simply no one who could replace President Thieu. And I mean by this that there is no one whom we could choose with the skills that Thieu has. But what we desperately need is a President Thieu who also has a policy to prepare us for the political struggle with the communists. We now understand that the communists' ultimate goal is control of the South and not unification. And we are bitter with Thieu for not having prepared us for this ultimate struggle.

Because political reform has been so long delayed, as the end of 1972 approaches there is a striking consensus among all non-

²⁸Foreign Minister Tran chanh Thanh, “The Perspective of Peace,” in Embassy of the Republic of Vietnam, *Peace and Beyond* (Washington, 1968), p. 8.

²⁹Thieu, “Address to the National Defense College,” June 1971, *op. cit.*, p. 14. (Abbreviations in original.)

communist political forces in South Viet Nam. It is, in the words of one government official, that "We all want peace, but, frankly, we are not ready for its consequences."

AFTER CEASE-FIRE, WHAT?

The occupation of Quang Tri symbolizes the kind of cease-fire the noncommunists fear. To the communists,

The new regime is as beautiful as the sun. It need only to be compared with the former fascist methods of the Americans and Thieu which were aimed at robbing, murder, and conscription to be able to more clearly see the contrast between the two regimes. . . .

Compatriots in Quang Tri province, like the compatriots of other liberated areas in South Viet-Nam, enthusiastically greet the new life, warmly applaud the revolutionary government, and are confident in the final victory in the resistance against America for national salvation. . . . The actions of the Quang Tri Province Revolutionary government give daily evidence of the unity between the revolutionary government's words and its action. This motivates the 300,000 compatriots in Quang Tri province to devote their material strength and spirit to the resistance. . . .³⁰

But the bulk of the population in the South is far more familiar with the reports of the occupation given by those who escaped. The communist occupation had three objectives: security, support and mobilization.³¹ Cadres sought to develop security by either forcibly relocating entire settlements to areas where they could be effectively guarded for indoctrination or undertaking the systematic assassination of any person determined to jeopardize party control. Stories of mass trials and executions abound. Groups of fleeing refugees, whenever found, were either rocketed or mortared in order to force them to return. The party's great need for resources to support the southern front meant, as escaped villagers report, confiscation of all food, medicine, money and motorbikes. Food was rationed on a daily basis, provided the villagers contributed their labor to the North Vietnamese logistical system. Mobilization was achieved through extensive organization of the population into work and thought-reform groups, constituting

a fish-net dropped over the villager totally enmeshing him. A system is created which monitors all village activity, produces increased food yields, roots out hostile villagers, recruits a village militia and provides

³⁰"The People's Independent and Democratic Government," *Nhan Dan* (Hanoi), May 15, 1972, p. 3.

³¹Thus far, the only detailed analysis of the occupation and codification of first-person reports can be found in Douglas Pike, "When the Communists Come," United States Information Service, Saigon (mimeo.), July 1972.

ENDING THE VIET NAM CONFLICT

certain psychic satisfactions such as a sense of participation in the village decision-making process.³²

To many, Quang Tri symbolized the beginning of political struggle.

For both sides, consequently, political struggle is not so much an alternative to war as an alternative means to conduct war. But the October proposal may not promote what South Viet Nam needs most to end the war: a basis for the participation of the Viet Cong in politics. So intense and brutal were the communist assaults and occupations in 1972, that much of the South Vietnamese population may now be unable to accept communists in politics. "If I saw a VC on the government platform, I would rush through the crowd and shoot him." These charged words of a father whose last surviving son was killed at An Loc summarize the attitude of many who for the first time saw the communists as responsible for the war. In the wake of the October proposal, prospects for political accommodation appear dim.³³

³²*Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.

³³See, in contrast, my "Government and the Countryside: Political Accommodation and South Viet Nam's Communal Groups," *ORBIS*, Summer 1969, pp. 502-525.

SOME INSURGENCY LESSONS FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA*

by George K. Tanham

RESPONSIBLE people who have served in or studied the struggle in Viet Nam and the lesser insurgencies in Southeast Asia have developed an astonishingly wide divergence of opinion about the proper way to counter these conflicts, with some observers reaching diametrically opposite conclusions. To many, for example, insurgencies are overcome through socio-economic improvements. Others believe force is the only answer. In the case of Viet Nam, there are those who think that massed land and air firepower has proved to be the correct approach, while others, military as well as civilian, believe in the effectiveness of patrolling, intelligence and small-unit actions and favor greater emphasis on the imaginative and unorthodox.

One reason for these differences is found in the complexity of insurgent and counterinsurgent warfare, which involves not only military and paramilitary means but also intelligence and police action, socio-economic measures, political action, and psychological operations. What and how much each element contributes to successful counterinsurgency varies according to the particular situation. Since the right mix cannot be measured precisely, it may be subject to endless debate, in which the proponents of differing views may move to polar extremes, tempted to gain points by overstating their case.

Another characteristic of insurgency that contributes to lack of consensus is its evolutionary nature: in a given discussion, much depends on what stage of the insurgency the speaker has in mind. There is also lack of agreement on what causes an insurgency. To some — to name the simplest alternatives — it is a means of gaining political power, a communist plot; others see it as a reflection of the unsatisfied needs of part of the populace — that is to say, as a righteous, spontaneous uprising of peasants, prompted by unattended socio-economic grievances; still others would define it as the combination and interaction of the two. As our view of the

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SOME INSURGENCY LESSONS FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA

cause largely determines our vision of the cure, or at least the emphasis on the means, disagreement is likely to begin on this fundamental point.

Distilling the lessons of Viet Nam has been made more difficult by domestic issues and dissension within the United States. Debate over the morality of our being in Viet Nam obfuscates the urgent need to learn from the experience. The budgetary squeeze, and particularly the immediacy of our domestic needs, have added to the pressures in favor of our getting out and forgetting the whole affair. As a result, the present attitude in Washington, and in the country at large, is not conducive to the careful examination of what we have learned from insurgencies and an attempt to apply their often bitter lessons. Yet insurgencies are not likely to "fade away," though they may change somewhat. Whether or not the United States becomes involved in future insurgencies, other nations, including some of our allies, are almost certain to do so. Most important, however, we must try to learn from past experience because our management of counterinsurgency efforts in recent years has pointed up some of the weaknesses in our government and in our approach to many of the larger overseas problems.

The first set of lessons, as I see them, is concerned with the general problem of combating communist-inspired insurgency. The second derives from the American experience in assisting countries threatened by such insurgencies. In reviewing and commenting on the latter, I shall not go into the wisdom or the morality of U.S. participation in counterinsurgency efforts, but shall limit myself to personal opinions on the role that the United States has played in various countries of Southeast Asia.

LESSONS ON COMBATING COMMUNIST-INSPIRED INSURGENCY

People Are More Important Than Things

At the risk of taking a polar position (the kind of tempting overstatement mentioned earlier), we will start with a simple assertion: in insurgency and counterinsurgency, especially in the early stages of campaigns, *people* are more important than *things*. The communists know this lesson well, having learned it at least partly from necessity. Starting with nothing but people, they concentrate on recruiting, training and developing capable cadres and forming an effective organization. Only after this basic instrument, composed entirely of people, is fashioned do they in-

produce material things, such as explosives and guns. But their primary emphasis remains on improving the quality of the members, on intensifying their revolutionary fervor, and thereby enhancing the capabilities of the organization. Having formed their political machine by developing good cadres and a disciplined organization, the communist leadership has a flexible tool for the varying demands of insurgency.

On the noncommunist side, which usually is the one engaged in anti-insurgency operations, the tendency has been to stress weapons and objects — a tendency often nurtured by American aid — and to neglect the human resources required to do the job. Once the insurgent threat has been recognized, the first reaction is to seek better arms and equipment, rather than to launch an intensive effort to improve the quality of government officials, military officers and police. And from then on, the demand for more and more weapons and equipment remains paramount. When things go wrong, it is alleged that the weapons were not modern enough — rarely that the men were not well enough led or trained or motivated.

Certainly material things are also important. But the human element must receive first priority. In the more successful counterinsurgencies this has been the case. When Magsaysay took over as Defense Minister in the Philippines in 1950, the government's campaign against the Huks was going badly. The army, geared to conventional military operations and prone to pillaging, was feared and disliked by the people as much as the Huks were. To my mind, the key factor in Magsaysay's successful campaign was not his laudable resettlement plan but his reform of the army. He removed corrupt and inefficient officers. He insisted that all military personnel deal justly and properly with the people and take part in constructive actions. He also instituted more imaginative military operations against the Huks. As these changes became evident not only through Magsaysay's statements but, more important, through the behavior of the troops, the course of the conflict changed. By providing better security, the army received more intelligence from the people, which in turn enabled it to begin eliminating the Huks — a cycle that continued to the final victory. Under Magsaysay there was no profusion of helicopters or any influx of the latest rifles; there were only more effective people. The Philippines remained unscarred by incredible tonnages of firepower. It was the scalpel, not the sledge hammer, that solved the problem.

SOME INSURGENCY LESSONS FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA

One can maintain, of course, that there are few Magsaysays, and that all situations are different. But the other successful counterinsurgency effort, in Malaya, also was distinguished by its emphasis on the importance, at all levels, of imaginative leadership and trained personnel. Special Branch (police intelligence) personnel and the constabulary were as carefully selected, trained and disciplined as were the soldiers. There was an account of a Malay soldier who nearly burst his eardrums diving for his rifle in deep water because he was afraid and too proud to report it lost. Such training and discipline, though perhaps carried too far in this case, are the foundation for successful counterinsurgency, yet all too often they are missing.

The development of needed human resources can have only positive benefits, while concentration on weapons and other inanimate objects entails serious and often unnecessary costs and drawbacks. If an effective intelligence system is developed in the initial stages of an insurgency, the movement may well be stopped early. In any case, the costs of such a system to the government are small, and it requires almost no weapons and equipment. A certain amount of matériel will be needed for constabulary or rural police forces, but, no matter what the stage or size of the insurgency, the men making up these forces are the necessary elements, and the cost of equipping them is relatively low. In the military, the officer and the soldier are the key. One of the reasons is that the enemy often (though, as Viet Nam shows, not always) possesses inferior arms and equipment; another, that he has the more difficult logistic system. But a government that places too much stress on weapons and equipment is apt to overtax its logistic and administrative capabilities and overburden its troops. It is also likely to depend on means that may prove a drawback in guerrilla warfare: air rather than foot patrol, loudspeakers in place of person-to-person psychological operations. Worse still, disposing an abundance of sophisticated weapons and ammunition may tempt the government side to use its firepower too liberally and incautiously, thereby adding to civilian casualties and creating hostility between the troops and the populace. Not only does such antagonism defeat the aims of counterinsurgency, it also tends to dry up the intelligence and other support needed by the government.

Though some may argue otherwise, men and objects usually are in competition with each other in counterinsurgent warfare. In the less developed countries, the skilled and educated are the

scarcest resource. The more of them who have to be used to operate sophisticated equipment, the fewer are available for the fundamental processes and problems of counterinsurgency. (It is patently absurd, for example, to have excellent helicopter pilots to ferry troops to the battle scene but to lack the aggressive, trained infantry lieutenants who must lead the troops after they have landed — yet this has been known to happen.) An indirect drawback of highly sophisticated weapons and equipment is that they tend to dazzle and unduly absorb the attention of the leaders of threatened nations, again to the neglect of the basic problems. Last of all, their costliness either creates a strong dependence on the donor (most often the United States) or consumes entirely too much of the indigenous country's budget.

This is not to suggest that threatened nations refrain from using such matériel as will help them to conduct a difficult struggle for existence. The warning is that they should concentrate on developing human resources, weigh carefully all the costs of acquiring sophisticated weapons and equipment, and, above all, remember that these are only the tools of men, not vice versa.

*The Conflict Is Total and Requires
an Integrated Counterinsurgency Effort*

The second lesson derives from the fact that wars of national liberation are a form of total conflict — total with respect to both goal and means. As the communists themselves have said clearly, the ultimate objective of wars of liberation is to overthrow existing regimes and establish communist governments in their place. Their goal therefore involves full political power and a complete reorganization of society and the economy. One need not go into either the morality of this objective or its ultimate feasibility to admit that it is the broadest possible goal, which to those who pursue it merits the total commitment of their efforts and means.

We know from the writings of Mao Tse-tung and other communist ideologists that they conceive of the revolutionary struggle as one orchestrating all means, including the use of force, to achieve their goal, and, furthermore, that they allow for changes in the relative emphasis on different means. Thus, they regard recruiting, organizing and propaganda work as the key functions in the initial stages of an insurgency. Once the organization has been formed and overt action begins, violence and terror can be

SOME INSURGENCY LESSONS FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA

introduced, and preparations made for more aggressive military action. In the latter stages of insurgency and the rush toward victory, the emphasis is on military means that are almost conventional. Such socio-economic measures as are undertaken tend to be small and local during most of the conflict. Political activity and propaganda, however, both local and international, are never omitted; they are specifically stressed in every phase of the insurgency. Though the relative emphasis on different means may change, the totality of the effort is maintained.

Even within each of the primary means there may be shifts of tactics and strategy. For example, the effort in the political sphere at one time may be toward a coalition government as the means to the goal; at other times the chosen instrument to that end may be a national uprising — more of a political weapon than a military one. In military action, the stress at times will be on formal operations, and at times on guerrilla and terrorist activities. Terror, though not singled out as a weapon, is an important and integral part of communist strategy. Rarely employed without a purpose, it is used variously to demonstrate the impotence of the government, to intimidate teachers and officials, and to subdue the population — in short, to strengthen the insurgent while weakening the government and, if not winning, at least neutralizing the people. There are also times when the communists will use terror to mask their own weakness, by letting it create the impression that their movement is stronger and larger than it really is.

Once we recognize that communist insurgents employ all known means of warfare — political, economic and military — and their variants, the lesson to be gained from this insight is that counterinsurgency must be a fully integrated effort, in which every program or action has to be related to others. Let us assume, for instance, that the intelligence service has a sensitive operation underway in a village and that the military favors attacking that village, which would mean destroying the intelligence effort. Someone, or some small group, has to be able to determine which action is the more important, and have the authority to make the decision and enforce it. Military and police actions, intelligence, and socio-economic actions must be planned and executed in such a way as to reinforce, not hinder, each other.

Wherever this lesson (applicable in many contexts besides counterinsurgency) has been practiced, the results have usually been good. During the Malayan emergency, Field Marshal Templar, when he was finally given full civil and military

authority, used this power and the thoughtful Briggs Plan¹ to conclude the campaign against the communists successfully. Similarly, Magsaysay in the Philippines was able to suppress the Huks by assuming full powers and providing enlightened leadership. In other counterinsurgency campaigns, wherein large committees have been expected to solve the bureaucratic and political problems of centralized control, unity of command has been less perfect. Such a principle may work with a strong leadership, as was the case under Templar, but where the committee system extends all the way to the top and lacks firm control, it will not work.

Thailand today has the Communist Operations Suppression Command, an admirably-conceived organization composed of representatives from most of the agencies concerned with integrating the Thai counterinsurgency effort. But because of the delicate balance of power in Bangkok, conflicts within the Thai bureaucracy, and the great size of the organization itself, it does not yet exercise real command or carry out integrated planning. In Viet Nam, despite the years of struggle, there is no mechanism to ensure an integrated effort. On the one hand, neither a president nor a prime minister can do the job without the proper organization; on the other hand, a large cabinet is not the solution.

Insurgency Evolves by Flexible Stages

The third lesson afforded by communist insurgency rests on another of its characteristics: its evolutionary nature, as spelled out by Mao in his theory of the three phases of revolutionary warfare. Moreover, Mao allows for a step backward when necessary, and has taught that some adversity strengthens the will and improves the effort. Yet we have neglected to take full account of the implications that the evolutionary and flexible nature of insurgency has for counterinsurgent planning, and tend instead to discuss and approach the problems posed by insurgent warfare as though they were static, as unchanging as was conventional warfare in Europe. There, in World War II, the two sides lined

¹The "Briggs Plan" refers to the operational strategy designed by Sir Harold Briggs who, as Director of Operations under the British High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, was given authority in April 1950 over all government security forces—army, police, intelligence and air force—and power to coordinate and manage all other civil and military departments that affected the counterinsurgency effort. The Briggs Plan is remembered chiefly for two reasons: (1) the combined, integrated effort mentioned above, and (2) the careful resettlement of over 420,000 squatters into new villages away from insurgent control.

SOME INSURGENCY LESSONS FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA

up their troops, artillery and airpower and slugged it out across the Continent, the major problem for each being how best to pierce the enemy's front line so as to get to the soft rear, and either encircle the combat forces or cause them to withdraw rapidly. From the Normandy landings to the final battles in Germany, this was the objective as pursued, with some variations, by the Americans, the British and the Russians.

Insurgency has no such formal beginning or continuing conventional characteristics. The origins of most insurgencies are shrouded in mystery and silence. There was considerable debate in the late 1950's, it will be recalled, over whether the Viet Cong were remnants of the Viet Minh or a new phenomenon. In Thailand, notwithstanding the misguided belief of some that the insurgency there emerged full-blown in 1965 and mainly in response to U.S. air attacks on Viet Nam, a closer look reveals slow, painstaking and often frustrated efforts to develop an insurgent apparatus. The Soviet Communist Party congresses of 1956 and 1961 proclaimed wars of national liberation as the proper method, but we have little information on Thailand's insurgent leadership and any actions that it took; we know only about some of the communists' activities. These included recruiting and propagandizing in the villages, taking some Thai and hill tribesmen to North Viet Nam and China for training, and infusing small amounts of money and material into parts of the country. Even as late as 1963 and 1964, this embryonic organization could hardly have served as the target of conventional military operations. It should, however, have been the object of intensive intelligence operations designed to identify and, where appropriate, arrest the leaders. At the same time, efforts ought to have been made (and a few were actually begun) to deal with the outstanding socio-economic problems in northeast Thailand, which the communists were using to camouflage their real aim of seizing political power.

By mid-1965 (the communists themselves date their heightened activity from August 7), the rising number of hostile incidents showed that the insurgents had organized guerrilla bands and acquired small bases for their support, and it was clear that greater resources and force were needed to deal with them. Bands of forty to fifty guerrillas could not be handled by the Thai police alone. Some skillfully led army units were required. But those units that were used proved to rely mainly on conventional sweeps and artillery and airpower, and it was soon realized that these methods

were not the answer. The Thai are still developing new tactics and techniques to deal with the insurgents, but progress is slow. Meanwhile the guerrillas have not only spread throughout the country but have proved in some cases that they are able to assemble over a hundred well-armed men for a single action. There are "red" areas in Nakhon Phanom in the northeast and in Nan in the north, while in other parts of the country there is incipient insurgency, with small bands of active guerrillas. The insurgency problem is not out of hand, but it is becoming serious.

This brief summary of the growth of insurgency in Thailand suggests at least three related lessons for counterinsurgency. The first is that it pays to respond to an insurgent threat early and effectively, at a time when the communists are still weak and small in number and it may be possible to stop them entirely. If their organization is allowed to develop, not only will they become stronger, but their means of fighting the government will grow beyond mere talk about force to the use of force and terror, and finally to conventional war. There is a tendency in certain places to dismiss a few communist organizers or guerrillas as constituting no threat; but to do so is to ignore the evolutionary nature of insurgency. The earlier the counterinsurgent effort is begun, the cheaper, easier and less bloody it will be. This may be an especially hard lesson to apply, because in its earliest phase insurgent activity commands little attention and the threat is not readily apparent.

Next, we must recognize that the response to insurgency may have to vary from place to place and from one time to another; not only the instruments of counterinsurgency (such as the choice between military and police) but also the plans and actions must be constantly adjusted to the changing nature of the struggle. A program that works and looks promising at one time may be of little relevance a year or two later. Thus, in trying to prevent the spread of insurgency, it may be useful at a given time to concentrate on village development units designed to help villagers solve their socio-economic problems — possibly, though not necessarily, as part of a larger effort involving intelligence and police activities as well. If, however, the insurgency grows in spite of these efforts and the communists are able to terrorize and intimidate the population, earlier programs aimed at providing wells, new schools, better sanitation facilities, and the like cease to be persuasive measures to the peasant who primarily wants protection and security for himself and his family. Education, pure

SOME INSURGENCY LESSONS FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA

water and sanitation will have become secondary to the preservation of life itself, and no amount of government propaganda will convince the peasant otherwise. At this stage, the means of ensuring his protection will have to be devised and made visible, and this remains one of the most perplexing and difficult problems for a government to solve. On the other hand, once counterinsurgency efforts have been successful, and have rendered the guerrilla elements less threatening, a return to productive socioeconomic measures and a reduction in the security forces may be possible and desirable. Hence, the importance of a counterinsurgency doctrine and command organization flexible enough to respond appropriately to the changing aspects of the struggle.

But more than this flexibility — which is a reactive, defensive capability — it is essential that a good counterinsurgency organization have a strategic plan if it is to defeat the insurgents. This is the third in this subordinate group of lessons. Although in the early stages the insurgents may have the initiative and make it difficult for the government to go on the offensive, this goal must nevertheless be kept clearly in mind. In Malaya the Briggs Plan was formulated in spite of the fact and during the time that the CT's (Chinese Terrorists) had the initiative. It laid out two immediate objectives: depriving the guerrillas of supplies provided from the villages, and severing contact between the guerrillas and the communist cells in the villages. After the British developed their human resources, obtained unified leadership under Templar, and were able to execute their strategy, the nature of the campaign changed and the CT's were put on the defensive. It took all three elements to make counterinsurgency work, but the plan gave cohesion and direction to the effort.

LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

We would do well to study some important lessons growing out of the American experience in assisting countries threatened by a communist-led insurgency. What, specifically, can we learn from the role of the United States in Indochina and Thailand in recent years?

First of all, the United States has only a limited influence on the behavior of foreign governments, even those that need some assistance from us in coping with insurgency. Not only do most government leaders think they know their country better than we do, but in many cases they are taken up more with personal

politics or pressing domestic issues than with problems of counterinsurgency. If the country is newly independent, it is likely to be especially proud and resentful at being told what to do and how to do it. Many Americans tend to overlook the overriding importance of local sentiments. I remember calling on a high Thai official in the late spring of 1968 and, at one point in our conversation, asking him how he thought things were going in Paris — by which I meant the Viet Nam peace talks. He chuckled and said “Serves them right!” over and over, to my utter bewilderment. Finally I asked him what he meant, and he said: “Serves the French right that they are having these troubles and riots in Paris, because they took away part of my country.” The French had indeed, nearly a hundred years earlier, incorporated into Indochina some provinces that the Thai considered theirs, and this still rankled with my host. Yet at the moment Thailand had troops fighting in Viet Nam and was quite concerned about the Paris peace talks.

Americans, who are themselves in a hurry, also tend to fear that a major catastrophe will occur if the local government does not act instantly. They fail to take into account that in Southeast Asia, where perhaps because of the climate things generally move slowly, the American ideas of progress and of rushing into action are somewhat novel concepts. We should remember that the insurgents, too, are Asians: though the communists have developed some interesting motivational techniques, the protracted warfare they are practicing is a kind of warfare well suited to their part of the world.

One of the hardest lessons for us to assimilate is that American ignorance of their mentality, and our occasional impatience with their ways, alienates the people of the host countries, superficial evidence to the contrary notwithstanding. Foreign governments may go through the motions of doing what we wish as a matter of courtesy, or out of a desire for aid, or because they are simply tired of listening to our advice. But unless we convince them that what we are suggesting is for their good, they will not really cooperate.

Incidentally, through the same misreading of the extent of our influence abroad, Washington has made the mistake of asking its foreign missions to get better results and exert a stronger voice than they are in fact able to do. The foreign missions, in turn, eager to please Washington and merit good efficiency ratings from their own agencies, tend to exaggerate what they have accomplished with the host governments. Often, this is no more than

SOME INSURGENCY LESSONS FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA

an instinctive reaction of the public servant trying to do his job in the manner expected of him. In some cases, however, officials deliberately send home glowing reports, knowing that these do not reflect the true situation, or actually suppress bad news and failures. Though humanly understandable, actions such as these are likely to mislead decision-makers, with possible serious consequences. It is up to Washington to recognize this danger and become more realistic in its demands on foreign missions and its view of the U.S. influence abroad.

The next lesson derives from a related failing: our tendency to expect foreign nations not only to *do* what we think is best but to do it the *way* we think best, as though we were hoping to shape others in our own image. Thus, the most glowing reports about the behavior of a foreign government usually dwell on its having accepted the American way of doing a given thing. Not long ago an American colonel told me how pleased he was that the particular army to which he was an adviser had, after careful consideration, designed a course for Special Forces that was exactly like the one at Fort Bragg. Officers from that country's army had been sent to Fort Bragg for training; some of its high officers had visited the base; copies of the Fort Bragg curriculum had been generously distributed to troops in their army; and U.S. Special Forces were serving as its advisers. Some officers had visited the British Jungle Warfare School at Johore near Singapore, but few had been exposed to any other army in the world. Yet, with full allowance for the fact that Fort Bragg is a first-class training center, one may wonder whether a carbon copy of it is the right thing for soldiers of a less developed country at this time. Surely, training in celestial navigation at night, compass patrols, and the use and maintenance of sophisticated weapons does not meet the most urgent needs of armies having to cope with training peasants in the fundamentals of modern warfare.

Nor is the situation much different in the civilian sector, where, again, we tend to give top marks to the country that adopts our ideas and institutions, and level criticism (and occasionally the threat of reduced U.S. aid) at the one that opts for any other system. What is best for one of the most advanced countries of the twentieth century may not always be best for a developing country, if for no other reason than that it is too expensive. In any case, every such country should have the privilege of shopping around for ideas and of adapting modern ideas to its own culture. Perhaps more than anything else, this insistence that other countries adopt

our ways is the cause of ill will abroad, even where ill feeling is suppressed for fear of losing American aid. At best, our attitude generates lack of respect, if not cynicism. I recall talking with a Thai official about the foreign advisers the Thai government had hired at the turn of the century, and expressing my opinion that it had been a good system which had served Thailand well. He agreed, but said that it was no longer needed, because Thailand had trained many of its own people to do the jobs of the advisers. When I asked him why, in that case, they were using AID advisers, he replied, with a smile, that these were free and that a lot of aid came with them.

This takes us back to the tendency of governments to stress material things such as weapons and equipment over the importance of developing human resources. Our own government must share in the blame for this error in emphasis. The bulk of our aid money and of the time and energy of U.S. officials is devoted to weapons and equipment. True, all U.S. agencies have good training programs, and some excellent examples can be cited. (In Thailand, the helicopter programs for both military and police provided for the training of pilots and mechanics in such a way that the personnel had completed their training by the time the helicopters arrived in the country.) But the development of human resources more often takes second place to the acquisition of objects. Even though training is receiving more attention, other aspects are being neglected. Personnel management, including the assignment of trained personnel, is one of them. It has been found, for example, that 90 per cent of those with advanced agricultural training and education are assigned to capital cities, while only 10 per cent are in the provinces, where their skills are directly applicable and needed. Admittedly, an inadequate personnel management system is not the only reason for this imbalance. But it serves to reinforce the lesson that the United States must stress the importance of the human resource. This should be a cardinal point of the Nixon Doctrine: our material resources could be used as an enticement, or even as a means of pressure, by which to prevail on recipient countries to improve the quality and increase the number of their trained manpower.

A concomitant lesson is that the United States should be most careful not to force too many new programs on the often limited government apparatus of a developing country. Many of the newer nations emerged from colonial status less than a generation ago, and they can do only so much with the government personnel

SOME INSURGENCY LESSONS FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA

and other human resources they have been able to develop since then. Many of them can manage their own countries well enough so long as they do not face an insurrection. But insurgency produces extra burdens, and its demands can easily overwhelm the developing civil service and political structure. In addition to overloading the system, hastily conceived counterinsurgency programs can exacerbate personal and bureaucratic rivalries to the detriment of the counterinsurgency effort. Too often Americans, coming in full of ideas and anxious to please Washington with their initiatives, tend to dream up too many new programs. Instead, one of their first objectives should be to ensure the basic ability of the host government to continue functioning. Once this is done, programs may be added with due deliberation. Counterinsurgency may require some new programs, but the first step should be to improve such ongoing ones as the indigenous intelligence service, the police, and certain other public services. This lesson is slowly being learned. It is not dramatic, and it probably earns the officials conducting it little acclaim in Washington, but if Washington can be involved in the learning process, our approach to the problem of assistance should benefit.

A final lesson is that we must learn to evaluate what is most important. One reason for the concentration on material things and on programs is that their results seem more readily measurable. We try to keep records on the maintenance, operational condition, and number of days or hours in service for a variety of American equipment, so that, for example, we can state with a fair degree of accuracy how many helicopters, both police and military, are operational on a given day and how many are down for maintenance. We can tell the number of hours an American-provided helicopter flew in one month. But it is a little more difficult to establish how the hours were spent: whether the helicopters were ferrying VIP's or dropping supplies to beleaguered soldiers. It is extremely difficult to ascertain what they actually contributed to the campaign, or how a given program affected the behavior of the population. Yet it is essential that we go beyond the statistics on the uses of equipment, the number of trainees, and the tons of fertilizer spread, and make a greater effort to evaluate the impact of programs and other important aspects of our assistance. Admittedly, hard questions will have to be answered in the process, but they are crucial and deserve highest priority attention in the context of insurgency and many other endeavors as well.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY AID POLICY*

by Stephen P. Gibert

EVERY American President since the Second World War has taken office hoping to concentrate on domestic problems and to limit American political and military activities abroad. Yet Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson presided over an extension of America's international commitments. The paradox of professed intentions to limit involvement overseas and actual extensions and deepening of that involvement cannot be ascribed to mere hypocrisy. Rather, it represented a conflict between wish and reality; the limited role desired has been inexorably expanded because perceived threats to the noncommunist nations could not have been countered except by the commitment and occasional use of American military power. First the European and then the developing nations lacked the capability, and frequently the will, to defend themselves. So, being unwilling to risk the expansion of communism, the United States used its strength to compensate for the weakness of the noncommunist world.

The Nixon Doctrine is the official expression of the present Administration's intention to alter this course of events. Militarily, it is a continuation of past policies; its triad of principles — deterrence, collective defense, flexible response — has informed American security policy since the Truman Administration first began to "contain" communism. Politically, it represents an emerging approach to international security in that it rejects what might be called the "Wilsonian syndrome" in favor of a policy of "enlightened self-interest."

This blend of new political and old military concepts has already resulted in foreign policy decisions, budgetary choices and modified defense postures that are beginning to revamp America's role in world politics. Since military assistance is an integral and important component of U.S. foreign policy, especially toward the

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THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND MILITARY AID

developing nations, it is not surprising that the Nixon Doctrine has already affected and will continue to affect the military assistance program.¹ The Administration may not be able to persuade Congress to agree to all of the organizational changes that the President believes are necessary to rationalize the foreign aid process. Nor can it be anticipated, given the strong opposition in Congress to certain aspects of the foreign aid program, that the legislature will appropriate all of the sums requested for all of the countries and programs involved. But these domestic political constraints, rather than reducing the value of analyzing the implications of the Nixon Doctrine for military aid policy, make it all the more necessary that the public and Congress understand the intentions of the Nixon Administration in this important policy area. Before considering the specific consequences for future military aid decisions, it may therefore be useful to outline the broad international security concepts emerging from the series of Administration statements and messages to Congress which collectively constitute the Nixon Doctrine.

NIXON DOCTRINE CONCEPTS

In its expression of military concepts, the Nixon Doctrine contains few surprises, although, as will be mentioned later, the U.S. military posture will be altered. Deterrence remains the key strategic element:

Peace requires strength. So long as there are those who would threaten our vital interests and those of our allies with military force, we must be strong.

. . . possession of 95 per cent of the nuclear power of the non-communist world gives us the primary responsibility for nuclear defense. . . .²

Defense, whether conventional or nuclear, will be regarded as a collective enterprise, although the role of the various partners will vary by type of conflict and according to capabilities:

The United States will keep all its treaty commitments.

We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security and the security of the region as a whole.

. . . the Nixon Doctrine means not only a more effective use of common

¹This is especially true of the Nixon Doctrine under the "Total Force" concept, since military aid is intended to enable the forces of recipient countries to be considered in determining U.S. force postures.

²*U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace*. A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, February 18, 1970 (Washington: GPO, 1970), pp. 4, 127.

resources, but also an American policy which can best be sustained over the long run.³

Finally, security policy will continue to be based on the doctrine of flexible response:

. . . while strategic forces must deter all threats of general war . . . our general purpose forces must be more sensitively related to local situations and particular interests.

. . . we cannot expect U.S. military forces to cope with the entire spectrum of threats. . . . Experience has shown that the best means of dealing with insurgencies is to preempt them through economic development and social reform and to control them with police, paramilitary and military action by the threatened government.

We may be able to supplement local efforts with economic and military assistance.⁴

While military concepts thus remain the familiar ones of the Cold War,⁵ politically the Nixon Doctrine appears to indicate an important change in the perception of the international system. Fundamental to this perceptual change is rejection of the complex of ideas that provided the intellectual rationale and moral justification for an unlimited American commitment during the past generation to other nations — to the point of indiscriminate involvement in their affairs. Academic purists will immediately argue that U.S. Cold War policy was precisely the opposite of the Wilsonian or “collective security” approach to peace. A collective security policy, they will assert, is one intended to mobilize the world community against any aggressor nation. Between ideologies it is morally neutral, not anti-communist or anti-Western or anything except anti-lawlessness.

True enough, but the essence of collective security is the belief that peace is indivisible.⁶ Thus a threat to one nation is a threat to all. Collective security also regards the sovereignty of all nations as equally sacred and to be equally defended. All governments have a moral obligation to defend any attacked nation: “Great or small, strong or weak, near or far, white or coloured, let us never forget that one day we may be somebody’s Ethiopia.”⁷

³*Ibid.*, pp. 55, 56.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 127.

⁵In theory, there have been some changes, notably the replacement of Defense Secretary McNamara’s concept of Mutual Assured Destruction by the present Strategy of Realistic Deterrence. It remains to be seen, however, whether this change will be primarily semantic or result in important strategic innovations.

⁶Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Swords into Plowshares* (New York: Random House, 1964), p. 228.

⁷Statement by the Representative of Haiti during the League of Nations debate concerning Italian aggression against Ethiopia, cited in *ibid.*, p. 229.

THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND MILITARY AID

It was precisely this universal and indiscriminate obligation to defend any nation against aggression, symbolized by Article X of the Covenant, that led the Senate to reject the League of Nations. But Wilson's ideas proved stronger than the Senate's votes: the concept of the indivisibility of peace lived on and became part of the intellectual baggage of several generations of American policymakers, despite their supposed realism. With the advent of the Cold War the Wilsonian syndrome was perforce modified to meet a two-world rather than one-world reality. But its essence — that a threat to any nation was a threat to all — remained. Americans found it even easier to believe in the indivisibility of peace when confronting communism, for it, too, has a philosophy that embraces the earth and mankind's entire future.

The containment doctrine, which served the Truman Administration in much the same way that the Nixon Doctrine is expected to serve the present Administration, strongly reflected the indivisibility of peace concept. Containment policy was intended to frustrate and eventually "mellow" the Soviet Union. For such an objective the question of selectively intervening, as distinct from meeting Soviet threats wherever they occurred, would have been inappropriate. Subsequently, Secretary Dulles thought fighting wherever the Soviets might choose to fight was an unsuitable strategy. But he not only embraced the concept of the indivisibility of world peace, he held the Soviets accountable for breaking the peace anywhere at any time. To justify the idea that the United States might use nuclear weapons on Moscow if a communist attack occurred anywhere, Dulles put forward the indivisibility of peace theme and popularized its ultimate expression in the so-called domino theory.⁸ President Kennedy devoted a substantial part of his early addresses to the same theme,⁹ although his prescription for dealing with the problem was closer to containment than massive retaliation. President Johnson followed suit. The heart of the continuing involvement in Viet Nam was the belief in the indivisibility of peace; defeat in Viet Nam would

⁸The indivisibility of peace concept held by Dulles was also a logical result of his perception of international communism, not the USSR per se, as the Cold War enemy. "... international communism is a conspiracy. . . . They have gone on getting control of one country after another until finally they were stopped. . . . Russian foreign policy is an instrument of international communism." Quoted by Ole R. Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy," in John C. Farrell and Asa P. Smith, editors, *Image and Reality in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 25.

⁹See, for example, his Inaugural Address: "The hopes of all mankind rest . . . not simply upon those of us in this chamber, but upon the peasant in Laos, the fisherman in Nigeria. . . ."

encourage aggression and erode the "commitment to freedom" around the world.

The notion that peace is indivisible has no demonstrable truth. It is essentially an ideological tenet, not a description of reality. A crucial consequence of rejection of the Wilsonian syndrome, therefore, will be a decline in the importance of ideology as a factor in American foreign policy. Peace will become "divisible," allowing U.S. intervention in "foreign quarrels" to be selective rather than universal. Hard questions will probe whether a threat to a given country is also a threat to America. The value of a threatened country to the United States will be appraised: Will it matter if it goes communist? Alliances will be sought with nations which add to rather than detract from American power. The role of world policeman, enforcing the "law" wherever communist (or other) aggression occurs against the Free World, will be abandoned.

It will take time for this perceptual change to carry over into policy actions, but there is little doubt that the Nixon Doctrine signals a return to the traditional diplomacy of enlightened self-interest;¹⁰ and assuredly, since the "Nixon Doctrine requires a strong program of security assistance,"¹¹ its implementation will have significant consequences for military aid policies in the 1970's. It is with these changes in the military assistance program and their consequences for American foreign policy that this article is concerned.

CURRENT SECURITY ASSISTANCE POLICIES

The new security policy has already begun to affect certain political aspects of the military assistance program and will have further impact on security aid as the decade progresses. The

¹⁰On several occasions the President has referred to the declining vitality of "isms," to the uselessness of ideology and the waning of nineteenth-century "ideological accessories of the intellectual debate." Self-interest has replaced ideology; U.S. aid policy should be governed by what is in the interest of the United States, and policy toward other states should assume that they also are motivated by self-interest. For example: "It will be the policy of the United States . . . not to employ negotiations as a forum for . . . ideological debate. We will regard our Communist adversaries first and foremost as nations pursuing their own interests, just as we follow our own interest. . . ." *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace*, op. cit., p. 135.

¹¹*United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace*. A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, February 25, 1971 (Washington: GPO, 1971), p. 183. In his latest statement the President says that "Security assistance is a cornerstone of our foreign policy. . . ." See *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of Peace*. A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, February 9, 1972 (Washington: GPO, 1972), p. 168.

THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND MILITARY AID

changes are both quantitative and qualitative in nature. They affect the total amount of funds and the size of allocations to the various countries receiving security assistance, the means of funding, justifications for assistance, and program emphasis.

With regard to amounts of funds requested, even prior to the adoption of the Nixon Doctrine it was clear that there might be some increase in dollars allocated to security assistance. Possible increases were linked by the Peterson Commission to reduction of U.S. forces abroad: "In some cases, reduction of U.S. military forces overseas will require temporary offsetting increases in such assistance."¹² This was not to be the only time the Administration has linked increased aid to reducing U.S. troop levels abroad — the theme has been repeatedly stressed. Consistent with this substitution of "dollars for doughboys," the total for all types of security assistance rose from approximately \$3.1 billion in FY 1970 to \$4.2 billion in FY 1971.¹³ The amount now appears to have leveled off, however; the obligational authority requested for FY 1972 also totaled about \$4.2 billion, divided as follows:

Category	Amount (in Thousands)
Military Assistance Program (MAPG)	\$ 705,000
Foreign Military Sales Credits (FMSC)	\$ 510,000
Economic Supporting Assistance (ESA)	\$ 778,000
Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF)	\$2,230,800
	\$4,223,800 ¹⁴

As can be seen, over half of the requested security assistance was service-funded (MASF) and directly related to the Indochina war.¹⁵ Service-funded aid goes to South Viet Nam, Laos, Thailand and Korea. South Viet Nam would receive about \$1.78 of the \$2.23 billion; the remaining \$447 million would be divided among Laos, Thailand and Free World (Korean) forces in Viet Nam.¹⁶

If we add to the MASF figure of \$2.23 billion South Viet Nam's supporting assistance of \$565 million and Public Law 480 funds of

¹²*U.S. Foreign Assistance in the 1970's: A New Approach*. Report to the President from the Task Force on International Development (Washington: GPO, March 4, 1970), p. 3.

¹³Charles Schultze, *et al.*, *Setting National Priorities: The 1972 Budget* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1971), p. 121.

¹⁴If to this sum is added \$73,500,000, chargeable to prior year appropriations, the total FY 1972 program as proposed came to \$4,297,300,000. *Foreign Assistance Legislation, Fiscal Year 1972, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate*, June 1971 (Washington: GPO, 1971), p. 373.

¹⁵The amounts actually appropriated for FY 1972 were: MAPG, \$500 million; FMSC, \$400 million; ESA, \$550 million; MASF, \$2,319 million. (Information provided by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Armed Services Committee, May 1972.)

¹⁶The breakdown of the \$447 million among the three recipients is classified.

approximately \$100 million, and Cambodia's military aid and supporting assistance of \$321 million, the Indochina war-related aid comes to approximately \$3.2 billion or roughly three-fourths of the world total of security assistance. Properly speaking, however, Viet Nam aid is a war-fighting measure, not "foreign aid" in the usual meaning of that term. Also, service-funded aid is not appropriated under the Foreign Assistance Act. It is probable that MASF programs will be terminated after all U.S. forces leave Viet Nam, and any future military assistance to the present four MASF recipients may then be placed in the new International Security Assistance Act.

By far the greatest regional emphasis in security assistance is on Southeast Asia. Not only would all of the \$2.23 billion MASF aid go to that region, but almost all (over 93 per cent) of the economic supporting assistance would as well. Of the approximately \$778 million requested, \$565 million was requested for South Viet Nam, \$110 million for Cambodia, and \$50 million for Laos.¹⁷ The remaining \$53 million (less than 7 per cent of the total) of economic supporting assistance would be scattered among many recipients around the world, with no country outside Southeast Asia receiving a consequential amount.

Military Assistance Program (MAP) aid is also concentrated in Southeast Asia, but not to the same degree and less narrowly related to the Indochina war. Of the \$731.5 million requested, about 68 per cent goes to Cambodia, Taiwan, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines.¹⁸ About 23 per cent was intended for the Near East and South Asia region, major recipients being Turkey, Jordan and Greece. The remaining 9 or so per cent of MAP aid is scattered among many recipients.

The final category consists of credits for military sales. For FY 1972, the Administration requested \$510 million for this purpose. Most of this amount was to go to the Near East-South Asia region, with Israel receiving \$300 million. Latin America is the second largest recipient region, but the total for all of Latin America would be much less than that allocated to Israel alone. The three largest recipients in Latin America were to be Brazil, with approximately \$20 million in credits and nearly \$1 million in grants, and Argentina and Venezuela, each of which would receive about \$15 million in sales and \$1 million in grants.¹⁹

¹⁷*Foreign Assistance Legislation, Fiscal Year 1972, op cit.*, pp. 184, 231.

¹⁸U.S. Department of Defense, *Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts*, March 1971, pp. 3-4, *passim*. The \$731.5 million includes \$705 million requested for FY 1972 plus \$26.5 million chargeable to prior year appropriations.

¹⁹*Foreign Assistance Legislation, Fiscal Year 1972, op. cit.*, p. 384.

THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND MILITARY AID

Combining all types of assistance, it can be seen that three sets of countries, comprising a total of ten, receive approximately \$4.1 billion of the world total of \$4.3 billion, or about 95 per cent of all U.S. security assistance. The "Asian communist containment" set of six — South Viet Nam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Taiwan and Korea — receive by far the largest share of all security aid. The two countries comprising the "Soviet communist containment" set — Greece and Turkey — receive substantial amounts of aid, but much less than the Asian group. The two countries that round out the "Big Ten" security assistance recipients — Israel and Jordan — may be termed the "regional stability" set. Aid to them, and lesser amounts to others in the Middle East, is intended to give the United States political leverage in dealing with the explosive Arab-Israeli confrontation and to maintain a "balance of power" in the region.

The remaining 5 per cent of security assistance funds is divided among some forty countries, many of which receive only small amounts for training purposes. In essence, the international security assistance program is aid to the Big Ten; if the Nixon Doctrine is to work significant changes in military assistance in the 1970's, it is with regard to these ten countries that changes must occur.

POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

Influence of the Past and Prospects for Change

The overwhelming impression gathered from perusing the list of Big Ten security assistance recipients is one of familiarity: the United States has been helping these countries for a long time. Aid to Korea dates from the Pacific war's end in 1945; Turkey and Greece were the original beneficiaries of the Truman Doctrine; Israel has been assisted in various ways since its independence; Taiwan received American aid during the Chinese civil war and still does. Even the more recent Southeast Asian recipients have obtained American military assistance for many years. Thus, while the Nixon Doctrine stresses the selective intervention of U.S. power abroad, insofar as the choice of recipients is concerned, there have been few if any changes from the past.

This appears somewhat contradictory to the alleged harder look the Administration intends to give U.S. security policy. It certainly is not consistent with a cardinal point in the Peterson Report: "Second, the amount of military assistance allocated among countries should be related to a realistic assessment of

needs, not to historical assistance levels.”²⁰ Perhaps the government, in realistically assessing the Big Ten’s needs, simply came to the same conclusion regarding FY 1972 assistance that Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson had come to in the past; but a better explanation seems to be the great, not to say inordinate, emphasis the Nixon Doctrine puts on past commitments.

There are sound reasons for this emphasis on the United States living up to its commitments and continuing to be concerned with its allies of long standing. It is feared, with good cause, that U.S. withdrawal from Viet Nam and force reductions elsewhere in Asia might convince Asian allies that American guarantees are no longer worth much. Especially since the recent Nixon and Kissinger visits to China, Asians can hardly be faulted if they scramble to reach accommodation with the communist giant — it would appear that there no longer exists a “balance among menaces”²¹ in Indochina. The stress on commitments is therefore intended, probably with private pessimism, to convince Asians that the United States will not abandon them, and continuing large amounts of military aid to the six Asian “communist containment” countries is intended to give material evidence to Administration statements.

But the fact that the six Asian countries remain among the Big Ten security assistance recipients can be explained in still another way: Vietnamization. The Nixon Doctrine emphasizes that the U.S. defense role should be complementary to that of the aid recipients and not a substitute for their failure to participate in their own defense. What Vietnamization means — or what “Asianization” means, since the process is not limited to Viet Nam — is that the United States will “do what it does best” and Asians will “do what they do best.” America will supply the triggers, Asians will supply the fingers. Secretary Laird put it less crudely: “As we proceed with Vietnamization and implementing the Nixon Doctrine, we seek to replace some of our past military presence with stronger local capabilities. . . .”²² With regard to Korea, for example, the Secretary said that aid “will strengthen their forces so that we can proceed with the planned reduction of U.S. troops

²⁰*U.S. Foreign Assistance in the 1970's: A New Approach*, op. cit., p. 13.

²¹This phrase was used by Cambodia’s President Sihanouk to describe his foreign policies toward Thailand, Viet Nam and China.

²²*Toward a National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence*, Statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird on the FY 1972-76 Defense Program and the 1972 Defense Budget (Washington: GPO, March 1, 1971), p. 108.

THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND MILITARY AID

without weakening the defense posture essential to deter North Korean aggression.”²³

As Asianization proceeds, it can be anticipated that aid amounts will begin to decline.²⁴ MASF aid, since it is related directly to the presence of American forces in Viet Nam, will drop substantially and may be phased out altogether. Given the decrease in U.S. force levels, all the talk in the world about the United States being a Pacific power will not avert the lessening of American commitments in Asia. Intensity of commitment, presence of troops, and level of aid are all intimately related. The discrepancy between continuing U.S. commitments and reduced U.S. force levels, pointed out by Earl Ravenal,²⁵ is likely to be resolved soon by reducing the commitment and aid as well as the troops. In the meanwhile, the policy Washington is pursuing is not calculated to please our Asian partners. As Professor Frank Trager has indicated, “We are encouraging and requiring our allies and friends to do more to defend themselves as the price of our doing less — a curious kind of bargain.”²⁶ The only solace is found in the fact that the Administration will proceed slowly and ease the way with substantial aid:

. . . we cannot move too fast without sapping the Asian sense of confidence and security. . . . And we cannot cut our own contributions to Asian security without providing for their assumption by our Asian friends. Thus, the decision to reduce our presence carries with it the obligation to help our allies create the capacity to carry the responsibilities we are transferring.²⁷

Re-evaluation of the Threat

Intensity of commitment, presence of troops, and level of aid are also closely related to threat perception. Here, too, recent policies suggest a lessening of commitment and withdrawal of

²³*Ibid.*, p. 109.

²⁴MAP aid has actually declined for many years, although the \$731.5 million requested for FY 1972 represents some increase over the previous year. In contrast MASF, which totaled only \$34 million in 1965, rose to \$2,177 million in FY 1971 and to nearly \$2,231 million for FY 1972. Sales and supporting assistance have also increased but not to the same extent as MASF. See *Economic Issues in Military Assistance, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States*, January-February 1971 (Washington: GPO, 1971), p. 204.

²⁵Earl C. Ravenal, “The Nixon Doctrine and Our Asian Commitments,” *Foreign Affairs*, January 1971, p. 216.

²⁶Frank N. Trager, “Alternative Futures for Southeast Asia and United States Policy,” *ORBIS*, Spring 1971, p. 397.

²⁷*United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace, op. cit.*, p. 95. This statement certainly implies a reassessment of U.S. commitments as strengthened capabilities are developed in aid-recipient countries.

forces, which will eventually result in reduced security assistance. Policy toward Communist China is central to these developments; a political accommodation of some kind with Peking will be particularly significant for the future of the military aid program. For many years, most MAP funds have gone to so-called Forward Defense countries. The concept of Forward Defense has been intimately linked to the perception of China (and to a lesser degree the USSR) as a threat to the security of noncommunist Asian states and indirectly to the United States. Thus any *détente* with China will substantially weaken the principal justification for MAP.

More important, improved relations with China will ease the American departure from Viet Nam. The enormous investment in Viet Nam, almost all critics agree, is disproportionate to the contribution that area of the world can make to American security. Still, as long as defending South Viet Nam was part of a larger policy of containing China, it could be justified. But a domino theory presupposes that someone is interested in playing dominoes. If China is not, it is appropriate to reduce both troops and aid to the Asian countries. The controversial question remains: Is the United States reducing its presence in Asia because China is less of a threat, or is the Administration claiming China is less of a threat in order to justify reductions? The Nixon Government avoids this question by stating that reduced U.S. force levels are linked to increasing capabilities of the noncommunist countries in Asia. These increased capabilities, in turn, have partly resulted from increased aid. Nevertheless, the downgrading of the Chinese threat will inevitably weaken the justification for enormous amounts of aid flowing to the six Asian nations. Sharp reductions in military assistance, beyond those voted by Congress in 1971, especially to South Viet Nam, are almost certain to occur soon.

Changes in perception of China as a threat are not likely to affect the aid given to the non-Asian recipients. In their case security assistance was provided with a watchful eye on Moscow. The USSR's increased attention to the Middle East and Indian Ocean areas in recent years might even be an argument for stepping up aid to Greece, Turkey, Jordan and Israel were it not for the widespread belief that a Soviet invasion of the area is nearly inconceivable.²⁸ Instead, Soviet activities are taking the form of

²⁸The Administration also accepts this view: "The most prevalent Communist threats now are not massive military invasions, but a more subtle mixture of military, psychological, and political pressures." See *ibid.*, p. 4.

THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND MILITARY AID

political and economic penetration of the Middle East. Furthermore, continuing hostility between Greece and Turkey reinforces the suspicion that each wants military aid primarily to counter the threat of the other. This is a serious difficulty the United States has often had to face in the history of the military assistance program: the purposes for which it gives military aid are frequently not the purposes for which the recipients desire the aid, or those carried out by the uses to which the recipients put the weapons. Unfortunately, there has been no satisfactory resolution of this problem, as recent events in the South Asian subcontinent attest. In the Greek case, distaste in the United States for the present military dictatorship militates against increased aid.

Aid to Jordan and Israel is likely to remain substantial, as the Administration attempts both to retain political influence in the Middle East and to counter Soviet aid to the Arab countries. Israel, especially, is seen by some as a barrier to the spread of Soviet influence. Barring an unexpected settlement of the Arab-Israeli confrontation, military assistance to Israel in the 1970's should continue at a high or even higher level.²⁹ Aid to Jordan helps to maintain that country as a viable political entity and reduces the risk that Palestinian guerrillas can force an Israeli-Jordanian clash.

The Concept of Self-Help

A basic precept of the Nixon Doctrine is that the United States should help those nations which help themselves. But self-help has not been interpreted to mean merely a willingness to share burdens. According to Administration pronouncements, the United States should encourage — indeed require — the people most affected to make the fundamental decisions on policy questions instead of imposing made-in-America solutions on them. Local initiative is considered central to the success of the Doctrine:

We Americans are a do-it-yourself people — an impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves. This trait has been carried over into our foreign policy.

We devised strategies, and proposed them to our allies. We discovered dangers, and acted directly to combat them.

Its [the Nixon Doctrine's] central thesis is that the United States will

²⁹Senator Henry Jackson, for example, stating that Israel is "in the front line in resisting the historic imperial ambitions that lie behind Soviet policy," said he would attempt to obtain \$500 million in new military credits for Israel. (See *Washington Post*, September 24, 1971.) He was not able to accomplish this for FY 1972. The exact amount of aid to Israel is classified.

participate in the defense of allies and friends, but that America cannot — and will not — conceive *all* the plans, design *all* the programs, execute *all* the decisions and undertake *all* the defense of the free nations of the world.

I wish to communicate my Government's conviction that Asian hands must shape the Asian future.³⁰

Encouraging local initiative among aid recipients is a laudable goal. It would appear, however, that the Nixon Doctrine cannot be fully implemented to serve this purpose in all of the Big Ten aid-recipient countries. Israel, of course, needs no military advice from the United States; one might suggest the contrary. This is also true, but to a lesser extent, of Greece and Turkey and possibly of Korea and Taiwan. But for the remaining five major military aid recipients, local efforts, however sincere, cannot replace American initiative. If these countries are to make their own defense decisions, in a sufficiently professional way to warrant U.S. aid contributions, they must acquire some capability to do so. Their defense establishments must learn to manage their resources effectively. They must accurately identify the threats to their security and request appropriate rather than "showcase" aid. They need to engage in force structure planning and adopt optimizing force postures. For these developing countries, the problems of modernization and improved capabilities relate primarily to ground force organization, training, command and control, mobility and firepower, logistic support and other aspects of what is generally referred to as the force and combat development process. The hallmark of this process is research and development — that is, that complex, future-oriented activity whereby operational capabilities are determined, developed and instituted within the military services in deliberate and orderly fashion.

This is not to suggest that American military planners always know best and are innocent themselves of making numerous and costly mistakes. It simply is inconceivable, however worthy the goal, that the Nixon Doctrine will result in the United States soon conceding the decisive policy voice to many of the present military aid recipients.

If the Nixon Administration really intends Asian hands to shape Asian futures in the security sphere, urgent priority should be given to improving the recipients' research and development

³⁰*U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace, op. cit.*, pp. 5, 6, 60. (Emphasis in the original.)

THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND MILITARY AID

capabilities.³¹ As of the moment, most of the developing countries have practically no R&D capability in any area of human endeavor.³² It has been estimated, for example, that expenditures for research and development in Latin America amount annually to only some 0.2 per cent of the Gross National Product, while in Asia such expenditures range from 0.1 to 0.5 per cent of GNP. In Africa, outlay for research and development is virtually nonexistent. The figure for the Soviet Union, on the other hand, is about 4.2 per cent and for the United States about 3.2 per cent of GNP. Most European countries spend from 1 to 2 per cent of their GNP on research and development. Asian countries, aware of their needs, have set a goal of 1 per cent of GNP to be devoted to R&D activities by 1980.³³

In Southeast Asia, where the bulk of military assistance flows, there is no country currently capable of sustaining rational military modernization efforts, with the possible exception of Thailand. Thus in the 1970's, the Nixon Doctrine notwithstanding, Americans will make most of the decisions affecting military aid policies. If the past is indicative, many costly and tragic mistakes will be made. Having mastered the complexities of creating and maintaining a modern military establishment, the United States naturally, if somewhat naively, extended this experience to the developing areas. As a consequence, modernization in the military sphere has been and still is largely conceived of as an exercise in molding the armed forces of the underdeveloped nations to the American likeness. This parochial approach has resulted in the uninterrupted flow of arms and men to nations whose security was allegedly threatened, and large-scale training in the United States of military officers from those countries.³⁴ Modernization came to mean Americanization, as U.S. personnel,

³¹The term "research and development" frequently connotes only "hardware" procurement to professional defense planners. I am using the term in a broader sense to include determination of requirements, decision-making and "software" considerations as well as hardware development, procurement and utilization.

³²Secretary of State Rogers said that the United States is "attempting to engage the decision-making and budgetary process of recipient countries by encouraging their leaders to recognize the total costs of their forces and to make themselves the hard choices for the allocation of limited resources." (See *United States Foreign Policy 1969-1970. A Report of the Secretary of State* [Washington: GPO, March 1971], p. 168.) Unfortunately, Rogers does not explain how they are to do this when they lack a research and development capability.

³³Lester B. Pearson, *Partners in Development* (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 66.

³⁴From FY 1950 through FY 1970, under MAP, 213,465 students were trained in the United States, and 105,578 overseas, for a grand total of 319,043. See *Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts, op. cit.*, p. 15.

doctrine, equipment, organization and training procedures inundated local security forces.

Results of these efforts have been mixed. Many would agree that, measured in terms of its enhanced security, Korea represents a successful, if incompleting, case. While all the returns are not yet in, Viet Nam must remain a question mark until the Saigon government demonstrates its ability to "go it alone." One could go around the world and argue case by case. But the future is more important: the Nixon Doctrine professes to want to reduce Americanization in favor of self-determination in security endeavors. This makes sense. Unfortunately, however, there have been no efforts yet to improve the research and development capabilities of the aided nations in order to enable them to make these important decisions. Unless this is done — and there was no indication in the FY 1972 program that the Administration had advanced beyond recognition that the problem exists — the self-help aspects of the Nixon Doctrine may result in more billions spent with little additional security achieved.³⁵

The United States, as well as the developing nations, would benefit if aid recipients could play a rational role in determining security requirements. Recipients might request more appropriate aid. Latin Americans, for example, might accept the fact that they have little part to play in global security and, accordingly, forgo advanced weapons systems in favor of more economic and social assistance. Latin American and other recipients might do well to emulate the new regime in Indonesia, which is stressing the economic and social role of the Indonesian armed forces and abandoning the preposterous emphasis on advanced weapons systems, such as long-range submarines, deemed necessary by Sukarno as he pursued confrontation politics.³⁶ At the same time, as the Cam-

³⁵The Peterson Report recognized this urgent need and made a strong recommendation: "The United States now makes the basic determination of the amount and kind of military equipment the receiving countries need. . . . More should be done to enable these receiving countries to estimate their own requirements . . . and to make their military decisions. . . ." Unfortunately, this recommendation has not been implemented except by the usual and endless training of foreign officers. (See *U.S. Foreign Assistance in the 1970's. A New Approach*, *op. cit.*, p. 14.) Training was certainly not the full implication of the Nixon Doctrine statement that the United States would give allies "the technical assistance needed to determine their own requirements and to make the hard decisions on resource allocation which a meaningful security posture demands." *United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace*, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

³⁶Most of the weapons acquired by Indonesia in the 1960's came from the USSR. For discussion of Soviet military aid to the Sukarno Government, see Wynfred Joshua and Stephen P. Gilbert, *Arms for the Third World: Soviet Military Aid Diplomacy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), Chapter 4.

THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND MILITARY AID

bodian case suggests, care must be taken that emphasis on the social role of the armed forces is not pushed to the extent that they are unable to perform their primary mission of maintaining national security.

Perhaps the greatest benefit from establishing R&D capabilities in the aid-recipient countries would be to put the "communist threat" in perspective. This would be especially true if their research establishments were broadly-based, drawing on the universities as well as military establishments for research personnel to provide more realistic threat assessments, vital to the structuring of armed forces. They would also be more likely to understand the inherent limitations any less developed society labors under in rationalizing its armed forces.

Finally, local initiative would occur more readily in a setting which accepted as a fact of life, as Samuel Huntington has pointed out,³⁷ that the military are inextricably involved in the civil affairs of their respective societies. Local authorities might wisely adapt to the situation, rather than unsuccessfully attempting to create apolitical armed forces on the American model.

Greater self-reliance on the part of aid recipients will probably mean some diminution of U.S. political influence in those countries. But perhaps this is a liability the United States should willingly accept, because security, if it is to be achieved at a tolerable human and financial cost in the noncommunist developing world, must reflect an ongoing adjustment of indigenous needs to indigenous capabilities. That does not mean merely creating lighter and smaller rifles for small-stature Vietnamese. It means, as the Nixon Administration clearly intends, a greater decision-making role for the aid recipients themselves — a commendable objective not yet implemented.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND U.S. FORCE POSTURES

A Lower U.S. Profile Through Security Assistance

The major items in the defense budgets of the developing nations are expenses for purchasing local consumption goods and paying troops. The enormous costs of weapons development and procurement and the lesser but still significant expense of research and development have affected aid recipients but little since the United States bears almost all of these costs. Precisely for this

³⁷Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), Chapter 4.

reason, as well as because the American force structure entails high costs per combat soldier and the need to pay American soldiers relatively well, it is clear that it is much cheaper to put an allied soldier in the field than an American. Furthermore, the Nixon Administration wishes to reduce U.S. general-purpose forces, for a variety of reasons. Thus emerged the point made in policy pronouncements that a MAP dollar could buy much more security for the United States than a dollar spent directly on U.S. forces. Carried to its logical extreme, such an argument would result in substantial U.S. force withdrawals around the world.³⁸ Substituting for the departing troops would be improved local forces, created partly by increased U.S. security assistance, partly by the recipients' greater self-help efforts, and partly by the assumption of larger defense burdens by other developed states, notably Japan in Asia and the NATO countries of Western Europe.

To further these goals, the Nixon Administration has taken a number of steps in addition to adopting the now-famous Vietnamization strategy. Korea has received particular attention since, outside of Viet Nam, it offers the best chance of demonstrating that increased security assistance can result in reduced U.S. force levels and concomitant net budget savings. Currently Korea is in the third year of its force modernization plan. U.S. aid is substantially underwriting this effort. Not only has Korea gotten a large proportion (the exact sum is classified) of the approximately \$447 million MASF funds to support its efforts in Viet Nam, it also receives a substantial part of the MAP funds for Asia. In FY 1971, an additional \$150 million was provided in supplemental legislation for Korea; this program is expected to continue for another four years.

In return, Washington plans to withdraw one combat division from Korea at a projected saving of some \$250 million annually, and may eventually withdraw the remaining combat division as Korean force modernization matures. Secretary Laird claims that U.S. net savings resulting from the differences in cost of security assistance and U.S. troop withdrawal and deactivation could amount to about \$450 million over a five-year period. Not merely

³⁸A central argument of the Nixon Doctrine is that security assistance will enable the United States to withdraw troops and reduce the probability that American forces will engage in combat abroad: "An effective security assistance program will lessen the need for and the likelihood of the engagement of American forces in future local conflicts." *United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace*, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND MILITARY AID

“good economy,” this is “a long stride in the direction of a key goal of the Nixon Doctrine — that of greater sharing of the defense burden with our allies.”³⁹

A Reduced Role for General-Purpose Forces

In keeping with this policy of increasing aid and decreasing troop levels, the worldwide role of U.S. general-purpose forces has been sharply reduced. Previously, the objective had been to maintain sufficient general-purpose forces to fight a major war in both Europe and Asia and cope with a lesser conflict elsewhere. Current doctrine has substituted the one-and-a-half war concept for the two-and-a-half. This reduced role theoretically permits U.S. troop withdrawals in Europe as well as in Asia. In fact, however, force reductions have all been in Asia. As Laird reported in March 1971, the United States in the last two years has reduced or currently plans to reduce American military strength in Asia by 325,000 men. Besides troops withdrawn from Viet Nam, this figure includes reductions in Japan, Okinawa, Thailand, the Philippines and Korea. Laird assured Congress that the “U.S. military presence in this [Asian] area is going down, not up. It is being replaced by improved capabilities of nations in this area, both through their own efforts and through the assistance which we are providing them.”⁴⁰

The Administration has also stepped up its campaign to get Japan to undertake a share of the burden the United States is relinquishing. But all the Secretary could report in 1971 was that the “Japanese have announced plans for continuing qualitative improvements in their self-defense forces, thereby enabling them to provide for substantially all of their conventional defense requirements.”⁴¹ This seems to be a minimal contribution from the world's third largest economy. Thus the new one-and-a-half war strategy, while theoretically meaning that the United States and its allies could resist an attack by either the USSR in Europe or China in Asia, actually indicates a “Europe first” security strategy.

That we are retreating from Asia but remaining in Europe is further validated by the Nixon Government's resistance to Senator Mansfield's proposal for sharp reductions in American force levels

³⁹*Toward a National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence*, op. cit., p. 109. The number of U.S. troops in Korea was reduced from 60,000 to 40,000 in 1971. See *National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence*, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird's Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1973 (Washington: GPO, February 8, 1972), p. 116.

⁴⁰*Toward a National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence*, op. cit., p. 108.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, p. 109.

in Europe. At the risk of oversimplification, it may be said that Europe will get American troops, Asia will get American dollars. Still, the Administration is attempting at the same time to get the allied European governments to pick up additional defense costs. Secretary of the Treasury Connally minced no words on this subject in his London talk of September 15, 1971:

... we again think we have a right to ask that there be a greater sharing of the defense burden among the nations of the world who can afford to do so. Now it is significant that 36 per cent of the total United States budget is in the defense area and I submit to you that there's not any industrialized nation in the world that is even close to it.⁴²

Security Assistance and the Achievement of Security

It is not certain, although the Administration's policy assumes so, that increased security assistance can substantially improve the military capabilities of the recipient nations, for there will be a diminishing rate of return for dollars spent. Additional increments of military aid will not automatically produce additional increments of security.

Even more dubious is the assumption that improved local military capabilities, if attained by countries such as Korea, can fully compensate for the departed U.S. troops. It is frequently asserted — and this is one of the Administration's principal arguments for increasing military aid — that “as long as Washington can support eight to ten foreign soldiers for the cost of one U.S. soldier, American taxpayers are getting a bargain. . . .”⁴³ While this may be true in a purely combat sense, it is a fatal flaw to assume that the sole purpose, or perhaps even the principal reason, for having American troops in Europe, Korea and elsewhere is the contribution Americans make to the combat capability of military forces opposing communist countries. On the contrary, the presence of an American division or two means that no invader can attack that country without killing substantial numbers of Americans. It is this fact — not pronouncements about the United States keeping its commitments — that makes U.S. intervention credible and hence deters attack. This is not to say it is wise to keep a large number of Americans overseas, but the Administration has to accept the fact that military assistance is no substitute for American soldiers as a deterrent security measure.

⁴²*Washington Post*, September 26, 1971.

⁴³Robert Jefferson Wood, “Military Assistance and the Nixon Doctrine,” *ORBIS*, Spring 1971, p. 273.

THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND MILITARY AID

THE FUTURE ROLE OF MILITARY AID UNDER THE NIXON DOCTRINE

The Nixon Doctrine is not one document but a series of policy pronouncements beginning with the famous Guam statement of 1969 and continuing to the present. These pronouncements were written by multiple authors and meant for multiple audiences and the particular objectives stressed naturally varied with the particular situation. As the President himself stated, "We recognize that the Doctrine . . . is not a detailed design. In this case ambiguity is increased since it . . . involves other countries."⁴⁴ Because of these factors, the Nixon Doctrine can at best provide policy parameters, not a specific guide to action in every case. The surprising aspect of the Doctrine is that it is as precise as it is, not that it contains some ambiguities and intellectual inconsistencies.

With regard to the future of the international security assistance program, some of the Doctrine's directions are easy to follow. It does not suggest an absolute decrease in the security forces of the noncommunist world; instead, the decrease in U.S. efforts is to be accompanied by intensive efforts to use international security assistance to upgrade the forces of aid recipients. It assumes, but with no policy to implement it, that recipient nations will play a greater role in making their own defense decisions. There is also an expectation that allied — both aided and developed — countries will undertake a greater share of the large defense burden the Nixon Administration thinks it is necessary to maintain. This assumption is being challenged by Japan and the European countries by their behavior if not by their statements. Both an absolute and relative decline in the security positions of the noncommunist Asian states appears imminent. To date these developments have not affected the security of Europe, since all troop reductions have so far been made in Asia. High levels of security assistance, if maintained, may slow but not arrest the decline of American power in the Pacific.

Whether high levels of security assistance can long be sustained by the Administration is debatable. It would appear, given the mood of the country and the resistance in Congress to such enormous military assistance, now exceeding \$4 billion annually, that sharp reductions may have to occur soon. This is especially true with regard to Viet Nam, and the other Asian recipients, for three reasons. First, when all the troops are finally out of Viet

⁴⁴*United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace, op. cit.*, p. 20.

Nam and Korea, it will no longer be necessary to placate or bribe these states with large-scale aid for "agreeing" to the American departure. Second, large-scale aid results from commitments reinforced by American participation in recipients' defense forces. When participation declines, belief in the commitments will decline and aid will diminish. Third, there is no consensus — in the United States or abroad — that it is necessary to maintain the high levels of military forces currently opposing the communist countries. On the contrary, many influential Americans believe some reductions in noncommunist military forces are not only feasible but desirable. Others regard noncommunist military forces as instruments that repress their own peoples without adding to U.S. security.⁴⁵ These critics will press for a reduction in both the U.S. military budget and the international security assistance program.

The Nixon Administration has justified its troop withdrawals in Viet Nam by alleging that Vietnamization is succeeding. It has also moved to normalize relations with China. This makes it easier to remove troops from Asia, to be sure. But it creates a paradox for the United States since an important justification for reducing troops — the diminishing Chinese threat — renders it difficult to justify billions in aid which permits the removal of troops.

Analysis of the Doctrine reveals another dilemma. On the one hand, it promises a selective, "hard-nosed," nonideological, self-interest approach to U.S. security. On the other, it promises to live up to past commitments. So far the battle has been won by past commitments. It would be hard to imagine a self-interest policy that would allot 95 per cent of the total of U.S. security assistance to these particular ten of the world's 130-odd nations. The policy dilemma is this: the countries that can most affect U.S. security do not need U.S. aid; the fate of the aided countries, with but few exceptions, can only marginally affect U.S. security.

Assuming that at least some security assistance is desirable, the way out of this situation may be to define U.S. security broadly to include such things as "influence," "access," and the fostering of "friendly" relations. Thus, paradoxically, it may be necessary to restore the ideological element and ask what kind of world the

⁴⁵Some base their opposition to military aid on the grounds that it retards economic development. While evidence on this point is not conclusive, such evidence as is available suggests that this view is incorrect. Even if true, security assistance programs could be designed to be complementary to, rather than competitive with, other forms of assistance. On these points, see the testimony of Charles Wolf in 1971 before the Proxmire Committee, in *Economic Issues in Military Assistance*, *op. cit.*, pp. 344-364.

THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND MILITARY AID

United States wants to see in the year 2000, not what will affect U.S. security narrowly defined. It would then be possible to develop a rational resource allocation model to determine the recipients, amounts, kinds, and mixes with other aid and efforts for the international security assistance program. Present commitments should be an input, but only one factor, in determining aid allocations.

In 1971 Congress reduced considerably the funds requested for international security assistance. Given this action, it would appear that long-range continuance of the program at anything like the \$4 billion level requested for FY 1972 is inconceivable. Congress, and notably the Senate, has too many grave misgivings over too many features of military assistance, especially the service-funded support going to South Viet Nam. Increasingly, doubt is cast on the value of providing security assistance to Third World countries on the grounds, whether true or not, that it serves primarily to prop up unpopular regimes whose alliance with the United States contributes weakness rather than strength to American foreign policy. These arguments, previously advanced only by a small minority in Congress, are now being accepted by many former supporters of the aid program, especially in the Democratic Party.⁴⁶

Such ideas run directly counter to the central role accorded military aid in implementing the Nixon Doctrine. Thus it is to be expected that there will be an intensifying of the battle between the Nixon Administration and many liberal Democratic senators over international security assistance policies.⁴⁷ Hopefully, out of this clash will emerge some consensus which will permit a rationalized and selective aid program, at a much lower level of funding, to be among the viable instruments of American foreign policy in the changed political climate of the 1970's.

⁴⁶Interestingly enough, however, at the same time that belief in the utility of military aid for security, political and economic purposes is declining in the United States, it appears to be rising in the USSR. In 1970 the Soviets made new military aid commitments to Third World countries totaling \$800 million, the largest amount since 1964. (See U.S. Department of State, *Communist Governments and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1970*, RECS-15, September 22, 1971, p. 16.) For a discussion of Soviet-American military aid competition in the less developed countries, see Stephen P. Gibert, "Soviet-American Military Aid Competition in the Third World," *ORBIS*, Winter 1970, pp. 1117-1137.

⁴⁷Since this article was drafted, disagreement within Congress on security assistance was demonstrated again in the Conference Committee defeat of the FY 1973 bill in October 1972. A continuing resolution provides funding at the FY 1972 levels until February 1973.

DETERRENCE, ASSURED DESTRUCTION, AND DEFENSE

by Martin J. Bailey

THROUGHOUT this century Americans have pursued the will-o'-the-wisp hope of peace and held with increasing fervor to the idea that war is too horrible to happen, or to be allowed to happen, again. Time and again the hope and the idea have proved false, and war has hit us unprepared. Moreover, our unpreparedness and the frustrated rage provoked by our disappointment have combined to make each war more costly — more horrible — than it need have been.

Since World War II we have partly corrected these bad habits, yet have occasionally fallen victim to even more dangerous variations of them. After a brief return to near-disarmament and isolationism in 1946-1947, President Truman awoke to the dangers of these policies and set America on the road to creating a substantial military establishment that has played a continuing and sometimes active role in shaping national security policy. To that extent we have reluctantly parted with our fondest hopes. However, the philosophy and structure of our strategic forces bear the marks of those hopes, showing an emotional and physical unpreparedness so pervasive as to threaten the life of the nation. We have built forces with a compulsive faith that they will not be used, and in so doing have needlessly assured that when they are used the war will reach the ultimate in horror for us. That is, we have concentrated on *deterrence*, particularly on deterrence of thermonuclear war, almost without regard to *defense*, which would mitigate the horror should deterrence fail.¹

In the 1950's our preoccupation with deterrence reached the extreme of being potentially self-defeating. Our entire strategic force — SAC bombers plus a few liquid-fueled missiles — was vulnerable, and coupled with SAC's "fail-safe" operating system would have been dangerously accident-prone if the Soviets had

¹For a general theoretical treatment of most of the issues discussed in this article, see Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); also, D. G. Brennan, "The Case for Missile Defense," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1969, pp. 433-448. For the case for defense concentrated exclusively on deterrence through assured destruction, see J. H. Kahan, "Stable Deterrence: A Strategic Policy for the 1970's" *ORBIS*, Summer 1971, pp. 528-543.

copied both. Starting with the deployment of Polaris submarines, followed by hard-silo Minuteman emplacements, we corrected these problems, perfected our deterrent posture, and made a half-hearted start on a civil defense system. In a sense we also perfected our strategic doctrine in this period, and as is customary, have let it harden into dogma.

The concept of “assured destruction,” which when two-sided translates into “stable deterrence,” also translates into dogmatic rejection of any defensive measure to reduce potential destruction on our side. In the dominant view the only consideration is to minimize the likelihood of war; any measure not contributing clearly to that end is presumed to work against it. At the extreme, this view rejects arms control as neither possible nor desirable, besides rejecting all forms of active and passive defense. All such measures make war prospectively less horrible, and so are claimed to reduce deterrence and make war more likely. Put differently, the doctrine is that each side strictly requires some minimum level of assured destruction to deter the other; any measure that would reduce assured destruction to one side below that level is unacceptable to the other, and would provoke it to spend whatever is necessary to restore the status quo. Thus, any such measure is destabilizing. If the measure proposed is mutual arms reduction, this view says both sides would *and should* reject it. If the measure is an anti-ballistic-missile (ABM) or other protective system, the view says that it would touch off an arms race.

In this article we will argue that it would serve the best interests of the United States to reduce the direct threat of total devastation even if the reduction is reciprocal. It is a worthwhile aim for the United States to be able to survive an all-out war and recover within, say, ten years, even if the Soviet Union and China can do the same, and even though the combination seems to lessen deterrence to all-out war. In our view proponents of “stable deterrence” disastrously overrate its reliability, even if their belief that the Soviet Union shares this strategic philosophy — which is at best unconfirmed by clear evidence — is true. If deterrence of all-out war is unreliable, and if all-out war, however devastating, is likely to happen at least every hundred years or so, the death of our nation is assured within the foreseeable future unless we protect our ability to survive and recover.

THE FRAIL REED OF DETERRENCE

The current strategic policy of the United States, and its un-

derlying philosophy, tries to reduce the risk of all-out war to an absolute minimum through terror, almost without regard to any other consideration. Let us examine the case for this policy. Suppose the threats to all countries were no greater than they were at the outbreak of World War II; millennia of experience tell us that such threats are not enough to prevent war. Today's threats, however, are more serious. Every country faces a clear and present danger that it might be wiped off the face of the earth, with few survivors and with no chance of a national revival. Disasters of that magnitude have threatened few nations or empires since ancient historical times.

Faced with this ultimate threat, it appears that the leaders of a great power should rationally behave more cautiously than they otherwise would, in two respects. First, they should be less likely to set out deliberately to use all their weapons in total war, when the effect is suicidal. Second, they should be less willing to start conventional wars that might go completely out of control.

Before accepting the appealing argument for absolute deterrence, however, one should ponder several questions. (1) Given the rich variety of types of national leaders that major powers have selected in the past, should we stake the life of our country on the hope that future leaders will always be competent and rational? (2) How certain is it that all-out war is irrational? (3) Suppose it is true that all-out war is less likely under our present strategic policy than it would be if total war were less devastating; *how much* less likely is it? (4) With regard to conventional wars and other situations that could lead to all-out war, does deterrence work? The first three questions are crucial to the *raison d'être* of our present policy of deterrence without defense; the fourth provides us with a test that may shed some light on the other three.

Because it does shed some light, consider first the fourth question: Does extreme deterrence prevent conventional wars and other dangerous crises? Manifestly, the record is far from perfect on this score. Since 1945 there have been at least three major breaches of this type of deterrence: the Korean War, the Cuban missile crisis and the Viet Nam war. The Chinese entered the Korean War in the face of a clear possibility that the United States might use nuclear weapons against their cities and industry. To be sure, they felt they had recourse to the umbrella of Soviet nuclear forces, but they could not be sure of its worth. The important point is that there was a possibility of further escalation, yet they went ahead. In the second instance, the Soviets knowingly took an

DETERRENCE, ASSURED DESTRUCTION, AND DEFENSE

even bolder risk when they placed nuclear missiles in Cuba; the immediate prospect of nuclear war failed to deter them from the attempt, even though it was brought to bear in their eventual backing down. In the Viet Nam case, in the 1950's Soviet leaders publicly declared their support for "wars of national liberation" in the teeth of the U.S. doctrine of "massive retaliation." It was plain that both sides had Viet Nam in mind. Subsequently the risk that escalation of the conflict could get out of hand failed to deter the Soviet Union and China from supporting the North Vietnamese.

Thus the history of wars and crises involving U.S., Soviet and Chinese forces through twenty-five years of nuclear deterrence is scarcely reassuring. The main value in deterrence, some think, is its contribution to the defense of Western Europe — but by now there is widespread doubt of the U.S. willingness to commit suicide in defense of that area. What if the Soviet Union and the United States reduced their mutual hazard from all-out war to a level of damage from which both could recover in ten years — about the same damage that the Soviet Union suffered in World War II? In that case the possibility of total escalation would be quite believable; would it not be at least as effective a backup deterrent to a Soviet invasion of Western Europe as is the possibility that the United States might opt for suicide? One could make a good case for believing so.

Another kind of evidence points to the same conclusion. Criminologists widely believe that capital punishment fails to deter capital offenses, and that a high probability of detention and (mild) punishment deters crime more effectively than a low probability of severe punishment. No conclusive evidence on these points is available, but centuries of relevant experience suggest that they are right. If by analogy the same is true of the deterrence of limited war, wars comparable to World War II or less will occur more often under present U.S. and Soviet policy than they would under a more credible, scaled-down threat of all-out war. That is, scaling down the mutual threat would not only make all-out war less disastrous, but would make deterrence of limited wars more effective.

Consider now our three questions about the deterrence of all-out war. First, should we count on U.S., Soviet, and other great-power leaders always to be competent and rational in the face of ultimate risks? Past American Presidents include some who were scarcely reassuring in this regard, and the record of past Soviet and

European rulers is even less reassuring. It may be said that none of these faced a danger as extreme as the present one, but one can find leaders farther back who did. For example, in the fourth to sixth centuries a succession of Roman-Byzantine and Persian emperors faced each other with varying hostility and in constant peril. The two empires were surrounded by fierce tribes that caused frequent trouble; particularly after the collapse of the Western Roman Empire, it must have been obvious that the same thing could happen to both the surviving empires. They could not afford to exhaust themselves fighting each other. Nevertheless, after successful deterrence for 139 years, they did just that. Subsequently, the Saracens overran the Persian Empire and the southern portion of the Byzantine Empire, and much of the rest of the Byzantine Empire fell to incursions from the north. For Persia this disaster meant the end of its civilization and its state religion; for Byzantium the disaster was less complete, but was also irreversible. The ultimate in deterrence succeeded in that instance for more than a century, but in the end it failed.² It could fail again.

Our second question suggests the possibility that a rational Soviet leader might contemplate all-out war. The term "rational" refers to a proper relation between *his* values, not ours, and the means he employs. Current calculations of assured destruction are comparatively reliable only for the destruction of industry; population can be dispersed into the countryside on fairly short notice. Moreover, it is cheap and easy to provide fallout shelters in the countryside that would assure the survival of nearly all the population regardless of how strategic weapons are used (provided people are protected from bacteriological attack, if any). A modest, innocuous amount of dispersion of key industries would make an enormous difference, also, to postwar recovery potential. A Soviet leader seeking the ultimate triumph of communism could quietly prepare for war along these lines, and could evacuate his cities on the pretext, say, of a deep crisis with China; then he could destroy the United States without warning, using chemical and biological weapons against the shocked and sick survivors of the nuclear attack. His prudent provision for recovery, and the use of his weapons against other countries, would assure Soviet dominance of the world even though U.S. retaliation destroyed two-thirds of his industry.

²Vern L. Bullough, "The Roman Empire vs. Persia, 363-502: A Study of Successful Deterrence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, March 1963, p. 55.

DETERRENCE, ASSURED DESTRUCTION, AND DEFENSE

It is immaterial to this scenario whether the Soviet leader can control his weapons tightly enough to gain a complete surprise, or has reason to doubt that he can. All that is required is a Soviet leader who *believes* he can, and is willing to take the risk. The paths of history are strewn with the bones of leaders who were as recklessly confident as that, and not all of them can be judged in retrospect to have been irrational. Should we trust the survival of our civilization and values to the hope that no such leadership will appear among our enemies? We are reckless ourselves if we do.

This case raises a question about how assured "assured destruction" is. To be certain of the level of Soviet destruction usually discussed, the United States would have to deploy terror weapons: cobalt and sodium bombs, 100-megaton bombs designed to maximize destruction by fire, and possibly also chemical and bacteriological weapons. But apparently, rather than taking assured destruction that seriously, we permit it to be unreliable.

Now suppose, in spite of the foregoing discussion, that all-out war is less likely than it would be if both the United States and the Soviet Union could assuredly survive it. Our third question about the wisdom of relying exclusively on deterrence is: How much less likely? It matters a great deal whether it is orders-of-magnitude less likely or only a few times less likely, if that. What reduction in the likelihood of war makes it worthwhile to prefer a policy of high "assured" destruction to a policy of assured national survival? Although World Wars I and II came atypically close together for wars of that severity, suppose that a frequency of every twenty-five years is representative with respect to war damage of similar extent. That is, suppose that if the United States and the Soviet Union scaled down their maximum threats to each other to the level of the Soviet Union's damage in World War II, wars of World War II scale between these two countries would happen every twenty-five years. Suppose further, from the example cited of the Persian and Byzantine empires, that with continued high assured destruction all-out U.S.-Soviet war will occur within 150 years. The total deaths and damage from war spread over 150 years might be roughly the same in the two cases, although the possible death toll from the single-spasm war with present and foreseeable weapons, at over 90 per cent of both populations, is greater than that from six replications of World War II. The two nations would survive through six replications of World War II, just as Western Europe and Russia have survived and recovered from two such wars. They would probably not both survive an unlimited

war growing out of present weapons and strategy, and the overall consequences of unlimited war for the world are incalculably greater. If we squarely faced the unpleasant choice between these two cases, with no other acceptable way out, which choice would most Americans make?

Moreover, the relative frequency of six wars to one may well be biased in such a way as to make present policy look more effective than it really is. The United States and the Soviet Union might indeed fight one or two wars costing each some 10 per cent of its industry and population, over control of Europe and the Middle East, but it is hard to believe that both would continue to contest these areas that forcefully as often as every twenty-five years. Every fifty to 100 years, no doubt; but every twenty-five years, definitely no. On the other side, any thought that the 150-year estimate for the chance of war under present policy is too pessimistic has to be checked against Murphy's Law, which says that everything that can go wrong does go wrong. Neither history nor a catalog of all the ways by which escalation can get out of control gives us any reliable guide to the likely length of time that all-out war can be avoided. They do remind us, however, that it is unwise to put categorical faith in the proposition that naked deterrence, current style, can be trusted as our sole protection.

PARITY WITH FORCE SECURITY VS. ASSURED DESTRUCTION

A threat that requires further discussion is that of force vulnerability. As noted above, in the 1950's our entire strategic force consisted of bombers and vulnerable missiles concentrated at a few bases; a small number of attacking bombers or missiles could have wiped it out. In contrast, in the 1960's the Minuteman and Polaris systems were comparatively secure from attack, and a substantial fraction of the bomber force was kept in the air at all times. The "assured destruction" doctrine took hold during this change, when its main thrust was concern for force vulnerability. Part of its current thrust remains this same concern, because new technology may make it cheap and attractive to plan to destroy missiles in underground silos.

If new technology should bring back the force vulnerability of the 1950's, eliminating the assured destruction potential on both sides, that would do nothing to reduce the horror of war for the losing side. The side that struck first in that case would still have a big enough force, at present force levels, to destroy the other side

DETERRENCE, ASSURED DESTRUCTION, AND DEFENSE

completely. A successful first strike would give the aggressor the choice of destroying its victim or compelling his surrender.

Thus we must distinguish sharply between two ways of reducing bilateral assured destruction levels — the first through any combination of force reductions and effective active and passive defenses, the second through force vulnerability. U.S. strategic policy properly seeks to protect our forces and to preserve prospective strategic parity in all contingencies, so that we will not find ourselves on the wrong end of a strategic imbalance. That says nothing, however, about the wisdom of reducing the offensive power of the opposing strategic forces through agreed force reductions or effective defenses.

The distinction between two ways of reducing bilateral assured destruction levels has remained blurred mainly because discussion of the subject has focused on unilateral actions that would produce strategic imbalance. Mutual force vulnerability necessarily carries the risk of strategic imbalance — in favor of the side that strikes first. An effective ABM system added to existing strategic forces on only one side creates such an imbalance by its very existence, to the benefit of the side deploying it. Current U.S. policy correctly tries to avoid the chance of any such imbalance in favor of the Soviets, although, as noted above, one could arise from Soviet evacuation plans, civil defense and industrial dispersal.³ To this extent the policy of assured destruction makes sense; it also makes sense to concede strategic balance, i.e., parity, to the Soviets. However, that does not rule out measures that would reduce potential destruction to both sides while maintaining approximate parity. To say that a requirement for assured destruction rules out such measures either misapplies the lessons from the earlier era of force vulnerability, or proposes an unlimited gamble on a policy of naked deterrence, or both. In order to maintain clear and orderly discussion, we sharply separate the question of what level of mutual deterrence is best from the question of maintaining strategic balance.

Consider now the following force postures. Posture A would signify a drastically reduced strategic force and military budget on both sides, such that each side could expect to recover from a full-scale attack by the other. Posture B would combine a drastic reduction in strategic offensive forces with an added full array of defenses, such that total military spending would remain roughly

³See Herman Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 99, 131-132.

unchanged at current levels. Posture C would add enough defense to our present offensive forces to secure a drastic reduction in our opponents' offensive threats. We shall look at Postures B and C both as possible unilateral changes in the U.S. force and as bilateral changes in which the Soviets would match the U.S. changes. Each of the bilateral postures might come out of a negotiated arms limitation agreement, although what either country would agree to depends on its aims and on its fears.

Before analyzing these postures, we should at once address the question whether defense is worth buying in any case. This question arises because there is a lingering suspicion that no form of defense works well enough to be worth the trouble. If tens of billions spent on an ABM system and on civil defense could be fully offset by a few extra billions spent on offensive forces by the other side, defense would lose an arms race and should quit before it starts. In contrast, if a few billions spent on an ABM and on civil defense could be offset only by doubling or tripling the other side's offense, defense would win an arms race and the offense should accept defeat gracefully.

These conclusions apply also if the two countries cooperate to a degree, instead of thinking only of counteracting each other. For example, instead of buying ineffective defenses, both sides would be better off to agree to an equivalent modest reduction in offensive forces; the effect on force potential would be the same, and both sides would save huge sums of money. If defense is irresistibly effective, both sides should agree to junk their offenses and buy only small defenses to protect against cheating and against smaller countries' offensive forces. They would save money and would have all the security that defenses could give them. For further discussion, let us assume that neither proposition is true — that the effectiveness of some possible defenses falls in a middle ground where neither offense nor defense is a sheer waste of money. Defense can nullify the entire opposing offense only at a crushing cost, and the added offense to offset a substantial defense would also be painfully expensive. If so, the outcome of an offensive-defensive arms race is in doubt, and so is the question whether an arms race would ever start if one or both sides built substantial defenses.

Let us now examine the alternative postures. Posture A, mutual force reduction, would protect the United States (and the Soviets) against the ultimate threat of being wiped off the face of the earth, and would save money. The safety it offers would reinforce any

DETERRENCE, ASSURED DESTRUCTION, AND DEFENSE

gain from eliminating bacteriological weapons, which the superpowers say they have tentatively agreed to ban. It would have no effect on the inability of either side to disarm and dominate the other, although it would reduce the possible penalties for trying, while reducing the collateral damage caused by such an attack. It would superficially reduce the nuclear backup for NATO and other U.S. commitments, but would make this backup more credible. Posture A can be arrived at only by an agreement that includes inspection, which the Soviets have categorically rejected.

Posture B, if adopted either by agreement or unilaterally, would also protect the United States against the ultimate threat, but would not save money. Suppose for discussion purposes that halving our offensive forces, and halting the introduction of new weapons, multiple warheads, and related improvements would release between \$5 billion and \$10 billion a year for strategic defenses. Conservatively, such a sum will buy ABM's able to intercept at least half (and perhaps nearly all) of any incoming warheads aimed at our Minuteman silos, while also making possible improved civil defenses, with or without city-oriented ABM's depending on their effectiveness, sufficient to cut civilian deaths roughly in half.⁴ This alternative thus gives at least the same safety against the all-out war threat as would a U.S.-Soviet agreement to cut respective offensive forces in half. By its ability to nullify half of the Soviets' attack force, it halves their effective force aimed at us without reducing their threat against other countries. At the same time, by cutting our own offensive force in half it would leave parity undisturbed and would guarantee to the Soviets that we could not disarm them with a pre-emptive strike, even if we could conceivably do it now. For the United States it would keep the same expected safety margin as does Posture A against the Soviets trying to disarm us pre-emptively.

If *both* sides adopt Posture B, the damage from all-out war is cut in half a second time, combining the effects of Posture A and a unilateral B. The Soviets would cut their offensive force in half, and our defense would halve the effect of the remaining part; the Soviets reciprocally would receive the same compounded benefit. Thus mutual adoption of Posture B looks good for both

⁴Statement by Robert S. McNamara before the Senate Armed Services Committee, *The Fiscal Year 1969-73 Defense Program and the 1969 Defense Budget*, January 1968, p. 64. Also see Joseph Romm, "Background of Civil Defense and Current Damage Limiting Studies," speech before the 1965 Convention of State School Plant Officials in Lincoln, Nebraska, October 4-5, 1965 (U.S. Office of Civil Defense, June 1966).

sides, assuming benign Soviet intent. However, verification of the offensive force cut requires inspection, the same as Posture A. The main practical appeal of Posture B is that the United States can adopt it unilaterally without giving the Soviets any reason to counteract it.

Posture C, in adding defense to the present U.S. strategic offensive force, would give us the same security against the major Soviet threats as would Posture A or a unilateral Posture B. It would cost more than either. However, it has a further notable feature: it disturbs strategic parity in our favor by halving the Soviet offensive threat against us. The Soviets might fear that an optimal combination of U.S. offense and defense could knock out most of their force and intercept the rest if it were then used in retaliation, while leaving us with a powerful residual force. Given the limited aims of U.S. policy, this possibility can only be a disadvantage to us. When we earlier had this kind of capability, we took little advantage of it; but the Soviets have had their fill of looking down the gun barrel, and would react. Thus Posture C would almost surely provoke a Soviet force increase. Their reaction could either be to build more offensive forces, as McNamara repeatedly claimed they would,⁵ or to build a corresponding defense. But the comparison between these two possibilities is exactly the same as the comparison between a unilateral and a bilateral Posture B; and we have found that the bilateral Posture B is better for both sides than a unilateral Posture B, if both sides have limited aims. Thus McNamara's repeated assertion was wrong; the implied Soviet response to the provocation of our new defense would be to build a matching one. As a result, each side would gain the strategic advantages of Posture A though both sides would be spending considerably more money.

Posture C is inferior to Posture B as a unilateral choice for the United States if in fact the Soviets are prepared to stop at strategic parity and have nothing more ambitious in mind. However, if their continued deployment of offensive weapons upsets the strategic balance, the United States must then choose between additional offensive weapons and Posture C. For that choice the same logic applies as for the choice between current policy and Posture B, but more strongly. The extra cost of a given increase in our strategic offensive force would be substantially greater than the cost saving from a cutback in the offensive force, because of

⁵See, for example, McNamara Statement, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-65.

DETERRENCE, ASSURED DESTRUCTION, AND DEFENSE

the sunk costs in the present force. Thus in this context cost considerations strengthen the case for an effective strategic defense.

The more ambitious policy by the Soviet Union would raise frightening questions about its aims and about the risk of war. Indeed, such questions are already justified. The Soviets have neither declared nor shown by their actions that they prefer a quiet life under the umbrella of "assured destruction." Repeatedly they have challenged the status quo in Europe, in the Middle East and in Southern Asia; and repeatedly they have challenged the strategic balance. Simple reliance on deterrence might make sense if the Soviet world view and attitude toward war were as close to ours as is the British world view. Such a similarity would make it easy for Washington and Moscow to achieve the harmony of interests that has kept Britain and the United States firmly at peace with each other for almost 150 years. However, it need hardly be emphasized that overwhelming evidence points to dissimilarity and disharmony. Within the next few years, further evidence of the same kind may force us to choose exclusively between a more powerful offensive force and some variant of Posture C, even though we should keep trying for something less expensive and less dangerous.

SPICE FOR SALT II

Again let us assume that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union seeks to disarm and dominate or utterly destroy the other. If this is true, almost any likely force posture is better than the one we have now. Posture C on both sides would cost an extra \$5 to \$10 billion a year, and would buy us extra safety comparable to a mutual force reduction by at least half. If we take the threat of nuclear war seriously enough now to be spending over \$10 billion annually on strategic forces and associated R&D, it seems entirely reasonable to contemplate a less than doubling of the spending to cut the threat by at least half.

Far more reasonable, however, would be Posture B, in which each side holds its total budget constant while diverting funds from strategic offense to strategic defense. This shift produces a dramatic drop in the threat to both sides compared with that posed by present forces, without any significant disadvantage, provided the Soviet shift can be verified. If the total size of the military establishments on the two sides cannot be cut in the short run, because of political and negotiation problems, Posture B

would be a good way to better both sides subject to that constraint. Then, in the longer run, perhaps overall reductions, especially in offensive forces, would be agreed upon, inasmuch as specific cuts in these forces would already have been introduced under Posture B.

Posture A with verification also looks good as a negotiating target for further SALT talks, inasmuch as both sides would be better off strategically than they are now, and both sides would save money. For a time, going to a halved strategic offensive force would almost eliminate spending on it, because the bulk of current spending is on new equipment and new technology, which would cease entirely. Thus in the short run Posture A offers almost no scope for shifting some of its spending into defenses. However, after a time keeping the offense modern and operational would require spending at something like half the current level; and we have seen in considering Posture B that it would be better to use the money to buy defenses, letting the offensive threat recede still farther.

Underlying this analysis is the belief that in a world of approximate parity, the lower the mutual threat is, the better. Its conclusion is that the arms race of the 1960's was a waste of money for both sides, which should be ended and reversed as soon as possible by mutual agreement. Moreover, the worst possible outcome of the SALT talks would be freezing the opposing forces in their current postures. If the alternative is a race between the two sides to build effective defenses, that could well be better than an agreement to freeze present forces.

CONCLUSION

Strategic thinking in recent years seems to have been dangerously dominated by the fears aroused by our vulnerable offensive forces of the 1950's. We saw the specter of a successful first strike against us that would leave us naked to our enemies, and we responded with the doctrine of "assured destruction." In clinging to that doctrine we have rejected a rational defensive posture and negotiating stance because we have too gullibly accepted McNamara's faulty logic about the supposed danger of an arms race. It is one thing to be sure that we will have something left if the other side attacks our forces; it is quite another to reject any measure for increased security to both sides. National security is too complex a subject to be wrapped up in a force doctrine so simple as to be no more than a slogan.

DETERRENCE, ASSURED DESTRUCTION, AND DEFENSE

Moreover, we should never forget that every type of weapon developed in the past has been put to use, even though throughout this century war has repeatedly been pronounced so horrible that humanity will surely abandon it. What sense does our present force posture make if in spite of it there will be a war using all weapons? If we thought war was imminent, would we leave ourselves bare of effective active and passive defenses? Present policy assures us that full-scale war will destroy from 50 per cent to over 90 per cent of the American population, with similar losses of U.S. and Soviet industrial capacity. Such assurances are appalling. With or without Soviet acquiescence, the United States can lower probable devastation in future wars. Any foreseeable strengthening of the Soviets' offensive power can be offset by defensive measures well within practical cost limits to us, and, joined with a limitation on our own offenses, our defenses would give them no reason to react if their aims are limited. If they can be brought to agree on a mutual damage-limiting strategy, money could be saved and we would be reassured about their aims.

THE FUTURE OF AMERICA'S COMMITMENTS AND ALLIANCES*

by Andrew J. Pierre

THE United States is in the midst of the most searching debate on the fundamentals of American foreign policy since the late 1930's. At the center of it is the future of America's commitments and alliances. Large numbers of citizens from all strata of society have begun to question some of the basic assumptions that guided U.S. foreign policy during the past quarter-century. Clearly we are in a period of confusion and uncertainty. We are told that we are at the end of the postwar era, not only by academics, journalists and others who feed grist to their mill by debating foreign policy, but also by the President. Yet we are also aware that much of the familiar pattern of the past twenty-five years remains, and that perhaps it is premature to pronounce the death of the Cold War.

What will make the 1970's distinct from the previous two decades is that then we were expanding our international role, whereas the present period is a time of retrenchment. After the Second World War a wide pattern of American commitments evolved as a consequence of the perceived need to defend the vital interests of our allies and ourselves in a hostile world environment. George Washington's dictum of avoiding entangling alliances was discarded as the United States contracted forty-four formal alliances and many other forms of commitment. Several hundred overseas bases were established for our armed forces. The American presence created abroad was unique in our history and unparalleled by any other nation during the mid-twentieth century. From the Truman Doctrine and the establishment of NATO to the formation of SEATO and the initialing of many other agreements, the United States made clear its intention to accept the international responsibility thrust upon it by its growth and its position of unequaled strength among the noncommunist countries at the close of the war. In recent years, however, the old

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AMERICA'S COMMITMENTS AND ALLIANCES

assumptions have been increasingly questioned as a number of new or changing factors have begun to transform the international arena. Four significant factors are involved.

(1) International politics is entering a new era of asymmetrical multipolarity. In the coming period five power centers — China, Japan, the Soviet Union, the United States, and an emerging Western Europe — will be the principal actors. Japan's new postwar status is the result of its impressive evolution in the past decade to the rank of the third most powerful economic state in the world. Although its strength today is primarily measurable in economic terms, history teaches us that such strength is sooner or later translated into political and military power. For the People's Republic of China the process of emergence has been hastened by two recent developments. The end of the cultural revolution has stimulated in the Chinese a new desire to enter the world of multilateral diplomacy, and this has occurred at a moment when the Western states, and in particular the United States, have decided to deal with this nation of over 800 million people on the basis of reality, rather than ideology or legalisms. Western Europe is yet to become a self-contained power center, not because of inadequate resources but because of failure in political leadership. Bolstered by British entry into the European Economic Community and the gradual progress being made in deepening and strengthening the integrative aspects of the EEC, Western Europe will be increasingly formulating an identity of its own.

A multipolar world will make for complex, untidy, subtle and sometimes inscrutable relationships. Each power center will react to the others and billiard ball-like clashes and causations may not be uncommon. Unlike a billiards game, however, the balls will not be of equal weight. Asymmetrical multipolarity will foster the growth of a complicated global balance of power, marked by fluctuations or shifts of differing relevance and import. We will, moreover, increasingly see startling changes which at one time were relegated to the theater of the absurd. In February and May 1972, for example, President Nixon was in Peking and Moscow negotiating with our presumed enemies, while our relationship with our postwar allies in Japan and Western Europe deteriorated. Correct and understandable as these moves in the new diplomacy may have been, they upset many of the past beliefs of the American people.

(2) The Soviet-American rivalry will continue into the multipolar era. These two nations will for some time still be the

only superpowers. Thus while asymmetrical multipolarity unfolds in the realm of *political* relationships, the *military* bipolarity of the past generation will only slowly erode. Aside from the nuclear balance, a fundamental change is occurring in the content and character of the bipolar relationship. The Soviet Union has recently emerged as a global superpower as well as a nuclear superpower. The growth of Soviet general-purpose forces, taken together with the expansion of Soviet strategic nuclear force capabilities, has given the USSR a totally novel military status. This is particularly evident with the development of its worldwide reach through added mobility.

Moscow has been engaged in an imperialistic thrust which marks the final transformation of Russia from a continental power to a global one with far-spread interests and military capabilities. The purpose of this expansion is more political than military, the expectation less one of waging war than of underpinning foreign policy goals. Thus the deployment of the Soviet navy into the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean is designed to support Soviet foreign policy through military power utilized for political purposes.

The perceptions now held by Soviet and American elites on the usability of military force for political purposes are radically different. In the United States the military is looked upon with increasing disfavor as an instrument of foreign policy. This has happened largely as a consequence of the Viet Nam war. In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, the worldwide dispersion of conventional forces and the establishment of bases is increasingly favored as an instrument of policy. These divergent perceptions are a cause of apprehension lest they lead to miscalculations of one side by the other.¹

(3) The age of strategic parity has arrived, but we have yet to grasp its full implications. In the past, the United States based its strategic and foreign policy on an initial position of nuclear monopoly and then on superiority. This made it easier — or so key political leaders believed — to “face down” the Soviet Union, especially in Berlin and at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. Superiority was also seen as buttressing the credibility of the United States’ nuclear guarantee to its principal allies. One can argue that the condition of superiority was less important than the fact that American freedom of action was restricted with the

¹For further discussion of this point see my “America Down, Russia Up: The Changing Political Role of Military Power,” *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1971.

AMERICA'S COMMITMENTS AND ALLIANCES

beginning of American vulnerability to Soviet offensive forces in the late 1950's, and that effective parity was achieved at that time. In the subjective world of nuclear strategy, however, what men and nations think and believe often counts more than objective criteria. If, as a consequence of the new rough parity, the perceptions of Soviet and American political leaders change and the perceptions of our allies are altered, the impact upon international politics in the coming years could be great.

The political implications of strategic parity are only beginning to be understood. We do not yet know if our NATO allies will perceive a substantial erosion in the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee because of the codification of parity in SALT. Similarly, negotiation of a Soviet-American strategic arms limitation agreement and its resulting inhibitions upon American policy have not yet been assimilated by Japan or the other nonnuclear powers to which we have given security assurances. A great deal will depend on the perceptions of the American leadership held in Moscow, and the perceptions and motivations of the Soviet leadership as seen by American policymakers.

Perceptions are important to the extent that they are indicators of national resolve and will. With the arrival of rough strategic parity, *slight* advantages or disadvantages in nuclear weaponry by one side or the other are not likely to be of great consequence in the resolution of a crisis. In such a situation, particularly a crisis involving protracted political bargaining, the national resolve of the political leadership as seen by the other side, and the public support that leadership holds, are more apt to be consequential. Thus a large number of nonmilitary factors — such as the social and political cohesion of a society, how it behaves at a time of great national stress, its degree of determination as opposed to vacillation, the confidence of its leadership, and the support it receives from the public — are likely to be of increasing importance in future crisis bargaining.

(4) The breakdown of the domestic consensus that supported American foreign policy for most of the postwar period will create important constraints upon the policy options open to the President. These constraints will be particularly felt with relation to the use of military force. The objectives of U.S. foreign policy in the past have been relatively clear: the maintenance of American security through the containment of communist expansion and assistance to the economic and political development of the non-communist world. This prescription has now become both too

simple and too difficult to serve as a guide for future action: too simple because the polycentric nature of world communism is well recognized; too difficult because the ideological challenge from the communist camp cannot be sealed off through territorial containment. Accordingly, we are uncertain about what our proper role should be in such areas as the Indian Ocean and Latin America.

Until the Viet Nam experience is well behind us, any American President is sure to use extreme caution before deciding upon armed intervention in the Third World. He will not undertake an intervention until he is reasonably certain of the support of a substantial portion of the American people and Congress. This support will now be more difficult to achieve because of the public debate over Viet Nam and the credibility gap in the good faith of the executive branch of government which it created. With the tolerance level on American interventions considerably reduced, it is difficult to predict under what circumstances the United States will be prepared to use armed forces abroad except in direct defense of the Northern Hemisphere and Western Europe. That American soldiers would now be used to deal with "unfavorable" political changes overseas, as in the Dominican Republic in 1965, or Lebanon in 1958, is doubtful. General Maxwell Taylor, speaking at the National War College in 1970, suggested that it was "a real question whether limited war in the present climate is a realistic option of United States foreign policy." He went on to define a "feasible" limited war option as one "limited to a declared war of clearly defined objectives rapidly conducted without conscripts or reservists."²

General Taylor's definition may be unduly restrictive, but it is clear that the constraints on the use of American military power have considerably increased. In the future we will be more selective and cautious. The supposition may be that the United States has neither the responsibility nor the right to intervene militarily in an internal dispute, even if an insurgency is being supported by an outside power. Thus the threshold of involvement will without doubt be higher than it was in Viet Nam. The use of American military power abroad will be restrained until the emergence of a new domestic consensus supporting our foreign policy.

THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND U.S. COMMITMENTS

The Nixon Doctrine is President Nixon's reaction to changes in

²Maxwell Taylor, "Military Strength and National Power," *National War College Forum*, Fall 1970, p. 11.

AMERICA'S COMMITMENTS AND ALLIANCES

the world scene and in American opinion. If the President had totally free rein in setting the course of U.S. foreign policy, it is not at all clear that this "low profile" would be his choice. In recent years, however, the American people have grown weary of the burden of maintaining a strong international role. This sense of national tiredness, this concern with the overextension of America's reach, may have been coming about in any case, but without doubt the Viet Nam war hastened its arrival. In announcing the Doctrine as formulated in his first two foreign policy messages to Congress, President Nixon was accommodating to pressures for a partial disengagement from our role of forward containment. In addition, he had to take into account widespread disillusionment with military power as an instrument of foreign policy. The course of the Viet Nam conflict threw into question the policies of counterinsurgency and limited war. Even more important, the whole question of American intervention abroad was at the center of an emotive debate. Still another ingredient was the feeling, strongly held by many Americans, that greater attention should be paid to our domestic problems: the urban crisis, the racial problem, the environment, ecology, and the quality of American life.

In retrospect the Nixon Doctrine may have been extremely prescient, identifying the rapidly growing asymmetrical multipolarity of international politics. History may well associate it more with a recognition of multipolarity than with retrenchment because of domestic concerns. Recent times have witnessed a historic reversal of American policy toward mainland China. This may have been inevitable at some point, but it remains a fact that the Nixon Administration policy reflects an interest of some years on the part of the President in opening the door to China. The new policy, in turn, results from a reappraisal of the Chinese threat and of the need for "close in" containment. A more relaxed attitude is now evident vis-à-vis China not only as a threat to American interests, but as a threat to its neighboring states in Asia.

The Nixon Doctrine is based on the assumption that a devolution of America's overseas role is desirable. This devolution is made possible by the emergence of a multipolar world in which other nations are able to undertake a greater share of the burden of their own security. Not only are other nations more affluent and militarily capable, but they should be able to concert their policies more effectively into a regional framework. The Doctrine,

therefore, presupposes the construction of regional balances of power which would lessen the degree and extent of American involvement. Greater intraregional cooperation is also seen as a desirable goal.

Self-reliance by other nations is a central tenet of the Doctrine. America's friends and allies can, and should, assume more of the responsibility for their security and well-being. The United States will continue to provide the nuclear shield but will look to its allies to provide the necessary conventional manpower. Indigenous forces are accordingly expected to replace American troops whenever this is possible. U.S. airpower and naval forces will, however, remain available for the support of indigenous forces. In addition, the reduction of American forces will be facilitated by military assistance programs for the national armies of the countries concerned.

The "low profile" proclaimed by the Nixon Doctrine is to permit a reduction in U.S. general-purpose forces and in the U.S. defense budget. Although it may turn out that the budget will not be reduced because of the rising cost of equipment and manpower, the Doctrine facilitates efforts to hold defense expenditures down. With respect to force reductions, the assumption is that there must be sufficient U.S. military power to fight a war in Europe *or* a war in Asia, plus the contingency of one small-scale war elsewhere, rather than simultaneous full-scale wars in Europe *and* Asia — in other words, one and a half rather than two and a half wars. Thus, by substantially altering the planned projection of U.S. military power around the world, the Nixon Doctrine has had a significant impact on America's commitments and alliances.

THE FUTURE U.S. ROLE IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Prevailing political-military trends will alter and limit the future U.S. role in Asia. The rise of China as a strategic nuclear power will strengthen that nation diplomatically, as will her return to multilateral diplomacy. Once the United States becomes vulnerable to Chinese nuclear power, confidence in the U.S. guarantee to Japan and to other Asian states will erode in the same manner as it did in Western Europe once the United States became vulnerable to Soviet missiles. Japan also will emerge as a stronger military power, although the nuclear question and the usability of Japanese conventional forces in the surrounding region continue to be matters of debate. Moreover, before the

AMERICA'S COMMITMENTS AND ALLIANCES

end of this century Japan may well supplant the Soviet Union as the second ranking economic power in the world. Her important economic position is even now placing her at the center of international negotiations on trade, aid and investment, and her increasing economic impact on Asian neighbors is enhancing her political influence in these countries. The extent to which this growth in economic power will be matched by growth in military capacity and international political influence is difficult to assess. It is likely, however, that there will be considerable "spill-over" into the military-political field. Already estimates of Japan's vast military potential are affecting the calculations of policy planners in various foreign affairs ministries.

The American role in Asia and the Pacific will also be changed by the reduction of U.S. forces in South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Japan, Okinawa, the Philippines, and, of course, South Viet Nam. Even if we extricate ourselves from Viet Nam with "honor," the experience of this tragic war will, for some of the reasons cited earlier, restrict the future U.S. role in Asia. Meanwhile the Soviet role in Asia is growing. The Soviet fleet is increasingly active in the Indian and Pacific oceans, and Soviet diplomacy now appears to be guided by a need to contain Chinese influence in the area. Moscow's recent interest in renewing political negotiations with Tokyo so as to balance the revival of Japanese interest in relations with China is a case in point.

Until the summer of 1971, one could reasonably hope for an orderly devolution of the U.S. responsibility in Asia through a coordinated policy with Japan. The "Nixon shocks" of that summer, however, sent a tidal wave across the political relationships in Asia and the Pacific, and the new configuration has yet to emerge. The lack of consultation before the announcement of President Nixon's trip to Peking did more than make Prime Minister Sato and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leadership look foolish. It also served to discredit the ruling party's policy of close alliance with the United States, to reopen the domestic political debate in Japan and within the LDP, and finally to hasten Sato's retirement and the rise to power of the dynamic LDP political leader, Kakuei Tanaka. The August 15 announcement of Nixon's New Economic Policy destroyed more of the fiber in Japanese-American relations, not so much because of the substantive issues involved as because the Japanese leadership and political community felt that it was Washington's intent to make economic war on Tokyo.

The special relationship with the United States, which has been

the centerpiece of Japanese foreign policy, has thus been brought further into question, especially among the opposition parties. The economic shock will probably be weathered as Japanese industry turns more to public works and government-supported projects, and as increased attention is given to social welfare, the nation's infrastructure, and the serious environmental problem.

In foreign policy the trend is already in the direction of greater flexibility and experimentation. Now that the United States is well on the road toward improving relations with mainland China, the new Tanaka government has taken its first steps — including the Prime Minister's visit to Peking in September — to normalize relations. Japan has even keener interest than the United States in such a course. Similarly, the outstanding issues between Japan and the Soviet Union may become subject to negotiation, particularly if Moscow perceives the need for improved relations with Tokyo as a consequence of China's breaking out of her shell, and if it also desires Japanese help in the economic development of the USSR's eastern areas. No country likes to feel isolated. Not always well understood in the West is the fact that Japan is essentially an isolated country with few friends in the immediate area. She is not surrounded by culturally related countries as is West Germany, for example. Accordingly, future Japanese policy may have as its objectives increased strength and new friendships. Tokyo will strive for cordial relations with all major powers and immediate neighbors, avoiding difficult choices whenever possible, and its policy would be buttressed by greater self-reliance and military strength.

Japan's potential military strength should not be underestimated. The Japanese already have the eighth largest defense budget in the world. The proportion of GNP spent on defense remains low at 1 per cent, but given the present 11 per cent annual GNP growth, even that provides for significant increases in defense capacities. The Fourth Defense Build-Up Plan for 1972-1976 provides \$16 billion over a five-year period for the Self-Defense Forces. Japan's military forces have been considerably enlarged in recent years and the planned expenditures will emphasize qualitative rather than quantitative improvements.

Furthermore, Japan could become an operational nuclear power in a relatively short time, perhaps in only twelve to twenty-four months following the necessary political decision. Both the existing civil nuclear program and the missile capability, as evidenced by satellite boosters, are highly developed. Whether the

AMERICA'S COMMITMENTS AND ALLIANCES

country will choose to become a nuclear power is another question, one not unrelated to its confidence in the alliance with the United States.

At this point in time, no one can say whether Japan will become a nuclear power in this decade, or even if she will seek to become a strong military power. The Japanese have been relatively comfortable under the protection of the American umbrella and they may want to continue their high yield-low risk policy. Their increasing concern with social measures and a relaxation of the work ethic will downgrade nationalist trends and self-sacrifice. The postwar generation may see advantages in continuing the low posture, particularly if it is accompanied by openings to Japan's former enemies, China and the Soviet Union. On the other hand, there are pressures working toward the creation of a strong Japan with considerable political-military power. Recent reports speak of a rising nationalism, of a "tiredness of being kicked around." Added to this would be the desire to gain leverage in international politics. Such leverage would be useful in future dealings with China and the Soviet Union, and might also serve to safeguard Japan's massive overseas economic investments. Most likely to induce a Japanese military buildup would be an increasing sense of insecurity. This could come about either through a loss of credibility in the United States as a protector, or through a growing fear of China as the latter moves onto the world scene.

There are important psychological and constitutional hurdles that a Japanese government would have to overcome before it could decide to go nuclear, but the "Nixon shocks" have led to a weakening of the nuclear "allergy" and have made possible discussion of a subject which was long taboo. Although the government has signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, it gives little evidence of planning to ratify the treaty soon. The changed position of the United States in Asia — as made evident by the Nixon Doctrine — is a cause of concern. The emergence of a multipolar world is understood in Japan and will influence the actions of Tokyo's current policymakers, who sense the partial disengagement of the United States and the need for rapprochement with China and the USSR. At the same time, the codification of strategic parity in SALT has been noted, and the crucial question asked in London and Paris in the late 1950's is now beginning to be asked in Tokyo: Would the President of the United States be willing to defend Tokyo at the expense of

Washington or New York?³ Early acceptance of the nuclear option is not likely, barring a major international shock, but it can be expected that Japan will continue to strengthen her conventional forces and develop the nuclear option through programs for peaceful uses.

The United States should not encourage Japan to become a nuclear power. For Japan suddenly to join the nuclear club would have a highly destabilizing effect on the nations of Asia. Nor should Washington exert heavy pressure against a decision to go nuclear, since this might be counterproductive and create a Japanese debate which would erode Japanese-American relations. The best policy for us to follow would be what Zbigniew Brzezinski has called "nuclear neutralism," a stance of noninvolvement which fits into the present Japanese inclination to defer a clear-cut decision.⁴ We should recognize, on the other hand, that if Japan should independently make the decision to become a military nuclear power, it would not necessarily be in the U.S. interest to treat Tokyo as we did Paris in the 1960's. Once the Japanese decision is made, there will be little gained by attempting to create obstacles; they are likely to be overcome in any case. The United States, under such circumstances, might well consider aiding the Japanese nuclear program through some kind of technological assistance. In this manner we could gain some influence over the characteristics of the Japanese nuclear program and make certain that our voice was heard in governmental debates on foreign and defense policy.

The Japanese-American security treaty is likely to remain in force in the 1970's since there is little support for its repeal. Japanese-American relations will, however, be modified by the Nixon Doctrine and the partial U.S. disengagement from the Pacific. Okinawa has been returned and U.S. bases in Japan will be reduced in number, if not eliminated, in part because of their decreasing strategic importance to us. Accompanying the partial U.S. disengagement will be an increasing Japanese capacity for self-defense. An upsurge in Japanese nationalism and self-interest may well support an expansion of the military program, even if it does not include nuclear weapons, and will encourage greater independence and flexibility in relations with the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union.

³"Japan Is Losing Aversion to Idea of Nuclear Arms," *New York Times*, December 26, 1971.

⁴Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Japan's Global Engagement," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1972, p. 278.

AMERICA'S COMMITMENTS AND ALLIANCES

Elsewhere in Asia the U.S. disengagement may be facilitated by the creation of new regional arrangements and by local solutions to outstanding problems in such places as Korea and Taiwan. In South Korea the effectiveness of the ROK army has been steadily increased, and further modernization, particularly if this includes assistance with jet aircraft and facilities for the protection of aircraft, could permit a greater reduction in the U.S. presence. The negotiations that have recently begun between North and South Korea are likely to be long and difficult. A start has been made, however, and in time a local solution might be achieved which diminishes the present military confrontation. An eventual agreement between the two Koreas, not unlike the *modus vivendi* now being worked out between the two Germans, could be a beneficial side-product of the opening of U.S. contacts with China.

That a local solution may also be possible in Taiwan appears to be the assumption built into the carefully constructed Nixon-Chou En-lai communiqué of February 1972. In this event, the American military presence in South Korea and Taiwan might, by the end of the decade, be limited to air and naval forces in the area designed to provide a guarantee for the security of these countries. The U.S. commitment to South Korea and Taiwan is not likely to be unilaterally abrogated, but the possibility of local settlements is now a subject of serious attention for the first time because of the emerging quadrilateral pattern in the Asia and Pacific area and President Nixon's trip to China. Following the withdrawal of American forces from Indochina, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) may come to have relatively little meaning for the United States. Hedley Bull, noting a diminished community of interest between the Asian-Pacific states and the United States, has observed that even the U.S. alliances with the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, which have a more enduring basis than some of the others, are subject to this erosion.⁵

If the pattern of disengagement projected here holds true, the Asian and Pacific states will attend more closely to possibilities for creating a regional balance of power. Given the evolution of Chinese foreign policy, and the growing interest among all nations to follow the American example by putting their relations with Peking in a new framework, such a regional grouping would hardly be an anti-communist alliance. More likely, it would be a collective security arrangement, not unlike those that presently exist

⁵Hedley Bull, "The New Balance of Power in Asia and the Pacific," *ibid.*, July 1971, p. 679.

in Africa and Latin America. In such a scheme, Japan, Australia and Indonesia might be prominent members, while the United States would probably not be included. American support might nevertheless be forthcoming if an Asian-Pacific security arrangement was seen as facilitating a partial U.S. disengagement and increasing the chances for peace and stability.

THE FUTURE OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

A multipolar world will have a marked impact on relations between Western Europe and the United States. The transatlantic relationship of the past quarter-century was built upon the construct of a bipolar world. A perceived danger from the East led to the creation of NATO and underpinned much of the rationale for American assistance to the economic recovery of Europe. The Cold War in its harsh phase lasted into the 1960's, and remnants of it exist to this day. Although an intentional and massive Soviet incursion into Western Europe is now considered implausible, the West European sense of security is still subject to real erosion. Western Europe will therefore remain reliant upon the United States until Moscow's aims are perceived to have undergone a fundamental revision, or until an independent and adequate European defense capability comes into existence. Neither of these two contingencies is as yet within sight.

The United States will nevertheless seek a substantial devolution of its security responsibilities in Europe in the 1970's. Many of those who in the past supported a high level of involvement will now feel that the Europeans are able to do more for themselves, whereas the United States needs to pay greater attention to its domestic problems. American diplomacy will reflect more of a global than an Atlantic outlook. Attention will be devoted to a combination of worldwide competition and negotiations with the Soviet Union, and to developing a relationship with China and Japan that will assure peace and stability in the Pacific. Within the Atlantic concept, Washington will seek to shift the United States from a position of predominance to that of equal partner in the sharing of common responsibilities.

Two broad paths are open to Western Europe in this decade. First, the European governments might choose to do nothing to make up for the partial disengagement of the United States. If this happens, they may in time find themselves forced to submit to subtle Soviet political blackmail. Although a Soviet military action across the present division of Europe is implausible, political

AMERICA'S COMMITMENTS AND ALLIANCES

manipulation of insecure West European governments might assure their accommodation to Moscow's purposes and grand design for Western Europe. "Finlandization," as this is called, particularly if it proceeds slowly, would not be likely to activate a sufficiently strong response to permit the West Europeans to resist Soviet influence. Under such circumstances, NATO might still be able to function but its sole remaining purpose would be resistance to direct Soviet military attack. Such a NATO would fail to provide the necessary political support and confidence for Western Europe.

The second and preferable path would be the creation of a European sense of identity which would make possible some relatively small-scale European defense institutions within NATO. This would involve cooperative efforts in defense affairs and eventually a certain amount of integration of national military efforts. The contention is often made that a reduction of the American presence in Europe would not be met by an increase in European force levels but by a similar European reduction in military capabilities. It is argued here that creation of a sense of common identity in matters relating to European security need not require an increase in manpower or in defense budgets. Security is as much a psychological phenomenon as a physical factor. A greater European sense of security could follow simply from the rationalization of existing national efforts and a relatively modest level of coordination. It is not necessarily dependent on increased forces or equipment. An augmented European identity within NATO, providing a new symbol of security, might be sufficient, at least so long as Soviet aims do not become more aggressive.

For the present there is little progress being made toward a European defense identity. British entry into the European Economic Community might have been expected to spur a new attempt at foreign policy consultations and defense coordination, but as the "new boys" in Europe, the British are not prepared to create waves that will offend the others. The French, in particular, continue their opposition to any type of European defense cooperation that might restrict the independence of their own forces. Minister of Defense Michel Debré is probably more hostile to European integration than he is to the Atlantic relationship with the United States.⁶ In addition, Lord Carrington, British

⁶In a recent article Debré suggested a policy of "nonalignment" which in a general political sense is quite similar to the now discredited military policy of "tous azimuts." See "La France et sa Défense," *Revue de Défense Nationale*, January 1972.

Minister of Defense, is less interested in European defense cooperation than his predecessor, Denis Healey, was. This is in part because of a different perception of "Europe," but also because Healey was using European defense cooperation as a way of showing that Britain was a "good European" power and willing to loosen its ties with the United States somewhat. Now that Britain is officially in the EEC, this rationale for British policy has withered away. Prime Minister Heath has many items other than defense on his agenda for negotiations concerning European affairs. On the other hand, bilateral consultations among West European states on matters of defense and foreign policy are increasing, and there is support for giving the present Euro-group within NATO a more formal standing through a permanent secretariat.

The short-term prospects for the creation of a European pillar within NATO are discouraging. Given the expected partial disengagement of the United States from Europe, however, the creation of such a European pillar may be the only way to avoid the demoralization of Western Europe under Soviet pressure.

A new European defense grouping within the Atlantic framework should not be a competitor of NATO. This would argue against placing it within the formal machinery of the European Economic Community. Conceivably it could be an expansion in authority of the present Euro-group within NATO. Another possibility would be basing it on the existing Western European Union, which consists of Britain and the present EEC members. It would be important, probably crucial to its success, that France be a participant, and this would be a critical factor in coming to agreement upon the proper institutional setting.

A new grouping — let us call it the European Defense Commission — would be involved with the whole range of defense capabilities, especially conventional forces, nuclear forces, and the procurement of armaments.⁷ With respect to conventional forces the Commission's prime task would be qualitative rather than quantitative improvements, since a substantial increase in European forces is unlikely as long as the present climate of *détente* persists. A good deal could be done, nonetheless, to make the European armed forces more effective through rationalization and integrative methods. These would include combining logistic systems and coordinating mobilization plans, joint training ex-

⁷The following paragraphs are drawn from my "Europe and America in a Pentagonal World," *Survey*, Spring 1972.

AMERICA'S COMMITMENTS AND ALLIANCES

ercises, and common reserve policies. In addition, a common West European "offset" arrangement with the United States to alleviate the costs, especially in the balance of payments, of the stationing of American forces in Europe might lessen pressures to cut these forces back.

Some reduction of American combat troops in Europe during the 1970's is probably inevitable. The Nixon Administration thus far has successfully resisted attempts in the Senate to reduce forces unilaterally. Past pressures have stemmed from balance of payments concerns, the feeling that Western Europe is now prosperous and should be carrying a greater share of the burden of its own defense, the whole question of "national priorities," the squeeze on the Pentagon budget, the tendency to shed responsibility resulting from the traumatic Viet Nam experience, and a certain amount of midwestern "Mansfieldism." What may now be added to this is a growing consensus within the executive branch of the government that these forces should be reduced in order to avoid less desirable cuts in other parts of the defense budget. The times also suggest a re-examination of NATO strategy which will place less value on the Kennedy-McNamara concept of controlled and flexible response.

There is virtually no chance that U.S. troops will be totally withdrawn as has been sometimes unwisely suggested. American forces are living hostages guaranteeing to the West Europeans that the United States would be involved in a conflict in Europe. But neither is there some magic number below which the cutback cannot go. The "hostage" function would no doubt be as well performed by one-third of the present level of 300,000 troops. The "permissible" amounts of reduction that can be safely made will depend on the political psychology and confidence of the Europeans, taking into account their reading of Soviet intentions. Another criterion will be the manner of the reductions and whether they are made in concert with a parallel reduction in Warsaw Pact forces. An important function of the European Defense Commission would be to assure that any American reductions result from a collaborative approach with the West European nations. A secondary, but critical, task would be to take the lead in drawing up a new NATO strategic doctrine if the present flexible response strategy becomes inadequate or infeasible because of the force reduction.

Discussion of the nuclear component of a European Defense Commission raises controversial and complex issues, but they can-

not be avoided indefinitely. The divisive intra-alliance debate on the United States' proposal of a multilateral nuclear force (MLF) in the early 1960's resulted in nuclear questions being swept under the carpet. Clearly the MLF illustrated the folly of Washington attempting to impose a totally new and elaborate weapons system upon its allies on the assumption that this is what they wanted or needed. Nevertheless, the defense of Western Europe will continue to rest on a strategy of nuclear deterrence. One must consider that: (1) in a multipolar world the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee will be subject to further erosion, perhaps as a consequence of the SALT agreement; (2) the British and French nuclear forces will not be allowed to wither away and their future will greatly affect the future of West European security; (3) in the long run a "uniting Europe" cannot acquire a sense of confidence based on greater autonomy without coming to grips with the intricacies of its nuclear defense.

The SALT agreement — especially the ABM treaty limiting defensive missiles — confirms and strengthens the condition of mutual deterrence between the superpowers. Europeans may now have less faith in the credibility of the American nuclear deterrent than in the past. A convincing argument can be made that the first use of nuclear weapons by the United States on behalf of Europe became implausible when America became vulnerable to Soviet missile retaliation in the late 1950's. What counts, however, are perceptions and beliefs, and most of our allies (excluding de Gaulle, but for different reasons) were prepared to accept McNamara's contention that U.S. nuclear "superiority" was largely responsible for making the guarantee credible.

Even though it may further erode the American nuclear guarantee, a U.S.-Soviet agreement in SALT has been well received by West Europeans because it is seen as curbing the arms race and adding to world stability. Failure to reach a SALT agreement would have been unfortunate from another European point of view. Had the superpowers been unable to agree on limitations they might then have proceeded to build and deploy ABM systems. This would have left Western Europe — which would be unlikely to build its own missile defense because of the expense, problems of command and control, and geographical proximity to the Soviet Union — with a sense of nuclear nakedness. Either way, however, the Europeans will be forced to re-examine the extent of their nuclear dependence on the United States.

For Britain and France, part of this re-evaluation will involve

AMERICA'S COMMITMENTS AND ALLIANCES

their independent strategic forces. These nuclear forces exist and will not be renounced. The lesson of the extensive European nuclear debate of the past two decades is that London and Paris will not accept a nonnuclear role, leaving Western deterrence solely to the United States. Even if the abstract logic of some strategic analysts suggests that "rationally" these forces should be abandoned — that they cannot be employed against the USSR without inviting holocaustal retribution — the political, military, bureaucratic, psychological and security incentives and pressures which led to their creation and maintenance point elsewhere.⁸ Eventually, however, the British and French nuclear forces will need to be modernized. New generations will have to be constructed, even if there is no further ballistic missile defense deployment in the Soviet Union. This will present the opportunity for an imaginative, cooperative undertaking, involving the nonnuclear states of Western Europe as well as the United States.

The task, as challenging as it is important, would be to harness the existing nuclear forces in the service of all of Western Europe. It would require the active and participating support of the non-nuclear states of Europe in close collaboration with the United States. An independent European nuclear deterrent, capable by itself of balancing the Soviet Union, is not feasible mainly because of the problem of its control. But a greater European nuclear role within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance *is* possible and should be given serious consideration.

My proposal, outlined in greater detail elsewhere,⁹ would involve the creation of a European Nuclear Committee (ENC) and a new set of nuclear relationships among Britain, France and the United States. The French and British nuclear forces would be jointly placed at the service of the ENC, on which they and the nonnuclear European countries would also sit. The main purpose of the ENC (which could be part of the European Defense Commission) would be to formulate political guidelines on when these nuclear forces should be used, and to plan for the numerous contingencies that might arise. Since almost all such contingencies would also involve the activation of the American strategic forces, the guidelines would be worked out with the United States, but they would have the advantage of presenting a unified European position to Washington.

⁸See Andrew J. Pierre, *Nuclear Politics: The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force, 1939-70* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972).

⁹"Nuclear Diplomacy: Britain, France and America," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1971, pp. 283-305.

The central element of command and control could not be delegated to the ENC unless there existed a highly integrated, politically unified "Europe." But British and French targeting plans would be coordinated with each other, and in turn coordinated with those of the United States in the same manner as British plans have been in the past. Nuclear strategy would thus become a common undertaking and a matter of close consultations. In practical reality Britain and France would have three sets of target plans: "Atlantic Alliance," "European," and "national," the latter in the unlikely event that independent action should ever be desirable.

The European Nuclear Committee, in addition to being an appropriate forum for discussions of plans and strategy, could have an important role in the development of the next generation of European nuclear weapons. These weapons could then be built on "Europe's behalf." The nonnuclear states might be asked to assist in their manufacture or to make a financial contribution. Although ultimate control would remain with London and Paris, the participation of the other European states would grant them a vote on matters ranging from the choice of nuclear systems to general guidelines for their use.

Agreement on purpose and use of the forces would then make possible collaboration on their construction and manufacture. An *entente nucléaire* between Britain and France is a logical idea. The technology of their nuclear forces is remarkably complementary and suitable for exchange. Britain has a great deal of experience and knowledge about warheads, but little about propulsion systems since it has bought American missiles for the past decade. France has independently developed land- and sea-based missile systems but is behind in sophisticated multiple-warhead technology. Possible collaboration between the two has always run into difficulty because the United States, having given Britain a considerable amount of atomic information and assistance over the past two decades, does not permit this knowledge to be passed on to a third country. Although the British nuclear program developed some impressive knowledge on its own (the first British atomic bomb, detonated in 1952, was manufactured without U.S. assistance), it is so intertwined with that of the United States that it would be impossible to identify the major aspects which are solely of British origin. The ability to cut the Gordian knot therefore lies with the United States. Washington could free the British of existing restraints to collaborate with the French; or it

AMERICA'S COMMITMENTS AND ALLIANCES

could offer direct assistance to France and continue as in the past with Britain. In the mid-1970's relevant sections of the Anglo-American nuclear exchange agreement of 1958 will come up for termination or renewal. At that time it might be best to "Europeanize" the present American nuclear relationship with Britain.

The proposal for a European Nuclear Committee based on the continuing British and French forces, as outlined here, would strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. It would be of special importance to the Federal Republic of Germany as the only major West European power without an independent nuclear capability. It would certainly require, and might make possible, the return of France to the integrated defense system, since it would give her a prominent place in the European defense undertaking. It would be in accord with the Nonproliferation Treaty since it would not include a transfer of nuclear weapons, or their control, to nonnuclear powers. For the coming period, it would have an important symbolic value — in time it could be the centerpiece of the security of a United Europe.

The third major task of a European Defense Commission would be the joint procurement of armaments. The need for much more European cooperation in arms production than exists at present stems from the spiraling cost of weapons at a time of increasing sophistication in the technology of warfare. This coincides with pressure to maintain defense budgets at the present level, or preferably to reduce them. Such pressures are likely to persist and even to mount if the climate of *détente* continues and leads to a series of East-West agreements on European security.

The difficulties of the defense industries of the European countries are in many respects similar to the broader problem of European nonmilitary technology faced with American competition. Whether the "gap" be managerial or technological or both, it is clear that without greater intra-European cooperation in high-cost technology, such as computers, they are under a handicap in competing with American industry. One of the particular problems of defense technology is the relative inelasticity of the demand. The national market is limited and often not sufficiently large. In the case of expensive weapons systems, such as aircraft, it is often essential that foreign orders be assured before a decision on production is made.

The history of joint weapons projects in Europe in the past fifteen years is a distressing one. Of all the projects planned, more were left unfinished than were completed. Often the unfinished

projects led to bitter charges and disputes between officials of the governments concerned. Equally often it has proved impossible to come to prior agreement on the weapons under consideration for development.¹⁰ Two reasons can be cited for this: first, governments' insistence that they receive a "just return" on their investment in the form of orders for their industry of equal value to what they put into the jointly produced weapons; second, the difficulty military services of two or more countries have in reaching agreement on weapons specifications.

The root of the problem is that agreement on weapons and their requirements presupposes agreement on strategy and defense policy. If Germany and the Netherlands, for example, are unable to agree on the tactical strategy for resistance to a frontal attack, it is unlikely that they will agree on the specifications for an anti-tank weapon.

A European Defense Commission would help to solve many of these dilemmas by requiring a far greater degree of cooperation at all levels of defense planning. Once the basic European defense strategy was worked out (in concert with NATO), the Commission would facilitate agreement on common research and development, weapons specifications, joint funding, production, and the like. These functions might also become the responsibility of the Commission. European collaboration would thereby create a European-wide market, capable of producing armaments more efficiently and cheaply, and better able to compete in the world market. This would be another big step in strengthening the European pillar of Western defense.¹¹

THE BALANCE OF FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS, MILITARY COMMITMENTS AND DEFENSE CAPABILITIES

If the great debate on which America has embarked is to lead to a constructive result, it will be necessary to examine our present and future military commitments in terms of our foreign policy interests and available defense capabilities. This is the only proper way to determine the force level required, and the defense budget

¹⁰The failure of the Anglo-French variable geometry aircraft is an example. See J. M. Ramsden, "Europe Learns Some Hard Lessons: Disillusion in Aerospace Cooperation," *Roundtable*, October 1969, pp. 363-368.

¹¹For further discussion of armament procurement problems, see *Defense, Technology and the Western Alliance*, papers issued by the Institute for Strategic Studies, London, in 1967 — especially the paper by Alastair Buchan, *The Implication of a European System for Defense Technology*. Also see Christopher Layton, *European Advanced Technology* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969); Walter Schutze, *European Defense Cooperation and NATO* (Paris: The Atlantic Institute, Paper No. 3, 1969).

AMERICA'S COMMITMENTS AND ALLIANCES

necessary, to safeguard American interests. Coming years will see a retrenchment of American responsibilities abroad and a reduction in our defense capabilities. Such a retrenchment should be carried out following sound analytical studies and on the basis of wise political decisions. The reductions should not be undertaken precipitately, in an emotional, post-Viet Nam atmosphere. Nor should they be determined unilaterally by Congress against the intent of the executive branch; they must be the product of a joint undertaking between the two branches of government.

The proper way to proceed would be to make a region-by-region reappraisal of American interests, present and future. These interests should then be balanced against U.S. military commitments in each area. In some cases the opportunity for reducing or eliminating commitments may become clear, in others it may be necessary to increase the level of commitments, and in still other cases the present level may be considered the most appropriate. Once the balance of interests and commitments is determined, we should examine existing and planned U.S. defense capabilities, expanding or reducing these capabilities as seems appropriate on the basis of the prior analysis. In some cases qualitative changes in capabilities may be called for.

This conceptual scheme is, of course, nothing but an ideal model. Reality will present much more complex choices. It is doubtful that agreement will be reached easily, for example, on the true nature of American interests vis-à-vis particular countries in the latter half of this decade. Nevertheless, only through this type of analysis can we come to a sound approximate measure of what our alliances and commitments should be. Since the military and perhaps economic aid involvement of the United States abroad is likely to be reduced in coming years, it will be necessary to pay greater attention to political and diplomatic instruments. This will require more active participation by the Department of State in national security decision-making, including the setting of Department of Defense estimates of future budgetary requirements and force levels.

Without wishing to prejudice the conclusions of such an attempt to find the proper balance of foreign policy interests, military commitments and defense capabilities, it would appear that the United States will need a force structure for the world environment of the 1970's which will meet some of the following criteria: The United States will seek to maintain strategic nuclear parity with the USSR and avoid the risk of sinking into in-

feriority, but any quest to regain clear-cut superiority will probably be futile. Barring an unexpected change in the international environment, pressure on the U.S. defense budget is likely to continue and it is unlikely that the percentage of the GNP devoted to defense will be permitted to rise. In order to deal with contingencies in the Third World, the United States will need to design military forces capable of rapid and effective intervention. Any American intervention abroad will require a substantial degree of support from the American people, but if this is given, the United States must have the ability to act effectively, either unilaterally or in conjunction with some multilateral peacekeeping operation. Increased emphasis, therefore, should be accorded to the mobility of conventional forces so as to expand their reach in space and time. Priority should be given to airlift capacities and the construction of naval forces capable of underpinning American foreign policy on a worldwide basis.

AMERICAN LEADERSHIP AND THE NATIONAL CONSENSUS

One factor transcends the entire question of the future of America's alliances and international commitments: the matter of American leadership. Our formal alliances will be of little avail if our allies lack confidence in the quality of American leadership. At present there is some doubt around the world about the staying power of the United States. This is evidenced in concern about how far the trend of disengagement in American foreign policy will go. Despite the indications that bipolarity is being transformed into a more multipolar world, the need for continuing American leadership is clear. Who else could undertake global leadership? Western Europe is not sufficiently united and has no international personality of its own to qualify it for the type of world role that is needed.

The character and strength of American leadership is the central question in the future of our alliances. The viability of an alliance relationship depends on the perception an ally has of the national will and resolve of its partner. Now that the United States has lost its clear superiority and a multipolar world is emerging, the question of national resolve will carry increasing weight. Since American military superiority can no longer be taken for granted, the political and psychological aspects of America's commitment will gain added importance. The political implications of rough strategic nuclear parity point in this direc-

AMERICA'S COMMITMENTS AND ALLIANCES

tion: a marginal advantage in offensive missile capability, or in ABM, will be less critical than the perceptions held by the Soviet Union and our allies of America's staying power and our ability to engage in the necessary protracted political bargaining during a time of crisis.

The emerging multipolar world will shift and complicate alliance patterns. The breakdown of past rigidities will encourage nations to negotiate with their presumed enemies and will create additional problems with their allies. We should take care, however, not to build bridges to our enemies while burning them to our friends. The desire to reach accommodations with the Soviet Union and to open contacts with the People's Republic of China, necessary and laudable as these aims are, should not be pursued at the expense of destroying the bonds of trust and friendship with Western Europe and Japan.

The growing world problems of technology, population, scarcity of resources, the environment — and many others with economic, social and scientific causes — make it essential that in the long run there evolve a community of nations among the advanced industrialized states capable of dealing with them.

The internationalist path that has guided American foreign policy for the past quarter-century no longer has the full support of the American people. The great debate underway is likely to modify our past outlook and policies, and lead to a more modest estimate of our needs and capabilities. Such a readjustment is not totally undesirable, but it is important that today's neo-isolationist pressures not divert the United States from its continuing leadership responsibility. In order for America to maintain an even course, a new national consensus must develop to support our foreign policy.

SCANDINAVIAN SECURITY IN TRANSITION: THE TWO-DIMENSIONAL THREAT*

by Nils Ørvik

TRENDS and events on the international scene in 1971-1972 have awakened fresh interest in the old concept of a balance of power. As yet, there is no agreement whether emerging constellations will conform to President Nixon's pentagonal design or appear as modifications of a continued bipolar power structure. What does seem clear is that the postwar pattern of American world dominance, based on strategic superiority, is changing; we have arrived at a crossroads in international affairs where several new directions seem possible.

Among the East-West border areas likely to be affected by these new developments is the Nordic region, and particularly the Scandinavian countries,¹ whose security has been closely related to the distribution of power among the major states. Looking at their position on the map and the characteristics of their respective security arrangements, one wonders how possible reshuffles of world power might influence Northern Europe and Scandinavia.

THE POWER TRIANGLE

Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, Scandinavian security has been a function of external factors. In that long period sometimes called "the British century," the Scandinavian states were a part of the British sphere of influence for economic and cultural as well as strategic reasons. Due to the special features of the British power system, they were able to develop domestically and enjoy security under Britain's naval and diplomatic protection. Finland was at that time a part of Russia.

But the British claim to superiority in Northern Europe was challenged in turn by Germany and the Soviet Union. Thus, Scandinavian security developed within a power triangle, one point of

*This article is a revised version of a paper given at the annual conference of the Society for the Advancement of Scandinavian Studies, at Columbia University, New York in May 1972.

¹The term "Scandinavian" applies here only to Denmark, Norway and Sweden, which on linguistic, traditional and other grounds form an entity different from Finland and Iceland. Whenever either Finland or Iceland is included, we will use the term "Nordic."

SCANDINAVIAN SECURITY IN TRANSITION

which was in Moscow, another in Berlin, the third in London and later in Washington. The Germans challenged British supremacy on three occasions. In 1864, Bismarck successfully snatched for Prussia the mostly-German-speaking remnants of Denmark's continental possessions, without essentially reducing the status of Denmark proper. In 1914-1918, Germany was held at bay by British, joined by American, seapower. Twenty years later, in the Second World War, Hitler's Germany succeeded for a short period in gaining almost complete control over Scandinavia; even unoccupied Sweden complied with German war demands until the re-establishment of Anglo-American dominance seemed certain.

Scandinavia never played a vital role in European politics. It was always a side show, a question of fringe benefits, of securing flanks and improving forward positions for further advance. The Soviet challenge which followed the three German moves had the same basic motivations: securing the USSR's northern flank and edging into better forward positions for dealing with the Anglo-American sphere of seapower. There is, however, one essential difference. While the German challenge to the Anglo-American dominance of Scandinavia was a *military* one, the Soviet challenge has been mainly *political*, only indirectly supported by superior military force.

The first of the Soviet moves came in 1944, with a demand to the Norwegian government-in-exile to cede Bear Island in the Norwegian Arctic to the USSR and to share control of the whole Svalbard island group in a bilateral agreement. The two countries would then establish joint military bases on Svalbard, which since 1920 had been demilitarized by international treaty.² The Norwegian government, still not in physical control, was able to postpone the issue. However, in 1946 Moscow again proposed scrapping the international agreement on Svalbard for a bilateral arrangement of joint rule, which in practical terms would mean Soviet dominance and control.

It is interesting to observe that the same approach was simultaneously applied on the USSR's southern flank, where the Soviets in 1946 wanted Turkey to replace the Montreux Convention for the neutralization of the Straits by a bilateral agreement based on the concept of shared military bases. In each case, consistent pressures were put on a small, nonaligned country

²Trygve Lie, *Hjemover* (Oslo: Tiden forlag, 1958), pp. 84-96, 156-161. Reference in English in Nils Ørvik, *Europe's Northern Cap and the Soviet Union* (second edition; Ilmgau: Pappenhofen Verlag, 1965), pp. 27-28; German version printed in 1965 as *Die europäische Nord Kappe und die Sowjetunion*.

whose possessions were protected by an international agreement deriving from the First World War.³ As we know, both of these Soviet probes were staved off by stiffening Western resistance, which after the British "abdication" in February 1947 materialized in the Truman Doctrine and the subsequent development of America's containment policy. In 1947 the negotiations on Svalbard broke off and have not since been resumed.⁴ Thus, from the late 1940's onward Scandinavia was secured within the limits of an American worldwide power system, much as it had been during the previous period of British dominance.

The impact of American power also slowed down the move of Soviet rule into Finland, which at the end of the war seemed destined for satellite status, similar to the occupied countries in Eastern Europe. Compared to them, Finland had — in traditional terms — a weaker case with only two decades (1917-1940) of full national independence. From the Soviet point of view, a resumption of Russian control of Finland (1809-1917) must have seemed as much of a "normalization" of Russo-Finnish relations as was the reversal of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, concluded in the year the Finns slipped away and won national independence through German aid and military assistance.⁵ The fact that the two pacesetting Soviet-Finnish treaties of 1947 and 1948 did not go farther than they did in subjecting Finland to direct Soviet rule reflects the extent of American influence.

THE TWO-DIMENSIONAL THREAT

In somewhat simplified terms, a small nation's security consists of three major components. Or rather, it is the product of three major inputs: those of the opponent, those of the supporter, and its own. Using "balance terminology," this would mean (1) the inputs provided by the challenger, (2) those by the balancer-holder, and (3) the national effort of the small nation. The op-

³Of the major powers, the Soviet Union was the last to sign the Svalbard agreement. Trygve Mathisen, *Svalbard in the Changing Arctic* (Oslo, 1954), pp. 46-60.

⁴When the Germans retreated from Finland and the Kola Peninsula in 1944, Soviet forces pursued them into northern Norway as far as the Tana River and occupied the northeastern corner of Norway, including the Varangerfjord, until the summer of 1945. At the same time, the Soviets gained control of the Danish island of Bornholm, which they occupied until 1946. These military advances and subsequent withdrawals from important strategic positions have been explained and interpreted in various ways. See, for example, Nils Ørvik and Niels J. Haagerup, *The Scandinavian Members of NATO* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 23, 1965).

⁵The most essential aid was the training in Germany of elite military units and the famous von der Goltz expeditionary corps to Finland in 1918.

SCANDINAVIAN SECURITY IN TRANSITION

ponent side is commonly referred to as the threat. If the threat increases, the nation's security is in danger. In order to maintain stability — the product of national security — the exposed nation will have to provide enough potential to counterbalance the threat, from its own national potential and/or from those of supporting nations. But if the nations that keep the security balance through their supplements either withdraw their support or are weakened to a point where it is no longer effective, this constitutes as much of a threat to a small nation's security as if there had been an increase in the military potential of the identified opponent. If there is, at the same time, an increase in the opponent's forces (the Soviet Union) and a weakening of the supporting side (the United States and NATO), the small state (the Scandinavian countries) faces what one might call "a two-dimensional threat."⁶ This concept will provide the analytical framework for our discussion of Scandinavian security. The hypothesis is that the Scandinavian countries are now facing a two-dimensional threat and have not yet been able to find ways to deal with it.

Applied to the concrete Scandinavian case, these respective components cannot, of course, be measured in any quantitative way. However, comparing the components that formed the security balance twenty-five years ago with those we find today will give some indication of whether there has been an increase or a decrease in the security and stability of the Scandinavian nations.

THE OPPONENT SIDE

Before the Second World War, Scandinavians tended to see Germany as the main opponent, the challenger and the potential threat. In the postwar years, Germany's role was taken over by the Soviet Union. However, Moscow's Svalbard move in the middle 1940's was hardly known by most Norwegians and not at all by other Scandinavians. This was partly because of its political nature. It seemed of little significance to a generation which had been so heavily exposed to military violence and direct applications of force. Further, because the Soviet military threat was overplayed in the late 1940's to justify Danish and Norwegian membership in NATO, many Scandinavians came to regard it as

⁶The "two-dimensional threat" has previously been discussed in my "Nasjonal Sikkerhet og nordisk balanse," *Internasjonal Politikk*, 1964, Nos. 2-3, pp. 233-274, and *Alternativer til Sikkerhet* (Oslo: E. G. Mortensens Forlag, 1970). National security in a wider sense is dealt with more extensively in a paper given at the annual meeting of the Canadian Association of Political Science in Montreal, June 1972, entitled "Dimensions of National Security."

something phony. During the next decade and even in the early 1960's it became fashionable, particularly among intellectuals, to refer to the Soviet threat as a myth that existed only in the disturbed minds of hysterical warmongers.⁷ Soviet relations with Scandinavia were said to be determined exclusively by defensive considerations, and since Soviet leaders were naturally sensitive and suspicious, Scandinavians should refrain from any word or act that might provoke the Soviets to overreact. Traditional arguments warning of the Russian need for ice-free ports were dismissed with a shrug. Ports for what? The Soviet Union had no oceangoing navy, and the existing facilities in Murmansk and Petsamo seemed amply sufficient for its coastal defense.⁸

Most Scandinavians were aware of the enormous development of military bases for air, ground and naval forces that took place in the Kola Peninsula. But they were for the most part satisfied with the explanation, which still prevails, that all these preparations were expressions of a global policy, reflecting East-West tensions and consequently of marginal relevance to the Scandinavian countries.⁹

Since the early 1960's this picture has changed. In a surprisingly short time the Soviet Union has developed large naval forces, fully capable of oceanwide operations. In the Mediterranean, the Pacific and the Atlantic, the Soviet Navy is effective, equipped with sophisticated missilery and nuclear weapons. It is still smaller than the U.S. Navy, but in the two fields of primary concentration, nuclear-powered submarines and missile-carrying surface ships, it has reached formidable proportions.¹⁰

While its expansion is a general Western concern, the Scandinavians have been particularly worried by its northern deployment. The combined Soviet and East European forces in the Baltic are oversized for any conceivable local defense needs and the massive concentration of naval vessels, trawlers and auxiliary ships in the two congested ports in the Kola Peninsula points up a need for dispersion and additional port facilities. The value of missile warning systems and anti-submarine warfare underlines the importance of northern Norway as a forward base

⁷Johan Vogt, *Partisan paa Forpost* (Oslo, 1965), pp. 104-113.

⁸Jan Klenberg, "The Cap and the Straits: Problems of Northern Security" (Cambridge: Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, Occasional Paper, 1968).

⁹Norwegian Prime Minister T. Bratteli in *Arbeiderbladet*, February 17, 1972, and Minister of Defense A. Fostervold in *Ukens Nytt*, January 12, 1972.

¹⁰*The Military Balance, 1971-1972* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972), and earlier issues.

SCANDINAVIAN SECURITY IN TRANSITION

area. Because the Soviets have only a couple of small aircraft carriers, they lack adequate means for air support around the globe, including the North Atlantic. Wolf Halsti, a Finnish military writer, sees northern Norway as a huge aircraft carrier with tremendous capacity for supporting naval operations far into the Atlantic. It is conceivable that Moscow has the same idea and considers control of that area vital.¹¹

A further aspect of Soviet naval deployment is the extent of naval and air exercises, which during the past few years have spread westward into the Atlantic and south into the North Sea. In effect, Moscow has established two "screens" of continuous naval concentrations, one between Svalbard and the Lofoten Islands, the other in the Iceland-Faeroe gap.¹² Seen from Norway, these screens amount to a policy of encirclement that has placed a substantial part of the country behind — east of — the forward Soviet naval positions in the North Atlantic.

While most Scandinavians find these new moves disturbing, one should not exaggerate their importance. A navy with global aspirations, which the Soviet Union is now building, has a legitimate need for adequate ocean facilities, and the Soviet home waters in the Barents Sea may be too small for the maneuvers deemed necessary. Yet one is surprised by the political and psychological motivations that seem to rule many of the Soviet exercises — especially the two large combined naval, ground and air exercises, the Sever in 1968 and the Okean in 1970. On these two occasions, large forces with landing ships and naval infantry sailed through the Danish Straits along the Norwegian coast all the way to the north, copying the German invasion pattern of 1940. The war games ended with landing operations in the Kola Peninsula.¹³

That the Soviets were striving for political side effects was obvious. While earlier maneuvers were always shrouded in deep secrecy, these were widely announced beforehand and amply reported as they took place. The Soviet Union may have decided to enter a new stage in its relations with Scandinavia: while continuing to appear harmless and full of good will, it also wants to demonstrate overwhelming military capabilities, superior strategy, and the futility of resistance. By following the German invasion routes, the Soviets fully expected to recall for the Danes and

¹¹Wolf H. Halsti, *Me, venaja ja muut* (Helsinki: Otava, 1969).

¹²Ørvik, *Alternativer til Sikkerhet*, p. 222.

¹³NATO Letter, September 1970. See also Johan J. Holst, "The Soviet Build-up in the North-East Atlantic," *Survival*, January/February 1972, and his "The Soviet Union and Nordic Security," *Cooperation and Conflict*, No. 2, 1972, pp. 87-96.

Norwegians the painful and frightening experiences of 1940, including association of the enemy's offensive striking power and the Western allies' inadequate assistance.

The naval deployments which have special relevance to Scandinavian security are only one example of the Kremlin's forward thrust. One can point to similar hard-driving expansionism in the Middle East area (temporarily checked), in Asia where a containment policy against China is emerging, in the Indian Ocean, East Africa and parts of the Pacific. In addition, the Warsaw Pact countries have been greatly strengthened and their incentive for loyal cooperation increased through such means as the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Brezhnev Doctrine, which, at least for the moment, seems effective. Although some of these expansionist programs were initiated in the 1950's, the most spectacular achievements stem from the early 1960's or more recently.

THE SUPPORT SIDE

While the past decade has brought evidence of an enormous growth of military capabilities on the opponent's side, the same cannot be said of the strength of the supporters, i.e., NATO, during the same period. When Soviet probes in Scandinavia were discontinued after 1947, this was attributable to America's continued engagement in European affairs, its monopoly of nuclear weapons, and its ability to supply almost unlimited economic, technological and political resources for the defense of all of Western Europe. Moscow was aware of its own relative weakness.

Twenty-five years later, the United States is still prominently engaged in the defense of Western Europe and NATO appears to be a thriving defense organization after twenty-three years of existence. The member countries have better equipped and better trained armed forces than they had two decades ago. Sophisticated equipment, developed by the United States, has been liberally distributed to the NATO states. Large sums of money for military aid have been poured into most of them. Compared with the situation in the late 1940's, their overall strength and resilience seem greatly improved. Why, then, should the Scandinavians have any doubts that the protection they have received since the late 1940's remains an effective deterrent, even when confronted with a vastly increased Soviet military posture?

But these doubts do exist and are attributable to developments within the Western alliance during the past decade. The 1962

SCANDINAVIAN SECURITY IN TRANSITION

Cuban missile crisis was President Kennedy's grandest hour and a great morale booster for the whole alliance. The United States and its allies had stood firm and the challenger had backed down. But since then the Western defense community has suffered one blow after another. In 1964-1965 the United States became hopelessly entangled in Viet Nam. A year later, France defected from the alliance organization and opted for its special version of undeclared semi-neutrality. At the same time, the West German government initiated its *Ostpolitik*, which may have brought some gains to the Federal Republic but represents another wedge of national separatism jeopardizing the unity of the North Atlantic alliance. NATO's ideological foundations, already slightly eroded through Portugal's anachronistic colonial policies, suffered another blow when the military junta came to power in Greece. The disarray of the alliance became embarrassing as national defense appropriations failed to meet the goals military planners had set as essential for maintaining a credible deterrence. The length of compulsory military service, which at the outset had been at least eighteen months in most countries, was reduced in some of them to sixteen or even to twelve months.

While the West European countries could have done much more to bolster their own and their allies' security, the decisive factor has always been the United States. The Europeans have been unable to provide, even within the framework of an extended European Community, the *leadership* necessary for any multinational organization to work. And the essential *strategic deterrence* cannot be maintained by even a merged French-British combination or an extended ten-nation EEC. In these two vital respects, the Western alliance will depend on the United States as much in the 1970's as it did in the previous two decades. The Europeans' inability to match the Soviet Union in conventional forces has been offset by the American lead in strategic weapons.¹⁴ They were not always consistent. While echoing the American argument against massive nuclear retaliation as a credible threat, the West Europeans nevertheless relied on U.S. nuclear deterrence of any Soviet military move that could not be met conventionally. On the grounds of conventional inferiority, they also disapproved of the succeeding doctrine of flexible response as being unrealistic

¹⁴The attempts to provide sufficient conventional strength by adding mobilization potentials of all NATO countries to troops-in-being have been less than convincing. Frederick S. Wyle, "The United States and West European Security," *Survival*, January/February 1972, pp. 8-15. See also Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much Is Enough?* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971).

and certainly incompatible with the gradual reduction of American forces in Europe. The mainstay of credibility and confidence in the disarrayed alliance was the unquestioned American superiority in strategic weapons systems.

For political and psychological reasons, the SALT agreements of May 1972 will have far-reaching consequences.¹⁵ While there is little concern about the ABM part of SALT, there are serious doubts about the arrangement on offensive weapons, whereby the Soviet Union gained numerical superiority in the two important categories, ICBM's and nuclear-powered submarines. Assurances that the United States leads qualitatively through the development of MIRV's are greatly weakened by the fact that the Soviet Union, utilizing ambiguities in the SALT agreement, may be able to convert some of its present missiles into new, much heavier ones.¹⁶ If Moscow takes full advantage of what SALT I permits, there can be no pretense of strategic parity.

What counts most in this atmosphere of *détente* is the political impact of any agreement. Most people can add and subtract, but few understand the finer points of MIRV technology. The formal recognition of Soviet strategic superiority, coming on top of the already recognized superiority in conventional forces, must have a strong impact on the small West European states whose security depends on credible and timely assistance from their American alliance partner.

Scandinavian political leaders have always been among the strongest spokesmen for *détente*, but in their view it will prove stabilizing only if the arms control agreements promote strategic parity. The SALT agreements do not. There is no reciprocity. SALT I has weakened the West and left the USSR significantly stronger. While the Soviet Union sees *détente* and larger military capabilities as a both-and, the Western states see them as an either-or. The more expensive military expenditures become, the harder Western statesmen long for *détente*, and the less critical they become in defining it. Today slogans such as "political realities" and "the art of the possible" are frequently used in Western national assemblies when matters of defense and national security appear on the agenda. There are so many domestic demands competing for priority in their national budgets.

Nothing that has happened during the months following SALT

¹⁵The text of the Moscow agreement is printed in *Survival*, July/August 1972, pp. 188-199.

¹⁶*Congressional Record*, Senate, June 1, 1972, pp. S8661-8666.

SCANDINAVIAN SECURITY IN TRANSITION

indicates any slowing down of Soviet efforts to surpass the United States, in quality as well as quantity of weapons. The *New York Times* reported in October 1972 that the Soviet Union had made "remarkable progress across the whole spectrum of offensive and defensive systems," and this has been true particularly in the field of strategic missiles.¹⁷ This seems to substantiate the fears expressed by Senator Henry M. Jackson and others who predicted just that.

Instead of trying to keep pace with Soviet advances in military strength, many NATO governments, pressured by their public opinions, have called for such *détente* measures as the European Conference on Cooperation and Security (previously the European Security Conference) and mutual balanced force reductions (MBFR). If an MBFR agreement could be reached, the thinning out of NATO forces that seems inevitable would be accompanied by a reciprocal reduction on the Soviet side. For obvious reasons the Soviets have been reluctant to discuss any mutual reduction of forces. If they stall long enough, they may not have to agree to cut back their forces in order to secure a Western reduction.¹⁸ Moscow is, however, insistent in urging a European conference which it hopes will produce a declaration on such general principles as peaceful coexistence, renunciation of force, and noninterference in internal affairs. Such a document would not solve conflicts or abate tensions, but it could serve as a tangible pretext for hard-pressed West European politicians who want to assure their constituencies that the bad old times are finally over and that large defense appropriations will not be needed in the future.

Thus, the Scandinavian countries in 1972 are confronted by increasing Soviet capabilities while the relative strength of their allies and supporters has decreased, thereby reducing the probability of effective and timely assistance. Are the Scandinavians aware of this major change and, if so, what can or will they do about it?

THE SCANDINAVIAN SIDE

Because of fundamental differences in formal attachments and policy orientation, we will deal with Sweden separately from the two West Scandinavian countries, Denmark and Norway. In the latter countries, the political elite and parts of the "attentive

¹⁷*New York Times*, October 1, 1972.

¹⁸Timothy W. Stanley and Durnell M. Whitt, *Détente Diplomacy: United States and European Security in the 1970's* (Cambridge, Mass.: Dunellen, 1970), p. 94.

public" have been aware of the Soviet naval encirclement at least since 1970, when the September issue of the *NATO Letter* served as an effective eye-opener. Some of the leading newspapers have followed up with supplementary reports, and the matter has been discussed in specialized journals. Yet the rapid growth of Soviet capabilities and the increased threat to Scandinavia have not become a public issue. There is even less willingness to discuss the disarray in NATO. People in a position to know tend to act confident and give NATO the benefit of the doubt: they admit that the alliance is going through a difficult period, but assert that there is every reason to believe that it will continue to be a viable instrument for Scandinavian security.

The Swedish attitude hardly needs comment. The government in recent years has earned a reputation in the West by its vitriolic attack on U.S. policy in Viet Nam and its early support of North Viet Nam. Neither the Soviet naval expansion nor the state of affairs in NATO is a major subject of public discussion. This reflects to some extent the Swedes' contention that the most important strategic areas are northern Norway and the Baltic entrances. According to a former Swedish deputy minister of defense, "it is of decisive importance that these most-exposed areas north and south in the Nordic region are not Swedish, and therefore beyond our responsibility."¹⁹ This straightforward public statement reflects accurately Stockholm's view: Sweden's strategic value belongs to the "second stage" of armed conflict, as a potential transit area. The areas of primary strategic importance are in the north and south and therefore, in the first instance, Norwegian and Danish concerns.

Norway and Denmark

Assuming that the two aligned countries are aware of the deterioration of their security balance, can they provide additional national inputs for stabilization? Do they have any means to counteract the double effects of an augmented external threat and a declining source of support?

There are three major measures which could be helpful in meeting the new dangers. First, the two West Scandinavian countries could take steps to increase the cohesion of the alliance. Second, they can remove the restraints they have imposed on outside assistance by their base and nuclear policies. Third, they can

¹⁹Karl Frithiofson, *Sveriges Sakerhetspolitik* (Stockholm: Forsvar i Nutid, Centralförbunden, 1965), p. 12. Also, *Kungl. Maj:ts proposition 1972: 75*, pp. 66-67.

SCANDINAVIAN SECURITY IN TRANSITION

strengthen their own national defense forces. By a successful application of all or some of these means, they might be able to improve the situation. But are they likely to do so?

The influence of small countries in coalitions and organizations, although limited, is generally underestimated. The short history of EEC shows that a small partner, the Netherlands, on a number of occasions was able to influence major decisions.²⁰ There are other examples. The Scandinavians proved effective in secret diplomacy during the early days of the United Nations, so why should they not be equally adept within NATO? Of course, the two cases are not comparable. Given the record of reproach, complaint and discord, spanning Portugal, Greece, Viet Nam and other moral issues, it seems unlikely that either Scandinavian member can sway the NATO Council in the direction of alliance cohesion and reinforced commitment to mutual assistance.

If NATO should fail, the extended European Common Market provides, at least in theory, an additional support alternative for the Scandinavian countries. It certainly has the potential for organizing defense and security. Few expected Sweden to trade her nonalignment for EEC membership, but it was taken for granted that Norway and Denmark would grasp this opportunity to "make other and stronger countries co-responsible for their national security."²¹ The issue was settled by national referenda: the Danish people decided to join, while a majority of the Norwegian people rejected membership in the European Community.

Although most commentators were convinced that Norway lost more than the Community did, its flat refusal was a serious blow to the efforts of those statesmen working for greater West European unity. Instead of reinforcing the strength of its major allies, Norway placed another obstacle in the way of Germany, Britain and France, the countries that, along with the United States, could provide assistance against Soviet pressure. By its self-imposed bans and restrictions, Norway has made it easier for its allies in a crisis situation to find a pretext for inaction. The Danes, by voting for membership, have avoided the isolation now threatening Norway. Denmark's formal identification with Western Europe has enhanced the prospects for cooperation with the major European powers in security matters and for their effective support in a time of crisis.

The second measure — removing restraints on allied assistance

²⁰Martin Saeter, *Det politiske Europa* (Oslo, 1972), p. 282.

²¹*Arbeiderbladet*, August 7, 1972.

— depends entirely upon national decisions. In Norway's case, there are two major prohibitions: the formal ban on stationing foreign (NATO) troops on its territory and a corresponding ban on nuclear explosives.²² Norway also has a more recent, informal ban on military activities by alliance partners east of 24°, i.e., in most of the province of Finnmark. Thus, if a serious Soviet threat should emerge, Norway would have only her national standing force of 2,000-3,000 men available. Unlike Central Europe, there is no local NATO deterrence in this northernmost province, either in troops or tactical nuclear weapons. NATO reinforcements, following Oslo's request, would have to be brought in after the alarm had been sounded. This third restriction, which amounts to a *de facto* neutralization of Finnmark, leaves a large area covering most of the northern tip of Norway virtually undefended.²³ The Norwegian government imposed these restrictions during the zenith of American superiority while the Soviet Union was in a fairly weak position. Despite American predominance, the government felt that Norway would risk more by possibly provoking the Soviet Union than by putting obstacles in the way of an allied rescue operation should deterrence fail. These restrictions on allied maneuvers are unlikely to be changed.

What Oslo feared in the late 1940's was not Soviet *military* aggression, but *political* pressure supported by an overwhelming military force of the kind the Soviets had shown in the Svalbard case, as well as in the Czech and Finnish cases in 1948.²⁴ The urgent need was for a pledge of assistance which made the United States and Britain co-responsible for Norwegian security. Given the U.S. nuclear monopoly and immense military potential, such a formal pledge would have deterred the Soviet Union from a westward move. There would have been no need to station American and British soldiers on Norwegian territory.²⁵

This kind of reasoning may have been sound in the late 1940's and early 1950's. However, as the USSR began to overtake the Western allies in nuclear strength and maintained its lead in conventional forces, these once perceptive calculations became less

²²Norway looks upon these bans as formal "doctrines" of the government, confirmed by voting in the Storting (parliament). While the Danish ban is less formal, it does have the same effect.

²³Apart from 200-300 border troops and a small staff detachment, there are no major ground, air or naval forces in the area. The main forces are hundreds of miles to the south.

²⁴*DNA. Landsmøteprotokoll 1949* (Oslo, 1950), pp. 158-159.

²⁵Cf. "Base Policy — Theory and Practice," *Cooperation and Conflict* No. 3-4, 1967, pp. 188-203.

SCANDINAVIAN SECURITY IN TRANSITION

valid for a number of reasons. First, there is no assurance that there would be enough ACE (Allied Command Europe) Mobile Forces available for a massive reinforcement expedition to northern (or southern) Norway. Second, if they should be dispatched, they would have to break through the "screens" of continuous Soviet maneuvers in the Iceland-Faeroe gap and beyond. These additional obstacles might mean that their task in Norway would be liberation rather than reinforcement, a much more difficult and expensive undertaking.

Third, the extended Soviet maneuver patterns have deprived Norway of the advantages of reliable early warning signals. Until the 1968-1970 naval operations, *Sever* and *Okean*, it was assumed that Norwegian and NATO intelligence would be able to detect Soviet preparations for a northern military move early enough for the government to declare a state of emergency and ask for military assistance from NATO headquarters.²⁶ As shown by the Czechoslovak invasion, where peacetime maneuvers were turned into full-scale military operations almost overnight, the Norwegians cannot count on an adequate warning. This problem of Soviet military exercises and a short warning period applies also to the Danes.

These indications of a new and radically changed situation might compel Norway and Denmark to review their obsolete policies and readjust their bans on allied bases and tactical nuclear weapons. A re-evaluation of the bans, based on a rapidly changing strategic environment, was proposed publicly by the present writer in the early 1960's. The response from public opinion and government representatives, heavily supported by Moscow's TASS agency, seemed to rule out even a discussion of possible changes in the existing restraints on allied assistance.²⁷ It seems even less likely today that the Norwegian or the Danish government will take a new look at their restrictive policies or invite public discussion of how these bans affect national security. Nor are the major allies likely to encourage them to do so. The restraints will remain.

The fear of initiating moves that the Soviet Union may interpret as provocative has grown as allied positions in the northern flank area have weakened. Thus, with regard to allied bases and tactical nuclear weapons, the Scandinavians appear to have been

²⁶Whether a decision of such magnitude could be based mainly on intelligence reports, on short notice, is open to doubt. There would always be a strong temptation to hope for the best and defer decision until the threat had materialized. A quick decision to request military aid, however, cannot be ruled out.

²⁷Ørvik, *Alternativer til Sikkerhet*, pp. 50-76.

left behind. A reversal of the bans policy at this point might have only declaratory effects. Norwegian and Danish invitations to station NATO troops in their territories in advance of a major crisis would hardly receive a positive response from any alliance member. If American troops are being withdrawn from Viet Nam and Central Europe, why should new U.S. units be stationed in Scandinavia? And which other allies might accept such an invitation? On the other hand, one might argue that lifting the bans would give the West Scandinavians a political advantage by depriving their major allies of a pretext for not giving timely and adequate assistance.

If one accepts as a fact that "political realities" prevent a reversal of the twenty-year-old ban on bases and nuclear weapons, there is still a third measure possible, namely, strengthening the national defense potential by larger allocations in national budgets. In spite of impressive economic growth rates, Norway has used only between 3 and 4 per cent of its GNP for defense, and Denmark only about 2-3 per cent. Fearing a U.S. withdrawal of some forces from Europe, Norway and Denmark have modernized some of their military forces, particularly in the quality of equipment. But given the rising costs of wages, the growing curse of obsolescence and the failure to allocate more funds (in real terms) to defense budgets, the net improvement in security is insignificant. Defense expenditures have not kept pace with the rise of GNP's.

The Norwegian defense posture is further weakened by an either-or policy, an inability to defend southern and northern Norway at the same time. Until the mid-1960's, it was generally assumed that the Soviet threat to Norway was localized in the north. Consequently, most standing Norwegian forces were moved northward and concentrated primarily in the Troms area, with only a thin, virtually symbolic cover in the south. This seemed justified by the overall NATO defense plans which counted on Danish and West German units holding the Baltic entrances and, thus, effectively covering South Norway. However, after the Soviet 1940-German-style maneuvers had demonstrated an ability to strike with sizeable forces against Norway's southern and western coasts as well as in the north, the earlier assumptions became untenable. If the Soviet Union in some future situation should decide to apply direct military pressure on Norway, it would seem to make much more sense to strike against the more vital but virtually undefended areas in South Norway than to run

SCANDINAVIAN SECURITY IN TRANSITION

into the prepared positions in the north, even though the latter might also prove to be inadequately defended. Skillfully executed, this strategy might give the Soviet Union what the Germans barely missed in 1940 — a bloodless, negotiated surrender.

Norway is clearly unable to meet its defense problem with indigenous forces.²⁸ Even if much larger sums are allocated for defense, the task is too great for Norway — a land with too much space and too few people. At the same time, she is prevented from drawing directly on allied forces by the restraints she imposed on herself in the days of towering American supremacy.

In a situation this bleak, one can understand the government's policy of stressing the impact of *détente* and the unlikelihood of a real military threat in the European area. SALT and other aspects of the Soviet-American rapprochement will almost certainly be interpreted as further assurances that the tensions and controversies still present in Europe will be solved by nonmilitary means. Hence, the Scandinavians have offered strong support for *détente* measures such as the proposed European Conference on Cooperation and Security. If there is no solution to military problems, one can find some consolation by concentrating on those that are mainly political.

In fact, in Norway and Denmark much more than in larger countries, defense is primarily a political matter. It may sound paradoxical, but the goal of these two governments for most of the past decade has been to maintain political support for alliance membership rather than to build a viable military defense force. In both countries, the point of departure is that neither can defend itself without external assistance.²⁹ National security depends on the alliance. As expressed in the recent Danish proposal for a new defense law, an attack on Denmark will be met "in a way that involves other NATO forces."³⁰ Once involvement is secured, it is assumed that the struggle will be continued on a joint, allied basis.

²⁸Public reactions to some unusually frank remarks by the then Chief of NATO's Northern Command, General Sir Walter Walker, are illustrative of this point. The controversial British general said that under its present national defense policy, Norway's position in a war would be extremely difficult, as NATO assistance would not arrive in time to avoid disaster. The implication was that Norway and Denmark ought to revise their present policies and allow NATO forces to be stationed in the territory they were pledged to defend *before* any aggressive moves had taken place. The Norwegian response was a furious one. Newspapers, government ministers and members of the Storting joined in blasting the general for intervening in domestic politics. *Arbeiderbladet* and *Ukens Nytt*, December 3, 1971.

²⁹Trygve Bratteli, "Ikke noe Norge kan løse alene," *Arbeiderbladet*, December 17, 1971 and February 17, 1972.

³⁰"Lov om Forslag til endring av lov om forsvarrets organisasjon m.v.," *Lovforslag. Folketingsåret, 1971-1972*. Cf. *Beretning fra Forsvarskommissjonen af 1969*, pp. 385-391.

Through most of the 1960's, the Danish and Norwegian governments have been under increasing pressure from left-wing factions, demanding a break with NATO and a retreat to some kind of a nonaligned Nordic security arrangement. The core of the opposition has been socialist and liberal youth groups, labor unions and various associations of intellectuals. "Card-carrying communists" have played a steadily decreasing role. Universities have by and large followed the radical example of some American campuses. They have gone quite far in their condemnation of NATO, EEC, the Viet Nam conflict, Nixon, and the "military-industrial complex," which is identified with international capitalism. A recent case was the University of Tromsø, North Norway, which refused to admit an American scholar who had received a NATO scholarship.³¹ Under these circumstances, exposed to a considerable degree of pressure at all levels of society, the Norwegian and Danish governments have chosen to keep their NATO membership cards but to limit direct involvement with NATO, politically and militarily. One should therefore not be unduly impressed with high percentages of parliamentary votes and Gallup polls in favor of continued membership in the alliance. Knowing full well that their nations are unable to mount a credible national defense, government leaders concentrate on fulfilling what they interpret as minimum NATO requirements for active membership. With such extravagant divergencies as presented by post-1966 France, this task has become easier in recent years.

This trend can be illustrated again through the latest Danish defense proposal. In December 1971, the Danish government took the first step toward what NATO has termed drastic reductions.³² While Denmark, according to official figures, now has an army of 27,000 and a term of military service lasting twelve months, the proposed arrangement would provide for a standing force of 7,000 men, with a basic military training period of six months. Spread over the next four years, the troops would have two refresher courses totaling one month. Six months of military service is a low figure. Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces serve twenty-four months or more; so do U.S. troops. In the West experts generally agree that less than eighteen months of military training is inadequate for the complicated tasks of modern defense. Six months (or even a

³¹*Arbeiderbladet*, March 20, 1972; *Nytt fra Norge*, March 27, 1972. The decision was vehemently protested by some faculty members at Bergen University. *Arbeiderbladet*, March 28, 1972.

³²*Arbeiderbladet*, November 12, 1971.

SCANDINAVIAN SECURITY IN TRANSITION

possible compromise of nine months) of military training will not produce militarily proficient forces. National defense becomes symbolic. After having served their six or nine months, the men will form a supplementary force that can be mobilized. The proposal also asks for heavy cuts in equipment, with particular reference to the navy and the air force. The Danish Social Democrats, who launched these ideas in April 1970, may not get the whole package through the National Assembly, but the indications are that they will enact most of it during 1973.

Sweden

It is sometimes remarked that Sweden's security policy is fundamentally different from that of her West Scandinavian neighbors. This cannot be taken at face value. Differences exist but they are hardly fundamental. Sweden is the richest, biggest and most prosperous of the three Scandinavian countries. While her neighbors have been dependent on what they could obtain from their allies, Sweden has been able to produce the arms she needs for her tight and effective military force, without cutting into the consumer sector of the economy. Perhaps the most remarkable achievement has been the development of a modern fighter-plane force (Draken, Viggen) which in quality compares favorably with those of the largest countries. As late as 1969, the Swedish air force had as many combat aircraft as the British Royal Air Force, and all were of Swedish construction.³³ Sweden's other sophisticated equipment, such as tanks and electronic guidance systems, is of first-class quality. If the Swedish government had chosen to develop nuclear weapons, it would have had little difficulty mastering the technological problems.

Sweden's military traditions and the undeniable success of her policy of armed neutrality have helped to generate political support for the large slice defense expenditures take from the national budget. Defense in some years cost more than 6 per cent of the GNP, in more recent years about 4 per cent. In order to facilitate long-term planning, the government in 1958 provided for an automatic annual budget increase in defense funds of 2.5 per cent to compensate for rising costs before the budget debate took place.³⁴ This was the peak of Swedish defense efforts. Since the ear-

³³Egil Ulstein, *Nordic Security* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 81, 1971), pp. 24-25.

³⁴Nils Skold, *Styrkebalans/stabilitet oc sakerhet* (Folk och forsvar i nutid No. 4, 1969), pp. 6-9. Carl Eric Almgren, "Svensk Arméprofil mot 70-talet," *Norsk Militaert Tidsskrift*, 1971, No. 6, pp. 257-270.

ly 1960's, there has been a steady decline. After having held the nuclear option open for nearly a decade, the Swedish government in 1965 finally decided not to develop nuclear weapons.³⁵ The reservations and conditions linked to the decision had little relevance. The reasons were mainly political. Sweden, Norway and Denmark are all committed to a nonnuclear policy;³⁶ the two aligned countries have made reservations for nuclear support in an emergency, an option naturally open also to a threatened Swedish government.

One must assume that in their internal discussions of future crises the Swedish defense planners have considered the possibility of requesting assistance from the major Western powers if Sweden's own national effort did not suffice. In an isolated non-nuclear conflict, Sweden might hold the Soviet Union at bay for some days, perhaps weeks, and then opt for either surrender or Western assistance. The Swedish policy of armed neutrality rests on the assumption that a crisis would never get that far: first, because a conflict in such a sensitive area could not be isolated; second, because the possible advantages gained by invading and occupying Sweden would not justify the damage which the small but proficient Swedish forces could inflict upon the Soviet Union. The Swedes have been confident that unacceptable risks would prevent an isolated attack, and they see little point in trying to plan rationally for total war.³⁷

Sweden shares with her aligned neighbors the same problem: How much (or, rather, how little) is enough? If the armed force that Sweden had ready during the 1950's was sufficient to maintain the peace, would not a smaller force do the same job of peacekeeping during the 1960's? And, if that also worked, why not try to do with even less for the 1970's? This kind of implicit reasoning is present in most countries. The more a government is pressed to pay attention to priority domestic issues, the more persuasive this kind of "strategic thinking" becomes.

Traditionally, Swedish forces have been trained to defend the country effectively against attacks both from across the Baltic and from the north, through Finland. In 1963 the task was redefined to cover *either* the one contingency *or* the other, an admission that

³⁵Karl Birnbaum, "Sverige och kaernvapenfraagan," *Strategisk Bulletin*, No. 6, 1965.

³⁶Cf. the Undén-plan of 1961 for a nonnuclear club and Sweden's ratification of the Nonproliferation Treaty.

³⁷These alternatives are discussed in more detail in Nils Ørvik and Nils Andren, "Dialog om Svensk saekerhet," *Strategisk Bulletin*, No. 3-4, 1970, and in Ørvik, "Forsvar mot hjelp. En strategisk model," *Norsk Militaert Tidsskrift*, 1970, No. 12, pp. 545-557.

SCANDINAVIAN SECURITY IN TRANSITION

defending both areas simultaneously was more than the Swedes could handle.³⁸ This is a close parallel to the corresponding Norwegian problem of coping with aggression in the north and in the south. Trying to do both at the same time would give Sweden neither deterrent nor defense value, while concentrating on one area might provide some chance of thwarting an aggressor. But it is not likely that the rational, sensible Swedish leaders would have adopted this either-or deployment principle without tacitly counting on the Western alliance to make up for the deficiency. The Swedish forces, similar to Norway's, play primarily a delaying role.

In 1968, the Swedish government enacted a new defense law which removed the 2.5 per cent automatic annual increase and made the defense budget dependent on current estimates of the situation. The military establishment was guaranteed certain minimum funds until 1972, when there would be another hard look at costs and options. There is little doubt that the 1968 arrangement amounted to a further reduction of the Swedish military potential. Hardest hit has been the air force, which feels it may no longer be able to provide adequate air cover for ground operations. How could Swedish defense planners conceive of successful holding operations without air cover? If the Swedish defense establishment is designed to conduct a holding operation until Western assistance arrives, which of the three services could be brought to the scene of action and reinforced at the shortest notice — ground, naval or air forces?

It is unlikely that there have ever been talks or secret understandings between the Swedish and Western governments on the subject of military aid in a time of crisis. But 150 years of successful neutrality was not achieved without a great deal of common sense. And, in the zero-sum game of the past decades, the United States would seem to have an interest in preventing the Soviet Union from controlling Sweden, if it had the power to do so.

The point is this: There is little fundamental difference between semi-neutrality and "demi-alliance" as practiced by Norway and Denmark and the formal nonalignment policy which has been Sweden's declared orientation. The two positions are not far apart on the continuum between absolute commitment and no commitment at all. The elements in the Swedish and Danish-Norwegian defense postures are certainly not equivalent. Neither of the two aligned countries can match Sweden's impressive

³⁸ *ÖB-utredningen 1965*, p. 6 (one of the annual public reports from the Swedish Chief of Defense [ÖB]).

achievement in building a respectable military instrument. They cannot sustain the economic sacrifices that first-class defense forces require. Traditional, psychological and sociological reasons, including the mental scars of defeat and occupation, have deprived even the most determined governments of the political support they needed to fashion adequate military services. Neither in Denmark nor in Norway is an isolated, national defense seen as a viable alternative. Therefore, the prime asset of their alliance membership is not the material assistance, equipment and infrastructure provided by the alliance, but the psychological impact of an argument that made sense to the average Norwegian or Dane. A defense force costing 2 to 3 per cent of the GNP is a sensible and worthwhile investment, if staying in NATO guarantees Western assistance for deterrence and, if need be, defense.

Similar statements cannot be made openly in neutral Sweden. But even a government with the most impeccably impartial intentions cannot prevent its people from identifying themselves with Western ideas, systems and values. If it ever comes to a choice, they will know where they belong. Impressed also with America's towering strength and overall superiority, Swedes naturally assume that if what they do is not enough, the West will respond to a call for help. There are nuances in Scandinavian attitudes and conceptions about defense and national security, but few fundamental differences.

THE POLITICAL THREAT

In summing up the Scandinavian security situation, two facts stand out: the steady growth of Soviet (the opponent's) military forces in areas relevant to Scandinavian security, and the continued weakening of the Western alliance (the support side). NATO has certainly not improved in political cohesion or military strength since the Harmel Report in 1967. Most serious is the lack of effective leadership and the confusion over major issues and directions, as illustrated by European reactions to the Nixon Doctrine and other American policy moves. These two major variables, the opponent side and the support side, form what we have called the two-dimensional threat. Growth on the opponent's side has not been counterbalanced by a corresponding increase in support. The result is a reduced level of security for all three Scandinavian states.

The third major variable is the product of their national input: their state of military preparedness, their contribution to the uni-

SCANDINAVIAN SECURITY IN TRANSITION

ty of European institutions and the alliance, and their willingness to remove national restraints that hamstringing NATO efforts to provide for their defense. The Scandinavians have not fulfilled these crucial requirements. The Norwegians and Danes have not made significant increases in their defense establishments. Norway, particularly threatened by the USSR's recent policy of naval encirclement, has made only modest attempts to maintain defense efficiency and preserve the status quo. The Danes have announced drastic reductions. Neither has contributed essentially to cohesion and consensus-building within the alliance. Their frequent outbursts of moral indignation have not endeared them to most other members and hardly increased their influence in the NATO Council. Neither has indicated any readiness to remove any of the bans on bases and nuclear weapons. Sweden has followed the same general trend of lowered defense goals and reduced capabilities. Rather than indicating any understanding for the Western dilemma, she has consistently and loudly condemned the West's faults and weaknesses, particularly those of the United States.

Why have the Scandinavian countries not made much of an effort to compensate for growing Soviet power and declining Western strength? One possible explanation is a belief that the use of military force has become obsolete in international relations and for that reason should have a low priority. But statecraft is presumably not based on speculation, and the hard data of arms procurement and armed conflicts would seem to contradict such assumptions. Another possible interpretation is a confidence that arms control measures, such as the Nonproliferation Treaty and now SALT, have reduced tensions and the likelihood of conflict in Europe. But again, the security value of these arrangements is questionable and hardly reassuring over the long term.

Then there is the possibility that leading politicians in these countries simply do not have the time to engage in long-range, in-depth analyses of security problems, that the day-to-day grind of politics limits their vision to the frequent tests of political strength on the domestic scene — or at most to the next election. Some leaders may have views that they are unable to put across convincingly to their parties, parliamentarians, and the general public. So, instead of inviting confrontations, they choose to postpone the issues, avoid political showdowns, and hope for the best.

Or has the impact of growing Soviet power in the northern area stimulated among Scandinavians a greater understanding for positions favored by the Soviet Union and a more noncommittal at-

titude toward Western policies? In some cases, people might feel that, on balance, the interests of their country would be better served by closer ties with the Soviet Union than the West. Or the motivation could be fear of the Soviets' awesome potential power. Instead of trying harder to resist a Soviet bid for hegemony, the Scandinavian countries would tend to conform to Soviet wishes or at least to adopt a flexible stance providing various options for the next set of moves. This pattern of political behavior would move the Scandinavian countries closer to the Finnish model.

Despite the military dangers, the Soviet threat to Scandinavia has been mainly *political* and is likely to remain that way. The political moves against Svalbard in the early postwar years may prove more typical of the Soviet approach than traditional military aggression. Occasional reminders of overwhelming military power and ability to strike at will are provided by sporadic submarine appearances in Norwegian fiords.³⁹ Such incidents may serve the double purpose of stressing the inadequacy of the national defense system while testing the government's political will to react determinedly and forcefully. Direct, open use of Soviet military power cannot be ruled out. If the balance of risks and advantages should take on favorable proportions, the temptation to strike might become irresistible. Also, if a major international crisis should make Scandinavian bases, ports or other facilities indispensable for Soviet operations, the Kremlin might order its troops westward.

The political approach, however, would seem more advantageous and consonant with Soviet traditions. Threats would be veiled in a flurry of negotiations for leases, loans, joint companies or other shared enterprises, preferably on a *bilateral* basis, where the Soviet Union would deal separately with each of the Scandinavian countries within a coordinated pattern of Soviet control. The Finnish model seems, at least for the moment, much more relevant than the 1940 model of German invasion, which may prove effective primarily as a psychological primer to warn of what overwhelming power can accomplish if more palatable methods do not work. These are the essential features of a system of "remote control" which, under certain circumstances, might be applied to Scandinavia.⁴⁰

³⁹*Globe and Mail* (Toronto), November 25, 1972; *Arbeiderbladet*, November 24, 1972.

⁴⁰The conditions for a Soviet "remote control" system are discussed in detail in Ørvik, *Sicherheit auf Finnisch* (Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1972) as well as in "Nasjonal sikkerhet og nordisk balanse," *op. cit.*, pp. 248-260.

BRITAIN, THE COMMON MARKET, AND THE FORCES OF HISTORY

by Paul Taylor

ONE of the interesting aspects of the current discussion about Britain and the Common Market is the weight given to economic over noneconomic arguments. This is not because of their greater precision or particular force. We are told that the cost of membership may vary between £300 million and £1,000 million in its impact on the balance of payments — even though economists cannot agree about what in total makes up the balance of payments. We are also told that, viewed as a burden upon Britain's economy, the cost of membership as a percentage of Gross National Product is small — except that when added to inflation it may be unacceptably large. In view of the uncertainty of the economists' predictions, the weight attached to them must be judged as eccentric; they are, however, interesting as an indication of the materialism of present society.

The ascendancy of the economists in this debate has been supported by the weakness of the other arguments; there has been no competition in a match which to outsiders must have looked like an engagement between British heavyweight boxers.¹ It is not, as some commentators have flatteringly implied, that the arguments are so familiar.² It is rather that the detailed arguments always were, in 1961-1963 as today, inconclusive and, except in their novelty, uninteresting. Where they were not trivial or polemical, the contributions of political science, international law and modern history in providing arguments for British membership in the EEC conjured up what the newspapers have called "the forces of history": the gathering storms of international society in the face of which Britain was running to port in Brussels; the dialectical forces of emerging statehood; the hidden hand that tuned the minds of the British people to a European harmony.

This essay is an attempt to redress the balance, though not necessarily to elevate the argument. It will show that political science can do just as well and as badly as economics. Moreover, it

¹At the moment these have a rather enfeebled reputation.

²See Miriam Camps, "European Unification in the Seventies," *International Affairs* (London), October 1971, p. 671.

suggests that British policymakers are faced with the possibility of choosing between actions which could contribute toward one outcome of European integration rather than another.

I

Three terms summarize both the present political expectations of British membership in the European Economic Community and, when defined somewhat more technically, the past and present phases of the process of West European international integration: Federalism, Confederalism and Functionalism. They are terms which indicate a characteristic argument, and they are also capable of acting as generators of an argument in that notions and views are frequently associated with them. Federalism is suggestive of a centralized state (although strictly speaking it is a form of decentralization): in Western Europe there is to be a new political entity. Confederalism suggests a way of having one's cake and eating it: Britain is to retain its separate identity, but there is to be fruitful cooperation. Functionalism, in the usage of the current political elite, is a kind of earnest pragmatism, an indication of a willingness to cooperate where necessary but not on the basis of continental institutions or idealistic prescription. Functionalism requires that a habit of cooperation should develop in a piecemeal way and be limited to the necessities.

Federalist arguments of the early 1970's in Britain contain various nuances of opinion and judgment. In one view there is about to take place a miraculous consummation, a joining of Tristram and Isolde, a denial of self in a new and more fruitful Europe. The great step is already taken; it is to be welcomed or rejected according to the individual's wish to retain his own identity — one is tempted to say soul — or willingness to sacrifice self for some larger truth. The dominant features are comprehension of the enormity of the step, expectation of an overwhelming impact, and realization of a union transcending the earlier entities. In some cases federal structures are to be welcomed as an opportunity to escape from the oppressive structures of the welfare state and return to what is thought to have been a golden age of greater freedom for the individual.

Confederalism is associated with a series of apparently contradictory views. There is rejoicing at the prospect of joining Europe but anxiety lest Britain not survive in its present form; there is stress on the rewards of cooperation but awareness of the occasional advantages of independence, and even a defiant asser-

tion that such independence will be protected by all means. There is also a much greater conceit in the special talents Britain may bring to the new Europe than that entertained by those who proposed entry with the Federalist image in mind. The Federalists see EEC membership as a case of Britain's depositing her richness in a kind of European cultural bank where it is liable to remain untouched.

The dialectical element in Confederalism — togetherness in separation — leads to an oscillation in the statements of foreign policymakers that contributes to confusion in the mind of the observer. In the present context British leaders are given, on the one hand, to assertions about the way in which Britain can lead Europe, and reminders about the greatness of her past,³ and on the other hand to statements suggesting an attitude of subservience unusual in international relations: one instance of this is the British government's agreement to teach its civil servants French. The idea of Confederalism has a force that shapes behavior, which appears today to be swinging between processes of centralization and impulses toward decentralization, between the assertion of togetherness and the reassertion of self.

Functionalism typifies the attitude that opposes Britain's formal membership in the EEC. In practice an appeal for caution in the face of political and institutional centralization in Western Europe, it leads to the preference for more limited cooperative schemes such as transnational mergers, *ad hoc* technological ventures, carefully worked out rearrangements of trading practice, a deliberate woolly-mindedness as a foil for French rationalism and French planning. It is perhaps the oldest postwar tradition of British thinking about Europe, harking back to the late 1940's and early 1950's, and is closely related to the view that government is to be arranged according to convention rather than written constitution. Britain is to cooperate but there is to be no silliness such as the continental suggestion of a powerful Council of Europe or the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community.

As used here the three terms, Functionalism, Federalism and Confederalism, denote styles of argument among those who are in favor of Britain's moving closer to Europe. But they also reflect something which is at once broader and more specific than these arguments: the general character of the various phases of the European integration process. An unawareness of this is a con-

³The appeal made by Sir Alec Douglas-Home at the 1971 Conservative Party Conference is a good example.

ceptual limitation upon the thinking of policymakers and others about Europe, and to this extent their perception of alternative outcomes and appropriate strategies is limited. Britain is like someone who is boarding a bus, without any knowledge of where the bus is going and without the ability to communicate with the conductor or read the schedule. Tracing the links between past phases of the European integration process and possible outcomes in the future may lead to an understanding of the forces of history, from which British policymakers may acquire some sense of the ways to guide the destiny of their country.

II

The period of the late 1940's and early 1950's probably represented the peak of achievement for those who favored federal Europe. After the Hague Conference of May 1948 hopes for a more powerful Council of Europe were high: they were dashed mainly on the reef of British functionalism. In the early 1950's, however, several developments among the Six confirmed the prospect of a rapid move toward a high level of institutional centralization. The European Coal and Steel Community had been established and the model of a High Authority of international civil servants, able to take decisions that would be binding directly upon individuals and groups within the state, was in the minds of ambitious Europeans. In 1952 there was some progress toward a European army in a European Defense Community, an integrated force under a European commander-in-chief, and this was soon followed by the proposal for a European Political Community which could exercise political oversight over the other agencies. The European Coal and Steel Community, unlike the later European Economic Community, set up the Common Market in coal, steel and scrap quickly and sought to rectify ensuing difficulties with controlled investment and compensations of various kinds. It seemed likely that these three agencies, each of which had been agreed to in ambitious treaties among the statesmen of Europe, would rapidly bind European countries close together. A federal Europe would soon emerge.

This was not to be the case: the Federalist phase came to an end in 1954. In August of that year the French National Assembly decided, on a procedural vote, not to consider, and therefore not to discuss for ratification, the treaty for a European Defense Community. With this decision the European Political Community

BRITAIN AND THE COMMON MARKET

was also discarded. The European Coal and Steel Community endured as the one fruit of the efforts and hopes of the early integrationists. It is interesting to note that according to one authority the imminence of institutional and political success in that period was but weakly founded in popular support. Public attitudes in France and Germany betokened little of the community-mindedness that could have sustained the new institutions. By the late 1960's stronger community attitudes had developed⁴— which makes it possible to argue that the action of the French Assembly was in the long-term interest of a united Europe.

Then, in the spring of 1955, statesmen from the Six, meeting at Messina, Sicily, took decisions which led in 1957 to the signing of the Rome Treaty and the establishment of the European Economic Community. This approach involved a gradualist strategy for European integration over a period of twelve years through three transitional phases. Some statesmen, particularly those from France, were much more cautious than they had been in the early 1950's: they could agree about abolishing tariffs on trade between members and the proper way to set up a common external tariff; and they expected agreement about a range of other questions, such as a Community policy for transport, energy, currency, agriculture and social questions. But the latter proposals were not covered in detail in the treaty; the central organization of the new Community, the Commission, was asked to consider ways in which they could be implemented. The Commission was in effect to act as a generator of proposals for integration which national governments could then consider, approve or reject, through the transitional periods. The whole approach, cautious, gradualist and tending to avoid premature overcommitment, was Functional in style. This was the Functionalist phase of European integration. It involved the gradual molding of Europe through increasing cooperation from politically less sensitive areas, such as tariffs and trade, to politically more sensitive questions, such as monetary policy and budgetary planning. Some expected that this would be an appropriate strategy by which Europeans could eventually be led to decide together in common structures upon questions of defense and foreign policy.

The Functionalists relied on such procedures as the organization of European pressure groups, adjustment of the attitudes of

⁴See Donald J. Puchala, "International Transactions and Regional Integration," *International Organization*, Autumn 1970, pp. 732-763.

civil servants, demonstrations that cooperation could be in the short term rewarding. One of the movement's central dynamics was the process of convincing a large number of people in commerce, industry and government that the utilitarian benefits of integration outweighed the costs. The Federalists, on the other hand, conceived of an integrated Europe built from the top as a result of decisions taken by enlightened, farsseeing politicians who were inspired by the promise of long-term rewards, not all of which were necessarily utilitarian. A typical Federalist strategy involved a Constituent Assembly (the so-called *ad hoc* assembly of 1952-1953 is a good example); a typical Functionalist strategy involved a committee of experts.

But the Functionalist phase was to end in the mid-1960's; it gave way after the 1965 crisis⁵ to a period of restraint in which the Commission labored under a mood of pessimism and the states seemed to reassert themselves. Until 1969 there was an effort at stocktaking in which the mounting problems of the new Europe were counted but the main effort was focused on the consolidation of earlier achievements. This may be called the post-Functional period.

The Confederal phase of the European integration process, which followed, bears the hallmark of the summit conference of statesmen from the Six at the Hague in December 1969. This conference was important for the range of new initiatives promising rapid integration in politically sensitive areas. But it was important also because it marked the emergence of Willy Brandt, Chancellor of West Germany, as a statesman who was prepared to take initiatives within the EEC and to pursue a more imaginative West German European policy. Previous German chancellors had been ready enough to work hard for Europe but were usually content to respond to proposals originating elsewhere. Because of this, the French government, particularly under President de Gaulle, was able to establish itself as the agency that decided the pace of integration; German reticence also allowed the French to undertake important new diplomatic ventures such as those in the early and middle 1960's toward Eastern Europe.

⁵This crisis grew out of the French government's opposition to Commission proposals for transferring control of Community resources, including those of the Agricultural Fund, to the institutions at Brussels, and for increasing the powers of the European Assembly. The French refused to participate in many of the Communities' institutions until January 1966, when they returned following an agreement with the Five. The terms included the postponement of majority voting in the Council and the curtailment of some of the Commission's public relations activities. The earlier proposals were dropped.

BRITAIN AND THE COMMON MARKET

Chancellor Brandt's *Ostpolitik* was perhaps the single most important mechanism by which the West Germans established their position in Western Europe in the late 1960's and early 1970's; it is indeed possible to argue that the crucial reason for the *Ostpolitik* was the situation in Western Europe rather than the need to improve West Germany's relations with East Germany and the USSR. The reading of Brandt's mind is now a favorite pastime of political commentators, who usually assume the primacy of East/West *détente* in his arguments; but it would be just as sensible to assume the primacy of the West European setting. As long as the West German government pursued the Hallstein Doctrine it was bound to try to maintain close contacts with the French and to be reluctant to push the French too far lest the latter compromise German interests in Eastern Europe. Toleration of this situation also contributed to a German reluctance to challenge the French on European Community issues and on the question of Britain's accession to the Common Market. It allowed France to monopolize high politics in the Community.

The *Ostpolitik* freed West Germany from an anxious, almost morbid, watchfulness over French activities in Eastern Europe. As the central aspect of a new style of diplomacy for Bonn, it also led the Germans to feel that it was their turn to occupy center stage within the EEC, as they did with great success at the Hague in December 1969. Moreover, by permitting them to be more certain in their advocacy of British membership in the Common Market, it encouraged the French to think of Britain once again as a potentially useful Community partner against West Germany.

The changed character of German diplomacy, the surviving elements of Gaullist ambition in the present French government, the likelihood of British entry — these factors have introduced into the EEC a new awareness of the contending political interests of the member governments. This competitiveness is not the high politics of de Gaulle, but it is certainly a slightly superior and more general level of political engagement than was previously the case. It has produced the essential character of the Confederal phase of European integration. As the *Ostpolitik* has led Bonn to enter into friendly relations with East Germany and to accept a *de facto* postponement of reunification, so the new style of German diplomacy has contributed in Western Europe both to the taking of new initiatives and to the weakening of supranational political ambitions in the Communities. The fact that the new initiatives toward integration were taken by West Germany and acquiesced

in by the French served to consolidate confederal Europe and strengthen the expectation that national governments would survive.

III

Detectable within the area of political engagements in the early 1970's, however, was the same kind of oscillation noted in British attitudes toward the Communities. On the one hand there was an earnest desire for more centralized European structures: out of the Hague Conference, for instance, came the initiative that led to the Werner proposals for a European Monetary Union to be established by 1980, plans for a more powerful Assembly, and the decision to increase the amount of funds to be allotted to the Communities.⁶ These gave high promise of advances which would have been more dramatic than any achieved in the 1965-1969 period. The German and French agreement on these matters was again expressed in the EEC Council meeting of February 1971 at which there was unanimous support for monetary union and for the kind of economic coordination in which the Germans were particularly interested as a condition of monetary union. Short-term and medium-term economic and budgetary policies were to be coordinated in meetings between finance ministers and central bankers.

On the other hand, the international monetary crisis and the August 1971 American decision to impose a surcharge on imports revealed serious differences of policy between the West Germans and the French. In May 1971 Germany allowed the mark to float upward against the dollar and in July Franco-German talks on the implementation of monetary reform broke down. The French also opposed the coordination of economic and budgetary policies in the face of German demands. France insisted, with the British, on maintaining the export advantage of existing parities. The lack of a Franco-German agreement on parities and on economic coordination created tensions within the EEC, most seriously by imposing burdens on the common agricultural policy which were bound to be expensive to the French. As Denis Healey pointed out in the London *Sunday Times* of November 21, 1971, "President Pompidou appears to survey the imminent disaster with a complacent *Schaden-freude* at the prospect of a Europe freed from U.S. hegemony in economic and military affairs." While the two

⁶A subsequent treaty signed in April 1970 allowed the Communities their own resources; from 1975 the Assembly was to exercise a certain minimum control over these resources.

BRITAIN AND THE COMMON MARKET

governments were agreed about the need for more ambitious steps toward integration, the French were prepared to take risks in relations with Germany that endangered what had been achieved in the Communities.

The surprising thing was that the international monetary crisis of 1971-1972 did not lead to the abandonment of the Werner proposals. The pattern of interaction between the perceived interests of the French and West German governments was such that within two months of the monetary agreements reached at Washington in December 1971 the Werner proposals had been resurrected and were being pursued with full vigor. Such oscillation is characteristic of political relations between governments in this Confederal phase of European integration.

The December 1971 meeting of the Group of Ten in Washington produced agreements to re-establish fixed exchange rates and to devalue the dollar by 7.89 per cent against gold.⁷ The U.S. government also abolished the 10 per cent import surcharge which had been introduced earlier to protect the American balance of payments, and the Japanese and the Germans agreed to revalue their currencies against the dollar. Further initiatives in Europe quickly followed. In January 1972 the Commission of the European Communities again proposed measures leading to economic and monetary union. On February 10 and 11 Chancellor Brandt and President Pompidou met in Paris and reached agreement about narrowing the margins of fluctuation among EEC currencies and coordinating policy to control short-term capital flows. The French government also made the important concession of agreeing to the closer coordination of French and German economic policies. The Werner proposals had indeed been revitalized.

They persisted because they were attractive to an unusually wide range of interested parties. Like the proposals for a European Coal and Steel Community in the early 1950's, they had advantages for those who stressed the special political and economic interests of states, for those who favored European integration, and for the problem-oriented who sought the best solution for the perceived problem. The Germans were prepared to consider the proposed union because it would benefit the already strong German economy and was compatible with their interest in a more politically integrated Western Europe. They also had a

⁷The devaluation of the dollar was 7.89 per cent when converting foreign currencies to dollars, and 8.57 when converting dollars to foreign currencies.

natural sympathy for a scheme that would strengthen the European contribution to the stability of the international monetary system, improve Europe's position in the management of the international economy, and help to minimize the impact upon European economies of unfavorable developments in the United States.

By the beginning of 1972 the French, too, had come to realize the advantages of monetary and economic union, which may explain the concession at Paris to the German interest in economic coordination. The Werner proposals could prove to be a way of working toward an objective de Gaulle had long sought but failed to achieve: the separation of Germany from the United States and the insulation of Western Europe from undue American influence. (The new proposal for a European unit of currency to replace the Eurodollar — the Europa — would reinforce this independence.) Even within the European system the Werner plan could be seen through French eyes as producing special economic advantages: it would result in the Germans subsidizing French prosperity, despite German caution about economic coordination, by funding regional development and by protecting a vulnerable French currency on the international market.

The Werner proposals for European monetary and economic union were initially challenged but later greatly assisted by the international monetary crisis: the crisis made it clear to statesmen that national interests favored the European proposals and could be conveniently linked with the ideals of those who were in favor of European unification. In 1972 it was too early to judge whether this peculiar convergence of interests would endure or whether intra-European disagreements would again assert themselves. If it could be maintained, important moves toward integration might be forthcoming. Such a powerful alliance of special and general interests was reminiscent of the pattern of support for the European Coal and Steel Community some twenty years earlier. On that occasion the range of political initiatives taken heralded the Federal phase of European integration.

Beneath the political level the functional interdependence established in the 1950's and 1960's continues and in some ways, as Mrs. Camps has suggested, is being strengthened.⁸ When attention is focused at the political level it is easy to overestimate the capacity for disagreement among West European governments: as observers, we are faced with the problem of weighting the

⁸Camps, *op. cit.*, pp. 676-677.

BRITAIN AND THE COMMON MARKET

disagreements we see. European structures now seem strong enough, and popular attitudes sufficiently warm, to make the violent resolution of conflicts between states in Western Europe most unlikely in the future; likewise, the area within which political disagreement takes place is being progressively reduced by the strengthening of the functional systems. That the national governments are reasserting their political roles within Western Europe may be seen as an attempt to defend themselves against the irresistible encroachment of functional systems rather than as another manifestation of the continuing strength of the nation-state. The Confederal phase is marked by both political oscillation and functional encroachment.

IV

It is at this point that the British government has decided to link Britain's fate with that of the Communities. The three phases of integration, Federal, Functional and Confederal, have each left their impact on European structures and European ideas. The Confederal phase, however, is essentially unstable because of the oscillations observed at the political level and the tensions between centralizing and centrifugal forces. The schemes for centralization should be seen in part as a reaction against centrifugal tendencies: the governments want the rewards of cooperation, and are disposed to act to obtain those rewards, but have not fully convinced themselves that they are prepared to pay the price of interdependence. The future facing Britain in Europe will therefore involve a post-Confederal structure, the nature of which will be explained in terms of Federal and Functional elements. An examination of the several conceivable outcomes for European integration should enable decision-makers to formulate an account of the cost of membership in the Communities from the political standpoint.⁹ In the process, policymakers in Britain may obtain a glimpse of the forces of history in the West European context.

It is difficult to forecast when these outcomes may be expected; they are not imminent but may appear in the medium-term future. It is also difficult to be precise about the mechanics of the transformation of the existing system into any one of the new forms. I leave this enormous theoretical problem alone.

⁹The starting point of my thinking about these outcomes was the interesting article by Ernst B. Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing," *International Organization*, Autumn 1970, pp. 607-648.

Nevertheless, the outcomes are conceivable. They can be imagined from elements detected in the present situation in the Communities and in Britain, and they reflect concepts which have become part of a tradition of thinking. Certainly the concepts of Federalism and Functionalism will endure as a part of the intellectual apparatus of future students of the European integration process.

The first outcome signifies the ascendancy of the Federalist element. Confederal uncertainties are resolved in favor of the forces of centralization, operating at the political and institutional levels. A new centralized decision-making system emerges out of the existing Brussels institutions, and powers and functions which are at the heart of sovereignty are transferred away from national governments toward the new center. Thus ordained, the United States of Europe is a European superstate, capable of defining a European attitude and a European stance in international society. Within it authority and legitimacy are redistributed to radiate from the central structures; the subregions are definitely subordinate entities and new tasks are allocated to the federal government.

The impact of federal Europe on patterns of diplomacy is interesting. The new state is seen as active and self-seeking by other states, normally in an informal partnership with the United States, but always with the capacity for independence. It is much more capable of initiative, and of pursuing high politics concerned with questions of prestige and linked values, than any of the older units. The present states are all limited to the extent that they are involved in common systems which they are not able to control directly. The new unit would possess far greater potential for self-sufficiency. Functional systems now only loosely contained within the European region would in this superstate be sharply defined within the frontiers of the Federation.

The existence of the new state will, in my judgment, recreate the traditional problems of international society on a larger scale. We can suggest here some of its likely effects. With respect to relations with Eastern Europe it will be divisive. The East European states will be encouraged to protect jealously whatever measure of independence they have won from the Soviet Union. The new Europe's ideological commitment — the projection of a European technocratic capitalist image — will discourage states of a different ideological stance from associating with it; this Europe will repulse rather than attract. In relation to the Third World it will

BRITAIN AND THE COMMON MARKET

pursue a policy of cautious self-interest, tending to enter into special agreements where appropriate, much like the existing association agreements of the EEC. On the whole its economic policies are not likely to reduce the gulf between the haves and the have-nots: its role will be to act as a jealous guardian of the resources it believes it possesses, and to seek out and exploit those resources it lacks.

In the eyes of other states, particularly in the Third World and Eastern Europe, the armed forces of the new Europe will be viewed as potentially hostile, capable of defending its distinctive interests, even to the extent of using violence. Eventually, the new Europe will probably be able to compete at the nuclear level with the United States and the Soviet Union.

To repeat, the traditional problems of international society are in this outcome manifested on a larger scale. It is extremely foolish to believe that the government of such a federal Europe would be an enlightened actor on the international stage.

The second outcome relies on the strengthening of Functional elements in the existing situation. Governments are persuaded to encourage greater interdependence because of the perception that this is rewarding, but the drive toward centralization is restrained when compared with the Federal outcome. Decision-making is dispersed among the various systems and is not added incrementally to the Brussels institutions. One of the essential conditions of restraint in the forces of centralization is that centrifugal tendencies created by the governments' perception of competing interests are themselves restrained: as governments become increasingly prepared to work together the question of whether formal powers are transferred to the center begins to appear irrelevant. Accordingly, governments remain the focus of authority and legitimacy; they remain intact as initiating and norm-defining agencies. This outcome may be called a *decentralized regional system*.

The closest approximation to it in the 1970's is found in Scandinavia, and the Scandinavian example may be used to illuminate several aspects of the position this new West European system will occupy internationally. The first point is that the surviving governments will not view themselves as prestige-maintaining or as agencies pursuing high politics; their success or failure will be judged increasingly by utilitarian values. Moreover, they will be accepted by outside states as ideologically neutral: there will be a perception of a European point of view, defining not an exclusive

European interest but rather a collective outlook on developments in international society. The foreign policies of the new Europe will appear to serve a high moral purpose, rather like Swedish foreign policy today, or the foreign policy of Nehru's India. The European armed forces will not be regarded as upholders of an exclusive interest but will be generally accepted as a suitable source of peacekeeping detachments. The national governments in the new system will be progressively dissuaded from indulging in high politics as they perceive the advantage of a high moral stance and as their success is judged increasingly in economic/utilitarian terms. The usefulness of the Scandinavian model in helping us to understand this outcome is apparent.

From the point of view of the East European states such an outcome seems compatible. It will not create a power challenge on their western frontier; will be less likely to give the impression of an ideologically committed unit in direct conflict with their own recently defined ideology; and will suggest the possibility of joining advantageous systems of cooperation without the immediate risk of political compromise or of compromising politics. In the long run the states of Eastern Europe might be drawn in as full members of the new system.

The dynamic, functional Europe conceived in this outcome is less divisive than the Federalist alternative and is capable of extending from a regional core to wider areas of the international system. It may be judged as morally more desirable but as definitely involving sacrifice of the drama and interest of the nation-state, while preserving something of the state's form.

The third outcome of the integration process may be called the *regional functional system*. For it we have no model. It also requires the ascendancy of the Functional elements in the existing situation, but in this case the national governments must lose all their functions except that of acting as a simple coordinating agency. Authority and legitimacy are neither centralized in new federal structures nor retained in the existing governments: they are dispersed throughout the various functional systems. Each of these has its own field of activity in which it has established competence, and each contains organs that have acquired the right to be taken as final courts of appeal. It is as if the present organs of the Community — the Commission, the Council and the Court — had been recreated in various forms and in overlapping geographic areas to administer a whole range of different task areas. Even so, it could be argued that the problem of coordination in the new system

BRITAIN AND THE COMMON MARKET

would be less serious than the problems caused by the prerogatives of the nation-state.

This system is indeed beyond the nation-state. The citizens of this new order would respond not to primitive national symbols but to the benefits of cooperation within the various functional systems; within these systems welfare as it is presently understood would also be administered. Stability would be maintained simply by the systems retaining a high level of efficiency in providing rewards to individuals and to subgroups. Because of the absence of what could be recognized as governments with independent status, there would be no need for foreign policy: relations with the outside world would be conducted by particular functional agencies with outside governments and other functional agencies. The use of armed force, where it was necessary, could be administered mainly within the functional agencies: a Securicor or Railway Police type of organization could develop with close links to particular agencies.

Projections of the diplomacy of this new unit are complicated by the absence of a recognizable model in the current situation. But the system is conceivable, and it is worth recalling that the nation-state, which until recently seemed such a permanent feature of the international scene, has in fact existed for a relatively short period of time. It may be that in conditions of advanced economic development, such as obtain in Western Europe, a new type of political organization could emerge; in a post-capitalist, late-industrial society this is particularly likely. We could then talk of political organizations that were "beyond the nation-state."

Of the conceivable outcomes, these three are the most feasible. The survival of nation-states as they are today, while also conceivable, is in my view unlikely. The strengthening of functional systems of interdependence — supported by such factors as the need for economies of scale, research pools, larger markets, regional defense, and the ideological and psychological need to escape from the oppressive structures of the national welfare state — makes some change in the present nation-state system inevitable. There was, it appears, no alternative to closer British participation in European systems of cooperation, though this need not have involved formal membership in the EEC.

The question that arises is whether members of national governments will be able to perceive changes in the conditions of sovereignty and accept the view that high politics must be determined by the environment of political action. For instance,

most governments, operating within a regional decentralized system, may yet consider themselves to be protectors of sovereignty and the primary means of enhancing the national image. The observer who knows that sovereignty has changed may see beyond these superficial elements to the reality of a situation in which governments are in fact seriously limited. De Gaulle, who stands as a champion of the unchanging, dominating structure of European politics, the nation-state, may from another perspective be judged as the man who last tried to defend a dying form of political organization.

V

What are the implications for national policymakers of this linking of past phases of European integration with future outcomes? We are indeed in a process of becoming; there are forces which take us from "here" to "there," and it may be judged an improvement that we know what "here" was and what "there" might be. But the major advantage is that an awareness of this process affords greater opportunities for making informed judgments about the strategy appropriate to the realization of one outcome rather than another. While the details of such a strategy may be worked out only in the context of day-to-day decision-making and administration, some broad guidelines are here suggested.

If a balance is kept between the forces of centralization and the forces of decentralization, the second outcome will be encouraged: centralization promotes the Federal alternative, decentralization preserves the Confederal phase. A premature overcommitment to the Brussels institutions will improve the chances for federation. In the interests of the second outcome there should be continuous concern with the appropriateness of procedures to the task at hand, rather than with the representation of either national interests or the interests of Brussels. For example, delegating final responsibility for the building of an aircraft to an international committee is functional; maintaining arrangements whereby national committees continue supervision over the craft's design and building is dysfunctional.

Today, Federalizing tendencies are evident in the moves to strengthen the budgetary powers of the EEC Commission and to set up direct elections to the European Assembly; majority voting in the Council may be another aspect of the Federalizing process. In contrast, stress upon the processes by which international agreement may be obtained, consultation in the Community system,

BRITAIN AND THE COMMON MARKET

the development of Community-wide pressure groups, the emergence of strong ongoing consultative procedures directly between governments, are concerns that encourage the decentralized regional system. There is a wide range of choice among strategies for uniting Europe, but in essence their possibilities depend on their contribution to the development of one or another of the three likely outcomes here described. I have a strong preference for the second outcome, the decentralized regional system, and would prefer to measure strategies in terms of their compatibility with that outcome.

In sum, setting the outcomes of the integration process in political focus suggests that decisions can be made about the political cost of one action as compared with another. It also indicates the way in which existing concepts may be used to construct a frame of reference for making political calculations. The science of economics, as applied to the case of British membership in the EEC, is capable of defining a range within which the costs of entry might fall. This exercise is not unlike the one I have undertaken in the different discipline of political science.

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE COMECON

by *Stanislaw Wasowski*

SINCE its inception, the COMECON — Council for Mutual Economic Assistance — has been affected by the pull of two opposing forces: one favors close economic cooperation and even centralization to provide both the benefits of international specialization and the means for a more tightly run communist bloc; the other favors separate national economic development, which would permit each country to determine its pattern and speed of growth and to preserve as much of its limited sovereignty as possible. The balance between these two sets of forces has been continually changing; the present period is marked by the strengthening of the centripetal tendency but not, by any means, its decisive victory.

Integration is now the order of the day. Communist leaders see it, although often for different reasons, as the solution to the major ills of the communist European economies. The East Europeans hope integration will help to remedy the bloc's underutilization of capacity, inadequate level of technological advance, capital scarcity, and insufficiency of raw materials. Moreover, in the minds of Soviet leaders and some in Eastern Europe, integration based on planning is designed to replace or impede the drive for "liberal," market-oriented reforms in the communist countries, as well as to provide stronger ties for the bloc.

While most ruling groups in the East European communist parties have accepted the principle of integration and made it a part of the ideological unfolding of communism, the actual implementation of integration is bound to be slow and circumspect, with good reason. National views as to the type of economic development desired differ from each other, sometimes basically. Moreover, integration without the use of market institutions requires an armory of new tools and methods as yet not available within the COMECON.¹ Some important characteristics of the Soviet-type economies, such as highly centralized national planning, make the formulation of such methods an arduous task.

¹O. T. Bogomolow, "Aktuelle Entwicklungsprobleme des sozialistischen Welt-systems im Lichte der Leninschen Ideen," *Einheit* (East Berlin), April 1970, pp. 452, 457.

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE COMECON

For us in the West it is not easy to understand communist-type integration. Our habit is to evaluate an attempt at integration by using theoretical and practical yardsticks developed in the environment of industrial free-market countries. The term integration describes close economic links resulting from a substantial removal of the effects of national frontiers. It implies various combinations of three types of economic measures: lessening institutional differences among economic areas; abolishing discrimination among those areas; and taking some economic activities out of national jurisdiction and decision-making and turning them over to international bodies. Each specific attempt at integration presents a different combination of measures and different set of economic criteria, needed to ascertain the materialization of real benefits and to guide in choices between alternative courses of action. Those in the COMECON who can see beyond institutional arrangements recognize that their organization has not yet evolved its own specific concept of integration.

Whether or not the concept of integration is imprecise and economic criteria are largely absent, however, the factor endowment of the COMECON countries and their economic system impose a type and style of integration that differs distinctly from the Western free-market variety. Highly industrialized countries, as for instance those in the EEC, tend to get together and rearrange their production patterns to achieve low-cost, technically advanced production through the adjustments to be imposed by market forces. Thus it was accepted that the inland-located steel industry of Lorraine and Belgium would shrivel while new, efficient mills would be built on the seaside, be it in Dunkirk or Tarento. The kind of integration achieved in Western Europe is typical of richer countries not averse to tearing down old buildings and scrapping obsolescent machines, because they understand that costs are measured by opportunities lost when their resources are used inefficiently.

The communist states in Eastern Europe, however, are still in the throes of industrial evolution; their capital is scarce and their sovereignty — as much as they have — is jealously guarded. Buildings are used until they crumble, machines that can be operated are kept running, and equipment is modernized only when replacement of parts is imperative. In all likelihood, integration in Eastern Europe would encourage large and efficient additions to the existing capital equipment. But the search for

higher efficiency would not permit anyone to dispose of existing, though uneconomic, capacity; lack of a political mechanism designed to resolve disputes (for instance, the democratic process) or an objective economic measure (such as the market price system) would lengthen and complicate the process of resolving thorny issues and thus would hamper the process of integration.

REASONS FOR INTEGRATION

The prime reason for integration in the COMECON is economies of scale. Existing production facilities are not fully used; production runs are often short, and costly retooling has to occur quite often. Underutilization of capacity in Eastern Europe stems from the pattern of development adopted in the first ten or fifteen years after the Second World War. This stressed the need for each country to build its economy around the same industries: iron and steel, heavy industry, machine-building. Instead of specializing in some products and exchanging them with other countries, the East European industrial plans became endowed with too many almost identical production lines. Each of them could be only partly utilized; what followed was insufficient variety of products and high fixed costs per unit of product.

In those circumstances expansion of trade among the COMECON countries has been difficult to achieve. The initial brisk growth of intrabloc trade, following the severing of most trade links with the outside world around 1950, was succeeded by a significant slowdown in the rate of growth, which lags behind that of industrial production. Also, while the COMECON share of the world industrial production increased from 31 to 33 per cent in the period 1965-1970, its participation in world trade declined during the same period from about 12.5 per cent to slightly less than 12 per cent. During those years, as world trade increased by 64 per cent, trade of the COMECON countries recorded only a 54 per cent increase.²

A significant difference between the development of COMECON trade and that of West European integrated economic regions has been noted by East European economists, as in the following table.

One of the reasons for the disappointing performance is the limited progress of specialization. On the eve of the Twenty-fifth COMECON Session a Polish newspaper complained that "the ex-

²S. L., "RGW, Bilanz, 1966-1970," *Die Wirtschaft* (East Berlin), January 6, 1971, pp. 21, 22; *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, August 1971; *Vneshnyaya Torgovlya*, various years.

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE COMECON

INCREASE IN TRADE AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE COMECON, COMMON MARKET, AND EFTA

(Annual average rate of increase of exports, in current prices)

	1951-55	1956-60	1961-65
COMECON	13.4	11.2	9.0
EEC	—	10.5	15.2
EFTA	—	6.2	10.8

Source: Stanisław Polaczek, "Istotne czynniki integracji krajów socjalistycznych," *Gospodarka Planowa* (Warsaw), September 1968, Table 3.

port of goods under the [COMECON] specialization schemes represents a small proportion of the global trade exchange. For instance, in Poland's exports to the COMECON countries this volume accounts for 14 per cent [of all exports]; in Poland's exports of machine and plant [to the COMECON countries], 25 per cent [of all such exports]. This is too little."³ Hence the hope that integration, by enlarging the size of the market, would allow the existing capacity to be used more efficiently and reverse the effects of the previous policy of parallel development.

Another important reason for the drive for integration is the need for technological progress. Most of Eastern Europe has passed the first stage of industrialization (iron, steel, basic chemicals) and is embarking on the second stage (advanced machinery and equipment, industrial consumer goods, electronics). Parallel to this development, the economies are moving from extensive to intensive development — that is to say, they now try to expand production by better use of resources instead of trying to increase output by merely adding more machinery and labor. The use of modern equipment in the communist bloc is still quite limited. For instance, only a few years ago automatic and semi-automatic machine tools comprised about 1 per cent of all machinery in the Soviet Union and in Poland, as compared with 10 to 20 per cent in Western Europe and over 25 per cent in the United States.⁴ The neglect of modern technology cannot be explained merely in terms of insufficient savings and lack of know-how. As Ota Sik once observed, communist leaders "considered cybernetics to be a fake, bourgeois science, while the Western world was installing hundreds of electronic machines."⁵

³"Program integracji," *Życie Warszawy* (Warsaw), July 27, 1971.

⁴Włodzimierz Wowczuk, "O nowy kształt zaplecza technologicznego," *Życie Gospodarcze* (Warsaw), December 15, 1968, p. 3.

⁵*La Verité sur l'économie tchécoslovaque* (Paris: Fayard, 1969).

There is widespread belief in the COMECON that advances in technology are closely linked to economic integration and that technological retardation can be mitigated, and perhaps avoided, by pooling economies and resources. More specifically, there is need for more purpose and direction to the R&D effort in the bloc, for avoidance of unnecessary repetition of research effort, and for area-wide research assignments. It is also expected that integration will bring about closer contact between research and industry and increase the former's awareness of the latter's needs.

Capital scarcity is another scourge of the COMECON economies, in spite of the high proportion of national product channeled to investment (the average is about 25 per cent; at times it has been higher than 40 per cent).⁶ The reason for the scarcity, aside from the relatively low initial level of development and the war devastation, has been a massive waste of capital in the process of equipping the communist countries during the last twenty years or so. Throughout Eastern Europe, unfinished investment projects (half facetiously called industrial ruins), resulting from nondelivery of equipment and machines, changes in plans, and other forms of inefficient planning, are a common feature. In 1969 in Slovakia the accumulated industrial ruins represented a past expenditure of 45 billion korunas, which was almost equal to the annual Slovak national income.⁷ The total of unfinished investments and of goods produced and stored for lack of demand was much larger. These investments and goods are not only a material loss; they also contribute to inflation. It takes resources to produce unmarketable goods. Their production adds the flow of income to the factors of production without increasing the flow of goods to be bought with that income. Thus, more income chases fewer goods.

If inefficient planning is the primary cause of the accumulation of industrial ruins, integration by itself will not solve the problem. New criteria of efficiency and new ways of deciding about investments would have to be introduced in a more closely integrated COMECON to cope with capital scarcity.

The COMECON is also handicapped by a dearth of raw materials. Moreover, their main producer, the Soviet Union, claims that the prices it obtains from the other members fail to cover the high cost of capital-intensive mining and extraction. If

⁶Alfred Zauberman, *Industrial Progress in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany, 1937-1962* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 39-43.

⁷R. F. Lamberg, "Der steinige Weg der tschechoslowakischen Wirtschaft," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (Zurich), September 28, 1969, p. 34.

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE COMECON

the East European countries paid higher prices for COMECON (mostly Soviet) raw materials, it would facilitate an increase in their production and the removal of the alleged exploitation. Specific measures have been suggested with this aim in mind — among them a special and separate price system for intra-COMECON exchanges, the setting up of COMECON stockpiles of commodities to be administered by the Soviet Union, and East European capital investments in the exploitation of raw materials located in the USSR.

One cannot help wondering whether the problem has been correctly stated. First of all, high transportation costs, resulting from long overland hauls, would keep the prices of raw materials in the COMECON higher than in the rest of the world, where relatively cheap water transportation is an advantage in the movement of bulky materials. Second, since the interest rate plays the role of an accounting device, at most, one cannot say for certain how the capital, and total, cost of extracting raw materials in the Soviet Union would compare with corresponding costs in market economies.

Third, the Soviets are eager to exchange their raw materials, at prices often well below those exacted from their East European partners, for Western industrial products. If the higher quality of the Western goods makes the export of raw materials from the USSR a useful economic activity, would it be possible for Eastern Europe to encourage Moscow to export raw materials in exchange for products comparable in quality to those of the West and thus increase the attractiveness of intrabloc trade in Moscow's eyes? If so, the solution for the East Europeans may be to imitate Western industry, probably through close cooperation with it, rather than to follow the practices proposed by the Soviet government. To the extent that integration might bring about more efficient and more advanced production of manufactures with which to pay for the commodities, it would help to resolve the raw material problem. But in such conditions, East European countries would be able to sell their products for the cheapest available commodities, not necessarily of Soviet origin. That much freedom of choice seems to go against the rules of the COMECON game.

SOVIET INTEREST IN INTEGRATION

Discussion of the Soviet interest in economic integration can be broken down into several categories, each corresponding to a distinct interest or concern of the Soviet Union in the politico-

economic realm: (1) its direct economic interest in Eastern Europe, (2) concern about alternatives to COMECON integration, (3) expected political benefits, and (4) concern over the economic performance of the Soviet-led bloc.

(1) At the risk of oversimplification, Moscow's main economic interest in Eastern Europe can be summarized as the desire for more favorable terms of trade and for assurances of an appropriate assortment of imports of industrial goods.

The measures which the Soviets expect would bring about higher prices for raw materials would imply a significant degree of cooperation between the USSR and its East European partners and could lead to the partners' exploitation by Moscow, but they would not necessarily require economic integration. Commodity arrangements with arbitrarily set export prices were made in the past without the benefit of integration — for instance, the low prices paid for Polish coal before 1965. Various measures could perhaps be more easily imposed on the East European allies in bilateral than in multilateral negotiations. Bilateral negotiations have been Moscow's way to deal with its friends, whether to dissuade the Bulgarians from further expansion of the Kremkovtsi steel plant or to persuade Poland and Bulgaria to conclude agreements on coordinating their plans with that of the USSR.⁸

The Soviet Union already has a substantial hold on the economies of its East European partners. Even without the fruits of greater cooperation or integration, the bloc countries depend on it as a unique market for their relatively low-quality industrial production which would not be acceptable outside of the COMECON, at least at their current prices. Continued large-volume exchange with the Soviet Union would encourage further adjustment of East European exports and production to Soviet needs and to Soviet methods of conducting international trade, strengthening both the production pattern and a trade mechanism not suitable for expanding exports to markets outside the communist bloc. An East European country would find it increasingly difficult to break out of the existing foreign trade pattern, regardless of the extent of COMECON integration and the political climate of intrabloc and East-West relations.

(2) A sudden reversal of the pattern of trade cannot be ex-

⁸"Koordynacja planow rozwoju gospodarki narodowej Polski i Związku Radzieckiego," *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), September 5, 1970, pp. 1, 2; "USSR-Bulgaria Plan for Economic Development," TASS International Service, Moscow, August 28, 1970, as reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), August 31, 1970.

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE COMECON

pected in any East European country. The same, however, cannot be said about a slow and gradual change resulting, for instance, from technology and capital imports from the West. Modernization of East European industry, cooperation agreements with Western firms and banks, and manufacturers' increasing familiarity with Western markets could, in the long run, bring about less dependence on trade with the Soviet Union and thus alter the existing system of exchange.

(3) The need for an added instrument of political control over Eastern Europe could persuade the Soviet Union to opt for integration. A proliferation of COMECON functions, committees, visits and planning bodies would give Moscow the opportunity to influence many decisions as well as to acquire a number of Soviet observation points throughout the COMECON area.

Integration would also subject economic contacts between Eastern Europe and the West to stricter supervision, if not control. Further, the dovetailing of the bloc economies could go along with more bloc autarky in respect to the outside world. The question arises, however, to what extent economic relations with the West need be abandoned or even severely curtailed. Within the COMECON there are presently only limited possibilities for satisfying Eastern Europe's shortage of raw materials, fuels and machine equipment.⁹ Decreased contacts with the West would also diminish the opportunity to acquire advanced technology and slow down the hoped for change from an extensive to an intensive form of economic growth.

(4) Moscow's political problems in Eastern Europe are not limited to maintaining control over the area. To the list of concerns must be added the necessity to make the economy of the Soviet bloc work successfully. Long past are policies of overt and gross exploitation, but their absence is not a sign that everything is working smoothly. Should the area under Moscow's control fall behind in the economic race, the Soviet leadership would be found deficient and the position of communist leaders in various East European countries would be considerably weakened.

OBSTACLES TO INTEGRATION

The process of integration in the COMECON is encountering several obstacles of an economic and administrative nature in addition to the main political difficulty, which is that individual

⁹G. Mazanow, "International Settlements of CEMA Countries: Improvement Problems," *International Affairs* (Moscow), April 1969.

countries, jealously guarding the existing elements of sovereignty, wish to be able to respond to their particular problems in the way most suitable for them. Four major impediments will be briefly reviewed: (1) bilateralism in intrabloc trade, (2) the non-comparability of national price structures, (3) complications caused by economic reforms, and (4) institutional habits linked with vertical planning.

(1) Under the bilateral trade system the choice of goods and markets is circumscribed by the availability of a particular currency or the existence of a balance on a special account; these are often more important than the price and quality of goods. In the COMECON, bilateral barter applies not only to total trade between countries but also to two major subdivisions of the product list, hard goods (food, raw materials, complex modern machinery) and soft goods (traditional machines and equipment), as well as to invisibles.¹⁰

While bilateralism in general is related to planning and non-convertibility of national currencies, bilateral balancing of specific categories of goods amounts to nonconvertibility of goods. Complex stratagems aim at getting rid of unwanted products (soft goods) and acquiring hard goods; this is done less by manipulating prices than by a prolonged process of complex negotiations and a great deal of horse-trading. Trade is thwarted, therefore, not only by bilateralism, but also by the use of implicit multiple exchange rates, resulting from both state trading and unrealistic prices.

(2) National price structures of the COMECON countries are independent of each other. Because they lack an economic or administrative-political mechanism that could provide a link among them, the search for optimal solutions has to depend on arbitrary international comparisons. In centrally planned economies prices are dissociated from most of the economic functions; they only poorly reflect scarcities of various goods and serve no significant role in the allocation of resources inside each country. As each country has had its own problems and responded to specific economic and social conditions, the inefficient internal price structures have not been related to each other. Internal prices fail

¹⁰Balances accumulated as a result of tourism and other services are kept on bilateral accounts; their transfer takes place, according to special arrangements, after the amounts outstanding have been expressed in transferable rubles at an agreed exchange rate (presumably different from the one used for commercial transactions). Based on Henryk Francuz, "The International Bank for Economic Cooperation," *International Monetary Fund Staff Papers*, Washington, D.C., November 1969, p. 492.

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE COMECON

to provide incentives for exports, and foreign trade prices play at best only a minute role in international cost and price formation.

Thus, for instance, to earn one ruble from exports to the communist countries, Czechoslovak industry must spend over 21 korunas on production inputs; to earn one dollar or its equivalent in Western currencies, Czechoslovakia must spend 33 korunas. And yet, at the official exchange rate, one dollar is worth only nine-tenths of a ruble. To take another example, a coke and coal exporting office, Ostrava Uhlozbyt, must spend 47 korunas on inputs to earn one U.S. dollar, while the Strojovit machine plant exporting office must spend only 12.37 korunas to achieve the same result.¹¹ The Poles complain that 40 per cent of all metal-working machines exported to other COMECON countries possess the same characteristics as those which are being imported; 87 per cent of the imports have the same characteristics as those produced at home. Prices paid for imported machines of the same type as the home-produced ones are often much higher. In sum, much of the intra-COMECON trade is pointless if not simply wasteful.¹²

Many East European economists are aware that efficient trade and integration must be based on an economically meaningful price structure. Integration requires the development of "commodity-money relations,"¹³ a communist euphemism for the market mechanism. Otherwise there would be no criteria for distinguishing between wasteful and beneficial exchange.

There seem to be two major ways of providing a COMECON-wide price structure: it could be fixed by administrative fiat or by establishing a systematic link between COMECON prices and world prices. Whichever method is chosen, there still remains the task of providing a cushion between the COMECON-wide price structure and domestic prices in individual member countries, for flexible exchange rates and tariffs could insulate domestic markets from the COMECON market. A great deal of skill would be needed to manipulate customs duties and exchange rates to keep domestic markets related to the COMECON market while allowing for some internal flexibility. One doubts that such expertise is available in Eastern Europe or, if it is, whether such an extended use of market forces would win the blessing of the political powers in several COMECON member countries.

¹¹Vlastimil Bubicek, "Hard Reality," *Prace* (Prague), February 24, 1969, as quoted by FBIS, February 26, 1969.

¹²Alicja Solska, "Once More About Imports," *Trybuna Ludu*, July 27, 1969.

¹³Zbigniew Kamecki, "Kierunki zmian w systemie koordynacji planow krajow RWPG," *Gospodarka Planowa* (Warsaw), October 1969, p. 9 ff.

(3) The different views on price formation reflect varying approaches to economic reform and different stages of its accomplishment. The variety in reforms has contributed to the difficulty of integrating the COMECON economies. Thus in country A a foreign trade agreement may mean guaranteed planned purchase or sale, but in country B it may merely provide a framework for the enterprises to decide about the quantities produced and exported, with no guarantees of delivery attached.

Integration repudiating the use of market forces will be an exceedingly difficult undertaking not only because of the bloc's increasing institutional and operational variety but also because of the divergent aims of the reforms in various COMECON countries. These aims are related to economic interests, and there are good reasons for the variety of these interests. The COMECON economies are unevenly developed; their natural endowment, national income per head, and respective places on the ladder of industrialization vary greatly. For the less advanced among them (Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland) catching up with their more advanced partners is an important aim; according to them, integration should help in equalizing the degree of economic development throughout the COMECON. The more advanced countries, especially East Germany and Czechoslovakia, tend to recommend a further division of labor and, thus, a strengthening of their lead. The two views touch upon vital interests and ambitions and have given rise to many acrimonious debates within the COMECON.¹⁴

(4) The communist system of economic planning and political control is based on the principle of vertical links, according to which higher authorities establish goals and procedures for lower ones. Moreover, all agencies, firms and plants are classified as superior, inferior, or as outsiders. Communication with outsiders is channeled through one's superiors. Direct links, or horizontal relations, among production units of roughly the same rank, and contacts between producers and users, are discouraged. But the success of the COMECON depends to a large extent on producers closely collaborating with their suppliers, distributors and users, or design bureaus of various plants getting together — i.e., on the development of horizontal links across state borders. To achieve this the vertical structure of decision-making would have to be revised if not largely thrown out of court. New forms of pro-

¹⁴See, e.g., John Michael Montias, *Economic Development in Communist Rumania* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1967), Chapter 4.

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE COMECON

duction planning and exchange based on enterprise-to-enterprise contacts and contracts would severely limit the role of high-level state bodies (planning commissions, ministries of foreign trade) in determining the direction and scope of intra-COMECON trade. More rational measures of efficiency in trade and investment would play an important role in decisions reached on the enterprise level.

To make a success of integration, economic planning would have to provide more internal flexibility. Overproduction resulting from poor synchronization of schedules, or a COMECON-wide dearth of certain resources crucial for the achievement of planned targets, would have to be increasingly dealt with by the mechanism of intra-COMECON exchanges. For this reason alone — supplying a safety valve hitherto provided by trade with the free-market world — integration would require a revision of the methods of planning now in use.

COMECON authorities and official circles in all East European countries are aware of the abovementioned difficulties.¹⁵ Their response is not uniform and is often far from adequate. Varying remedies are suggested by different countries and groups of experts. For instance, the use of some market forms and the introduction of convertibility has been advocated by the Hungarians and by most Polish experts, but the East Germans have been following the diametrically opposed idea of improved, streamlined, programmed planning as the main tool of integration. While the discussion is still going on, signals emanating from Moscow indicate that joint planning and centralization of decisions have won the day.¹⁶

THE EMERGING PATTERN OF INTEGRATION

As officially adopted by the COMECON countries in 1971, the program for integrating their economies stresses institutional arrangements and measures designed to solve serious economic deficiencies of the area; it is short on economic criteria, methods and analysis.

The development of the program can be traced by following the last four sessions of the COMECON Council (the Twenty-third in Moscow in April 1969, the Twenty-fourth in Warsaw in May

¹⁵For instance, see Wieslaw Iskra, "Mechanizmy integracji" ("Mechanisms of Integration"), *Zycie Gospodarcze*, June 21, 1970, p. 10.

¹⁶Oleg Bogomolow, "Economic Integration of Socialist Countries," *World Marxist Review* (Toronto), November 1970, p. 66; "Zeichen einer verschärften Gleichschaltung in Osteuropa," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, July 15, 1972, p. 5.

1970, the Twenty-fifth in Bucharest in July 1971, and the Twenty-sixth in Moscow in July 1972) as well as the frequent intervening meetings of the Executive Council and specialized committees of the organization. The decision to undertake the task of integrating COMECON economies was made at the Twenty-third Session and fully confirmed a year later at the Twenty-fourth. During these two sessions and in the interval between them, plans were outlined to provide for both close cooperation and specialization. The detailed document called the Complex Program, adopted after many delays during the Twenty-fifth Session, superseded previous decisions, authoritatively restated the need for economic integration (I-1),¹⁷ and outlined institutions to be introduced and a program of action.¹⁸

The Complex Program calls for institutional changes which can be grouped under four headings: coordination in economic planning, joint ventures, close cooperation in the area of research and development, and a more efficient mechanism of exchange. These changes, depending on how they may be interpreted and implemented, may prove to be complementary or incompatible. The Program implies the former but fails to provide a clue about how to avoid the latter.

The process of integration would rely on planning upgraded from the level of national methodology to the principle of international collaboration (I-4). Coordination of national plans would apply to long-term (five years) and very-long-term (fifteen to twenty years) plans as well as to plan forecasting. Joint planning would be introduced in selected sectors of production (I-6) and subsequently taken into account in the preparation of national economic plans (IV-24). The resulting organic bonds linking the economies of member countries would find their expression, among other ways, in a coordinated and integrated system of products (IV-20.2).¹⁹

Integration would be furthered by common production schemes

¹⁷Roman numerals refer to chapters of the Complex Program, arabic numbers to paragraphs.

¹⁸Twenty-fourth Meeting of the Council of the COMECON, "Official Communiqué," *Trybuna Ludu*, May 15, 1970, pp. 1-2; Roger Bernheim, "Kontroverse Osteuropäische Integration," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, May 10, 1970, pp. 19-20; "Complex Program," published in the main communist-bloc newspapers on August 7, 1971 — quotations from the Program included here are from *Pravda* or *Trybuna Ludu* of the same date. An English translation of the Complex Program has been published in the Fall 1971-Winter 1972 issue of *Soviet and Eastern European Foreign Trade*, pp. 187-305, under the unfelicitous title: "Comprehensive Program."

¹⁹The meaning of the last phrase is not entirely clear to the writer.

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE COMECON

and joint investment ventures (X-21, 55) in selected sectors. These sectors would include fuel and energy, raw materials, metallurgy, the machine tool industry, industrial electronics, and the chemical industry. Strong and lasting links are expected to develop among similar industrial sectors in various COMECON countries. New or modernized plants are thought to be especially appropriate candidates for these closer forms of cooperation.

Research and development of new technology is the only factor of production subject to a vigorous and explicitly stated integration effort (V). The methods to be used would include sharing mutual information, joint planning of the R&D effort, and common programs for training new research cadres. Bloc research institutes and laboratories as well as scientific-technical collectives would apply their efforts toward solving problems of common interest. Several communist leaders assign a special significance and role to scientific-technological cooperation. Aside from the planning body, the standing COMECON committee on scientific-technical cooperation is the only one with special bloc-wide authority.²⁰ A Western observer might add that scientific-technological cooperation is the only major area of cooperation where lack of efficient economic criteria does not militate against beneficial integration.

As seen by the authors of the Complex Program, other factors of production play a less conspicuous role in the process of integration. Movement of manpower across national frontiers has not been mentioned, although it has been taking place for some time and all expectations point to its intensification. Capital flows are merely implied, especially in connection with various schemes for common production of fuel (X-13, 16). Since the expected capital movement would flow from Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union, this silence is an indication of some delicacy of feeling on the part of the drafting committee.

State monopoly of foreign trade would continue to provide the framework for the exchange of goods (I-6). The Complex Program insists on the need to improve the efficiency of the exchange system while denying to trade an important role in determining the pattern of integration. Exchange of goods should be made more effective (VI-1) and responsive to the needs of the production sector. Trade would result from the coordination of plans (VI-2); planned coordination of production would lead to

²⁰Jeno Fock, Interview with MTI (the official Hungarian news agency), July 29, 1971, as reported in FBIS, July 30, 1971.

agreements as to delivery of goods and conditions thereof (IV-2). An authoritative voice, Oleg Bogomolow, the director of the Institute for Economies of the Socialist World, adds that the view of "some economists who call for expanding this form of trade so that it should ultimately become predominant" is unacceptable.²¹

The authors of the Complex Program have also shown their awareness that improved exchanges would require an extended use of commodity-money relations. When used in a planned manner (IV-1), these relations would lead to multilateralization of payments (VI-10) and intra-COMECON convertibility of currencies. Multilateral clearing would be geared to the needs of planned development (VII-2), and at least initially would deal with balances arising in planned, bilateral trade (VII-5). Multilateral payments would require general use of transferable rubles, which are already used for bilateral clearing of most of the intra-COMECON trade.

A much wider use and a greater international role for the transferable ruble is seen as the necessary condition for improving the mechanism of exchange in the COMECON. The transferable ruble would become an international COMECON currency playing a triple role as the standard of value, means of payment and unit of accumulation (VII-1). The change-over to its general use would be spread over several years. Between 1971 and 1973 schemes would be put in operation providing for the eventual use of transferable rubles in all trade transactions (VII-9). But transferable ruble balances would be of limited usefulness as long as their purchasing power in individual countries was subject to the uncertainty and arbitrariness of national pricing systems. Therefore, during the remainder of 1971, methods and procedures would be adopted to allow for the introduction of exchange rates or coefficients between transferable rubles and national currencies.²²

Cross exchange rates or coefficients would follow (VII-15); appropriate procedures and conditions should be formulated by 1973 (VII-18). This should remove the most important hurdle in the progress to convertibility between the transferable ruble and individual COMECON currencies. The planned-for exchange

²¹Bogomolow, "Economic Integration of Socialist Countries," *loc. cit.*

²²At the Twenty-sixth session in Moscow implementation of the program outlined the year before in Bucharest was referred to in general terms. Reportedly banks in the COMECON have increased their transactions in transferable rubles by 11 per cent. See "Die 26. Comecon-Session," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, July 15, 1972, p. 13.

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE COMECON

rates and/or coefficients would be introduced some time during the period 1972-1974 (VII-16). A few years would then elapse to permit the novelty to be tested and digested. Toward the end of the decade (between 1976 and 1979) work would start on the unification of the exchange rates. By 1980 a decision would be undertaken concerning the value and modalities of the unified exchange rates as well as the deadline for their introduction (VII-16). There is an implication that until that date is set multiple exchange rates and coefficients will be allowed in the COMECON. Indeed, provisions are made for rebates on the exchange rate applicable to the payments arising from reasons other than trade (VII-30). Multiple exchange rates may continue for some time; there is no clear indication that when convertibility is introduced, some time after 1980, it will apply to all transactions among the COMECON countries.

Search for COMECON-wide convertibility requires that some orderly and systematic relationship be introduced among the pricing systems now in operation throughout the bloc (VII-16); otherwise convertible balances would have variable purchasing power, depending on whether they were used to acquire relatively underpriced or overpriced goods. While convertibility is a distant goal, the immediate concern is wider use of the transferable ruble. Transferability does not mean, however, that a COMECON country credited with transferable rubles could freely purchase goods not listed in the bilateral agreement. Although not all intra-COMECON exchanges of goods would require long-term contracts or even annual trade agreements, all protocols providing for intra-COMECON sale would have to be subject to bilateral negotiations (VI-12 to 20) and agreed contingents. Diminished restrictions on trade in some goods refer merely to their removal from long-term trade plans. The state monopoly of foreign trade would continue to decide about the quantity and type of products subject to import and export, even if their prices were to be unified on the COMECON-wide basis. Though hope has been expressed that the transferable ruble can be used in payments with noncommunist countries (VII-5), the document does not go beyond generalities. In particular the Complex Program does not address the question whether a non-COMECON owner of transferable rubles could freely pick off the shelf any products produced in the COMECON area.

Economic integration based on coordinated and/or joint planning of production is not without potential advantages. It offers

opportunities for lowering costs through large-scale production, for expanding output where obvious regional advantages are present, or for undertaking technology-intensive developments by pooling the resources of several smaller countries. Such improvements would require the use of some optimization criteria. But while market-related criteria have been disregarded by the Bucharest document, it proposes no others instead. It is not clear what principles would guide bloc policymakers in the allocation of centrally managed investment funds among various proposed ventures; or what sort of incentives would be used to elicit higher efficiency. The expectation of efficiency relies on confidence in the proper working of integrated institutions of the COMECON.

Hence, the search for the theoretical underpinnings of planned specialization continues, and constant reminders that an economic concept of integration has still to be found amount to an admission that national planning methods cannot be simply transferred to an international setting.²³ In 1970 a well-known East European economist said: "In economic theory socialist economic integration is a new concept, and therefore a concept not entirely elucidated and defined."²⁴ This situation has not changed as a result of the adoption of the Complex Program. As a Hungarian monthly stated, "one will not find anywhere in the program a definition of integration, since the program does not attempt to interpret the idea."²⁵

Because an operative principle of international optimization still eludes COMECON planners, they have settled meanwhile for a gradual and pragmatic adjustment of planning to their international needs and problems. They hope that a growing body of experience in dealing with COMECON-wide economic questions will be shared through a process of continuous consultation (III-4). This would help international planning to spread throughout the East European area. Common ventures and jointly planned sectors would stand out as fixed points around which an ever tighter net of COMECON-wide planning would grow (IV-30). This net would eventually "cover all spheres of interstate economic relations" in the Soviet bloc.²⁶ On the negative side, this half-pragmatic, half-dogmatic approach carries with it a high

²³Bogomolow, "Aktuelle Entwicklungsprobleme. . .," *loc. cit.*; I. Dudinsky, "Economic Integration — Law of Development of the Socialist Community," *International Affairs* (Moscow), November 1970, p. 8.

²⁴Iskra, *loc. cit.*

²⁵Istvan Gyulai in *Nemetkozi Szemle*, October 1971, as reported in *Radio Free Europe Research Report*, No. 6, 1972.

²⁶Dudinsky, *op. cit.*

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE COMECON

degree of uncertainty, making it impossible to provide deadlines for achieving various steps of integration or its final completion.²⁷

The lack of economic criteria for integration does not mean that the COMECON is lacking a program of action. The Complex Program outlines several measures to cope with some of the outstanding difficulties experienced by the communist bloc, which region-wide action is expected to alleviate. Increasing the scale of production and removal of bottlenecks in production are among them. The appropriate size of production units is suggested by observing reputedly efficient industrial plants in free-market countries. For example, in manufacturing trucks the minimum economic size of production has been reported to be 100,000 units per year. As no plant in the COMECON produces at this rate, appropriate coordination — i.e., expansion of some production lines and closing down of others — is thought to be necessary.²⁸ Similar efficiency indicators, taken from Western experience, have been mentioned in relation to other products. Removal of bottlenecks would benefit from the existence of centers of forecasting and coordination in the bloc. Total area balances of requirements and expected output could be used as signals that production should be increased.

Imitating Western production and making supply more responsive to needs do not necessarily amount to rational measures. Optimum Western levels of plant output may be inappropriate in countries where factor proportions and cost structures differ greatly from those prevailing in the West; removing bottlenecks by sheer increase in production may use more resources than would be lost through their continued existence.

Insufficient supply of raw materials, another important difficulty experienced in the COMECON, would also be open for solution through regional cooperation. An increased production of raw materials would be guaranteed by higher prices paid to producers as well as by joint exploitation schemes. The latter would imply capital flow to the raw material producing areas from the rest of the COMECON; in most cases the recipient of higher prices or capital aid would be the Soviet Union. There is no doubt that Bulgarian participation in the paper and cellulose factory in

²⁷Le Comecon ne prepare pas une integration économique dont la date serait fixée d'avance," *Le Monde*, June 2, 1970. A warning that the Complex Program is not bound to a specific timetable was voiced by Czechoslovak Prime Minister Strougal on the morrow of the Bucharest session. See *Rude Pravo* (Prague), July 31, 1971, pp. 1, 2.

²⁸Prospects for Cooperation," Radio Discussion, Budapest Domestic Service, December 16, 1969, as reported by FBIS, December 19, 1969.

Arkhangelsk would result in increasing the supply of these products in Bulgaria.²⁹ The economic question that arises is whether this is the cheapest way for the Bulgarians to obtain paper and cellulose. Reallocation of the costs of raw materials would remove at least some of the Soviet complaints but would not guarantee low-cost supplies to the bloc as a whole.

The Complex Program contains no measures designed to cope with capital scarcity. Undoubtedly, expected economies of large-scale production and savings resulting from scientific-technical cooperation should result in the less wasteful use of capital resources. On the other hand, adoption of a sterile planning formula for a complex international problem would quite likely result in miscalculations and the misuse of many resources, including capital. Whether, on balance, the application of the Program will help to cope with capital scarcity must remain an open question for the time being.

THE POLITICAL ADVANTAGES OF INTEGRATION

Evaluation of the attempt to integrate the bloc economically would be incomplete without a brief mention of the political advantages the guardians of bloc unity hope to derive therefrom. They cannot but welcome several expected consequences of the integration drive, for common organization should tighten the grip of central planners on the individual countries; greater interdependence, given the size differential, should mean the increased dependence of smaller economies on the Soviet Union; the administrative and political structure would double that of the Warsaw Pact structure and be able to replace it in case of the Pact's dissolution; stronger intra-COMECON ties would provide for the replacement or control of links with the free-market world. Last but not least, as stressed by a prominent Hungarian general, economic integration would encourage military integration.³⁰

Such various advantages are readily perceived and praised in the Soviet Union and among staunch supporters of bloc unity in Eastern Europe. Radio Moscow commented on May 12, 1970, the day the Twenty-fourth COMECON Session opened in Warsaw: ". . . the political and economic cohesion of the socialist countries is the most important condition for victories in the historic com-

²⁹*Ibid.*, and "A protocol on the coordination of state economic plans between Bulgaria and the Soviet Union," Radio Sofia, August 29, 1970, reported by FBIS, August 31, 1970.

³⁰Interview with General Jozsef Lantodi, *Magyar Nemzet*, September 29, 1971, reported in *Radio Free Europe Research Report*, *op. cit.*

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE COMECON

petition between socialism and capitalism." Moreover, to raise integration above the level of mere convenience, theoreticians gave it the guilt of ideological acceptance. Thus G. Sorokin stated that "socialist economic integration is an intrinsic part of the construction of Socialism."³¹

A Western observer cannot fail to see an imbalance between the limited and ill-defined economic promise of COMECON's integration and its undoubted contribution to bloc cohesion, which would be beneficial to Soviet interests. The implications of this imbalance will have to be faced sooner or later by the communist leaders of Eastern Europe.

³¹G. Sorokin, "Problemy ekonomicheskoi integratsii stran sotsializma," *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, December 1968.

THE CHANGING PATTERNS OF MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN CHINESE POLITICS

by Parris H. Chang

SINCE 1966, as a result of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the People's Liberation Army has risen to unprecedented political ascendancy in Communist China, and many important, far-reaching changes have taken place in the Chinese political system. This essay seeks to analyze the changes in military-party interactions and in the role of the PLA in Chinese politics.

THE HISTORICAL LEGACY

In the history of the Chinese communist movement, the military and the party could hardly be distinguished. Most communist leaders concurrently held influential positions in the military and party hierarchies. Nonetheless, a policy of civilian (party) supremacy and control over the military was declared in the Kut'ien Resolution in 1929. This policy, epitomized in the expression that the party should command the gun and the gun should not be allowed to direct the party, evolved into a cardinal principle of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and was often invoked to settle differences between military and party leaders and to justify party control of the military.

Prior to 1949, because of the wartime situation and the civil war aftermath, conflicts between the party and the military were minimized, particularly since their leaders were virtually identical. But that the principle of civilian supremacy had gained wide acceptance among the Chinese communists, including the PLA leaders, was demonstrated in the orderly transition of power that took place in the early 1950's. During 1949-1952, following the communist takeover of China, military leaders ruled the country through the Military Control Committee and the Military and Administrative Committee, the highest organs of authority in the provinces and the six major regions. However, as communist power was consolidated, the military governors of the provinces rapidly "returned to the barracks" and handed political power over to civilian party/government officials; in some cases they themselves took up civilian posts in the provinces and gave up

MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN CHINESE POLITICS

their military status. By 1954, the vestiges of military rule had almost disappeared. With a few exceptions in border regions such as Sinkiang and Yunnan, civilian governing structures, headed by civilians, had replaced the provincial military bodies, and in that year the Peking regime proclaimed its state constitution. From that time until the mid-1960's, there was more or less a separation of civilian and military functions, and party/government cadres and PLA officials became highly specialized in their own spheres of work.

Yet environmental changes, the division of labor and the specialization of functions between civilian party officials and military officials inevitably led to conflicts of interest. Even though the top PLA officials were represented in the party's most important decision-making bodies, the Politburo and the Central Committee (CC), in an interlocking party-military leadership, they found themselves compelled by the logic of their special responsibilities and the special concerns of their own constituency to fight for the military's priorities and to resist the demands of other party leaders. There were numerous issues of contention between the party and the military during the 1949-1966 period: chief among these were entry into the Korean War, professionalization and politicization of the PLA, the army's participation in economic tasks, the buildup of a militia, the Quemoy-Matsu crisis, Sino-Soviet relations, and the Chinese response to the escalation of the war in Viet Nam.¹

Without exception, each of these and other discordant issues was settled in favor of the party's policy priorities, testifying to the general acceptance in the polity of the principle of civilian supremacy and party control over the military. PLA leaders, despite their control of the instrument of violence, could merely "lobby" the party leadership through prescribed channels. Not unlike representatives of an interest group, they participated in the decision-making process as claimants and advisers, advocating certain courses of action in domestic and foreign policy, demand-

¹Various writers have treated some of these issues in great detail; see, for example, John Gittings, *The Role of the Chinese Army* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967); Ellis Joffe, *Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949-1964* (Cambridge: East Asia Research Center, Harvard University, 1965); Alice L. Hsieh, *Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962); Harry Harding and Melvin Gurtov, *The Purge of Lo Jui-Ch'ing: The Politics of Chinese Strategic Planning* (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, 1971); and William W. Whitson, "The Military: Their Role in the Policy Process," in Frank N. Trager and William Henderson, editors, *Communist China, 1949-1969: A Twenty-Year Appraisal* (New York: New York University Press, 1970).

ing a greater allocation of resources, and trying to protect and advance their corporate interests. When they could resort only to lobbying and politicking in political conflicts with the party leadership, and when the arena of such conflicts was the Politburo or the CC where the civilians were pre-eminent, the military leaders were easily outvoted.

The best illustration of civilian supremacy was provided by the Lushan affair in the summer of 1959. During an enlarged Politburo meeting held at Lushan in July 1959, Marshal P'eng Teh-huai, a Politburo member and Minister of Defense, submitted a memorandum attacking Mao Tse-tung's Great Leap and commune policies. A large number of PLA officials signed the memorandum in support of P'eng's action. However, his challenge to the party leadership stopped short of the threat or actual use of naked force (of which P'eng was obviously capable inasmuch as he and his close collaborator, General Huang Ko-cheng, the PLA Chief of Staff, had the power to deploy troops), and it was eventually defeated in a CC Plenum that followed the enlarged Politburo session. Marshal P'eng and General Huang were replaced by Marshal Lin Piao and General Lo Jui-ch'ing as Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively.

THE RISE OF THE ARMY'S POLITICAL INFLUENCE IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 1960's

On assuming the leadership of the army in the fall of 1959, Lin Piao moved quickly and vigorously to raise the political-ideological standards of the PLA and rebuild the party control mechanism within it, while flaying his predecessor's alleged emphasis on professionalism. In his first public statement as head of the military establishment, he pledged the "unconditional loyalty of the People's Liberation Army to the Party and to Comrade Mao,"² and from 1960 onward he carried out an intensive campaign of political indoctrination, centering on the study and application of the thought of Mao Tse-tung.³ Mao evidently adjudged the army campaign to be much more effective than those carried out in the nonmilitary sectors of society during this period, having to do with socialist education and ideological rectification

²Lin Piao, "March Ahead under the Red Flag of the Party's General Line and Mao Tse-tung's Military Thought," *Jen-min Jih-pao (JMJP)*, September 30, 1959.

³See "The Resolution of the Enlarged Session of the Military Affairs Committee Concerning the Strengthening of Indoctrination Work in Troop Units" (October 20, 1960), in J. Chester Cheng, editor, *PLA Kung-tso Tung-hsun: The Politics of the Chinese Red Army* (Stanford, Calif.: The Hoover Institution, 1966), p. 64.

MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN CHINESE POLITICS

in arts and literature. Accordingly, the PLA was held up before the nation as the paradigm of the correct "communist work style," and individual soldiers said to have distinguished themselves by their selflessness and ideological dedication, such as Lei Feng and Wang Chieh, were made models for emulation campaigns.

Further evidence that Lin Piao and the PLA were now the repositories of Mao's highest confidence was provided by the latter's call in December 1963 for the whole country to "learn from the PLA," wherein all political, economic and social organizations were directed to study and emulate the army's methods of organization, operation and ideological training. That Mao's call was an indirect rebuke to the party for not having done its job properly is unmistakable in retrospect. Even more important, from 1964 on steps were taken to establish a network of "political work departments," clearly modeled on the PLA's political commissar system, in government and economic organizations. These departments were staffed primarily by political cadres transferred from the PLA, and PLA veterans took over many other positions in government and industry normally held by civilians, while civilian cadres in the economy were sent to PLA schools for training.

Thus, on the one hand, there were extensive efforts to bring the PLA under tight party control and to rectify its professionalism but, on the other hand, the PLA was encouraged, increasingly after 1963, to become the party's competitive political institution and to make inroads into those functions previously in the party domain. The main explanation of this paradox lies in the division of the party leadership: Following the collapse of the Great Leap Forward programs, many top CCP leaders, such as Liu Shao-ch'i, Teng Hsiao-p'ing and others, had begun to doubt the infallibility of Mao's leadership and to question seriously his methods for modernizing and revolutionizing China. Opposed and obstructed by his colleagues who controlled the party organization, Mao was compelled to find a new power base outside the party to project his will. He subsequently turned to the PLA, which had, in his eyes, evolved into the foremost revolutionary organization in China.

It is tempting to view the political prominence of the PLA since 1966 as the end result of the developments just discussed, yet to do so would be to ignore the special and largely unforeseen circumstances that came into being with the unfolding of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR). To put it

another way, the PLA did not seize political power through a military coup as the military has done in many other political systems. Rather, power devolved into its hands largely by default; its assumption of various political functions in the Chinese political system was not only gradual but came more as a result of outside circumstances than from its own initiative.

There is no evidence, moreover, to substantiate the thesis that Mao or Lin Piao planned in advance to use the PLA to assail and replace the party. Mao did use the army for political purposes, but initially these purposes and the political role of the PLA were limited. The emulation of model soldiers and of the entire PLA can, in retrospect, be viewed as a tactic to spur the party to reinvigorate itself with revolutionary *élan*.⁴ In time, Mao intensified the pressure by broadening the role of the PLA. The network of "political work departments" established in governmental and economic organizations was, as pointed out before, modeled after the PLA's political organization and staffed largely by its officers. But only when these efforts to reform the party and push it to carry out the policies he favored seemed fruitless did Mao apparently decide to use the PLA as a power base to attack and remove the centers of opposition.

The first such sign came on November 29, 1965 when the organ of the PLA, *Liberation Army Daily*, reproduced an article by Yao Wen-yuan criticizing a historical play by Wu Han, Vice-Mayor of Peking, and accompanied it with an "Editor's Note" which denounced the play as a "big poisonous weed." The significance of this PLA move should be briefly explained. It is now known that Mao had harbored resentment against Wu Han, whose historical play, "The Dismissal of Hai Jui," allegedly defended Marshal P'eng Teh-huai's criticism of Mao at the Lushan meeting, and had called for the party to repudiate Wu publicly. When this demand was resisted by other party leaders, particularly Wu's superior, P'eng Chen, Mao instructed Yao Wen-yuan to write an article attacking Wu Han and, by extension, P'eng Chen and others who supported P'eng. The article was published on November 10, 1965 in the Shanghai *Wen-hui Pao*. P'eng apparently maneuvered to circumvent publicity and minimize political repercussions from Yao's attack by ordering newspapers and journals outside of Shanghai not to reprint it. Reproduction of the article in *Liberation Army Daily*, however, gave it not only publicity but PLA en-

⁴Ellis Joffe, "The Chinese Army in the Cultural Revolution: The Politics of Intervention," *Current Scene*, December 7, 1970, p. 3.

MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN CHINESE POLITICS

dorsement; the severe indictment of the "Editor's Note" also had the effect of redefining the nature of the "offenses" committed by Wu Han and his protectors.⁵

From that time on, as Mao used it as his instrument of power to struggle with other leaders entrenched in the party organizations, the PLA steadily expanded its role in the political arena. On February 2, 1966, Lin Piao entrusted Chiang Ch'ing (Madame Mao) to convene a "Forum on Literary and Art Work in the Armed Forces" in Shanghai. At the conclusion of the eighteen-day forum, a summary report was prepared under Chiang Ch'ing's guidance and revised three times by Mao personally before its release.⁶ The "Forum Summary" did not confine itself to literary matters in the armed forces; it spelled out the Maoist position, policy and intention concerning a cultural revolution in the nation. It pointed out that literary and art circles had basically failed to carry out Mao's instructions and that the cultural front was dominated by an anti-party and anti-socialist "black line"; moreover, it called for a "great socialist revolution on the cultural front" to eliminate this black line and stated that the PLA "must play an important role in the socialist cultural revolution."⁷ The Maoists later claimed that the summary was "in direct opposition to the counter-revolutionary 'February Outline Report,' and launched a vigorous attack on the counter-revolutionary revisionist line."⁸ Clearly, Mao had secured the full backing of Lin Piao and was using the PLA as a power base to fight P'eng Chen and his allies in the central party apparatus.

In the spring of 1966, *Liberation Army Daily* set the pace in the attacks on Mao's intellectual critics and their supporters within the party hierarchy. For instance, its editorial on April 18, which was based on the PLA "Forum Summary," declared war on the anti-party, anti-socialist "black line" in the nation's cultural front. Furthermore, the PLA organ now openly challenged the party's

⁵Bowing to the pressure *Liberation Army Daily* obviously exerted, *People's Daily* reproduced Yao's article the following day (November 30) but added its own "Editor's Note," said to have been authored by P'eng Chen, which mentioned nothing of the political offensiveness of Wu Han's play and described the issues involved as "academic."

⁶Editorial, *Liberation Army Daily (LAD)*, May 29, 1967; in *Survey of the Chinese Mainland Press (SCMP)*, No. 3951, June 2, 1967, p. 21.

⁷"Summary of the Forum on Literature and Art in the Armed Forces," New China News Agency (NCNA), Peking, May 28, 1967; in *SCMP*, No. 3951, June 2, 1967.

⁸Editorial, *JMJP*, May 29, 1967; also see "Two Diametrically Opposed Documents," editorial, *Hung Ch'i*, No. 9, May 27, 1967. The "February Outline Report" was put out by P'eng Chen to channel the GPCR into less harmful academic debates.

authority by attacking and ridiculing editorials appearing in the party organ, *People's Daily*.⁹ In May, Lin Piao was apparently a key figure at the enlarged Politburo session which sealed the fate of P'eng Chen and other top leaders including Lo Jui-ch'ing and Lu Ting-yi. In a speech at that meeting, Lin expressed his wholehearted support for Mao, warned of the danger of capitalist restoration in China and hinted strongly that the danger was most acute at the upper levels of the party leadership.¹⁰

In June there were reports that troops loyal to Lin Piao were being moved into Peking, and at this juncture Fu Ts'ung-pi, a long-time aide of Yang Cheng-wu, the newly appointed Acting Chief of Staff, took over the command of the Peking garrison. Also, the *People's Daily* editorial board was reorganized on June 1 and placed under the control of the PLA. It is not known whether troops were used to intimidate Mao's opponents during the showdown with Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing at the eleventh CC Plenum in August. Nevertheless, PLA support was crucial to Mao's victory; this can be seen from the fact that Lin Piao was chosen as Mao's deputy and heir-apparent and three marshals of the PLA, Yeh Chien-ying, Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien and Nieh Jung-chen, were rewarded with membership in the Politburo.

PLA INVOLVEMENT IN CHINESE POLITICS DURING THE GPCR

Although the PLA played a substantial role in helping Mao to defeat such powerful party figures as Liu and Teng in the August 1966 CC Plenum, and was also instrumental in organizing and providing transport and logistical support for the hordes of Red Guards who journeyed to Peking in the summer and fall of 1966, its extensive intervention in the GPCR was evidently not planned from the outset. It appears that many of the PLA's commanding officers were opposed to army involvement in what they considered to be an intraparty dispute and initially adopted a hands-off policy.

In the provinces the assaults on party structures by Red Guards and "revolutionary rebels" following the Plenum appeared to have the effect of shifting the sympathy of PLA leaders toward the provincial authorities. Since the local PLA units had the responsibility of assisting in maintaining law and order and the PLA was part of the establishment, their leaders probably viewed

⁹See *LAD*, April 17 and May 20, 1966.

¹⁰*Pei-ching P'ing-lun* (Peking: Propaganda Department of the Capital "December 26" Commune), No. 4, February 28, 1967.

MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN CHINESE POLITICS

those attacking the establishment with suspicion and resentment and were inclined to align themselves with the local party officials. Personal and organizational ties between PLA and party leaders were also close. In many provinces their children had worked together to organize the initial Red Guard groups, an action possibly initiated by the parents and, in any case, quite likely to affect parental attitudes. Senior regional-provincial party secretaries often served concurrently as first political commissars of military regions or districts, and PLA commanders served in the party's regional bureaus or provincial committees. The reported "confession" of Ch'en Tsai-tao, Commander of the Wuhan Military Region until July 1967, sheds some light on the nature of the "civilian-military" alliance and deserves to be quoted at length:

After recuperating for over a year, I returned to Wuhan in September last year [1966]. As a Standing Committee Member of the Hupeh Provincial Party Committee, I attended sessions of the Standing Committee after my return to Wuhan; I listened to the opinions of Chang T'i-hsueh [Acting First Secretary] and sided with him. . . . I followed Chang T'i-hsueh and promptly answered his call whenever he wanted me. He asked me to preside over four general meetings convened by the conservatives

In all of the rallies that I attended I sided with the provincial Party committee and the conservatives, supporting the conservatives and suppressing the rebels, embellishing the provincial Party committee and advancing the cause of Chang T'i-hsueh. . . . In shielding Chang T'i-hsueh, I accommodated him in a rented house and provided his staff with office premises. I was even prepared to provide them with an office building. What for? I did so to hide, and provide cover for, the members of this black provincial Party committee and to support their reactionary line.¹¹

Frequently party leaders deposited the "black materials" which they had collected in the PLA headquarters to prevent them from falling into the hands of the Red Guards, or persuaded local PLA leaders to deploy troops to guard the premises of the party against a possible "rebel" invasion. Some civilian party leaders allegedly also put on PLA uniforms, rode in cars carrying military license plates, and worked in the office of the local PLA headquarters, using those quarters as their "shelter."¹²

¹¹"Ch'en Tsai-tao's Examination" (transcribed and edited from a recording on December 1, 1967), *Na-han Chan-pao (Outcry Combat News)* (Canton: Suburban Cultural-Educational Revolutionary Rebel H.Q. of Red H.Q. of Municipal Organs), No. 4, April 1968; also translated in *SCMP*, No. 4167, April 30, 1968, pp. 3-4. The quoted passages are based on the *SCMP* translation with minor corrections in English.

¹²*Ta Pi-p'an T'ung-hsun (Mass Criticism and Repudiation Report)* (Canton: Canton News Service of Shanghai T'ung-chi University Tung-fang Hung Corps), October 5, 1967.

Thus, the unfolding of unanticipated events and local PLA leaders' personal, political and organizational ties rendered PLA neutrality in the GPCR impossible. This was precisely Mao's argument for PLA intervention, and intervention on his side. He was quoted as having said:

The so-called non-involvement is false, for the army was already involved long ago. The question, therefore, is not one of involvement or non-involvement. It is one of whose side we should stand on and whether we should support the revolutionaries or the conservatives or even the rightists. The PLA should actively support the revolutionary leftists.¹³

On January 23, 1967, a central directive ordered the PLA to "support the left"¹⁴— that is, to intervene on the side of the Maoists. The Maoist leadership was well aware, however, that some military leaders, both in Peking and in the provinces, were opposed to using the PLA to crush opposition within the party.¹⁵ It therefore reactivated the aged and semi-retired Marshal Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien to head the All-PLA Cultural Revolution Group, and promoted Hsu and Marshal Ch'en Yi to coequal posts as Vice-Chairmen of the party's Military Affairs Commission (MAC), in an apparent maneuver to commit them to Mao's cause so that they would use their influence to win over their followers and former associates.

But any hopes that the PLA intervention would facilitate the seizure of power were soon dispelled. Though PLA units in five provinces did support the Maoists in early 1967, in the rest of China the response to the order to support the left was equivocal. In some provinces the PLA actually intervened against the Maoist rebels. This is understandable. As part of the establishment the Maoists sought to destroy, the military would instinctively have acted with a bias toward preserving law and order.

Angered by the army's stand, the Maoists, now pointing the

¹³See "Decision of the CCP Central Committee, the State Council, the Military Affairs Commission and the Cultural Revolution Group on Resolute Support for the Revolutionary Masses of the Left" (January 23, 1967), in *Current Background (CB)*, No. 852, May 6, 1968, pp. 49-50.

¹⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁵See "The PLA Resolutely Supports the Proletarian Revolutionary Faction," editorial, *LAD*, January 25, 1967. During the month preceding the army's formal involvement in the GPCR, several top PLA figures were purged, including Ho Lung, Vice-Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee; Yang Yung and Liao Han-sheng, Commander and Political Commissar, respectively, of the Peking Military Region; Wang Shan-jung and Lei Ying-fu, Director and Deputy Director of the PLA General Staff Department of Operations; and Liang Pi-yeh, Deputy Director of the PLA General Political Department. They may have been the high-level examples of "capitalist power-holders in the Army" who had been denounced in the PLA daily for their opposition to the GPCR. *Ibid.*, January 12 and 14, 1967.

MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN CHINESE POLITICS

"spearhead of the struggle" at the PLA, stormed and invaded local military headquarters and seized arms from the soldiers. In retaliation, the PLA suppressed rebel groups as "reactionary" or "counter-revolutionary," and arrested their leaders and disbanded their organizations.¹⁶ These unfavorable developments in the provinces were subsequently labeled by the Maoists the "February adverse current." But in Peking, too, there was an "adverse current" which found expression in a "conservative backlash." Plucking up the courage to assert themselves, T'an Chen-lin, a Politburo member and Vice-Premier in charge of the regime's overall rural policy, and other moderate officials attacked the leadership of the Cultural Revolutionary Group (CRG) headed by Ch'en Po-ta and Chiang Ch'ing, and sought to curb the excesses of the "rebels," particularly their indiscriminate attacks on veteran party officials.¹⁷

The "February adverse current" sparked a crucial debate in the party's Central Work Conference at the end of March 1967 on the future course of the GPCR. CRG leaders who wanted to cut PLA powers apparently prevailed, for on April 1 and April 6 both the Central Committee and the Military Affairs Commission issued orders forbidding PLA units to arrest or persecute "revolutionary masses," or to label mass organizations "reactionary" or suppress them.¹⁸ Instead, these orders advised the PLA to use persuasion, education and political work.

Meanwhile, the power in the provincial party structures was gradually devolving into the hands of local PLA leaders. On the one hand, the Red Guards' assaults on the provincial authorities in what was called "seizure of power from below" (an emulation of the 1871 "Paris Commune" experience) had paralyzed the party and government machinery; on the other hand, the incompetence, intrigues and infighting of different factions of the Red Guards and "revolutionary rebels" had resulted in the collapse of the Maoist strategy to establish a new political order. The PLA had to move into the power vacuum to maintain order. In

¹⁶See "Document of the CCP Central Committee," in *CB*, No. 852, May 6, 1968, p. 111.

¹⁷See speeches by Chiang Ch'ing and other central leaders as reported by *Chung T'ung-fang-hung (Pearl River East Is Red)* (Canton: Pearl River Film Studio), and translated in *SCMP*, No. 4166, April 29, 1968, pp. 6-8. T'an Chen-lin was reported by another source to have attacked the CRG in a party meeting on February 19, 1967 and declared: "I firmly disagree with the striking down of so many veteran cadres, even if it cause my head to be chopped off and my expulsion from the Party!"

¹⁸The text of the two directives is in *CB*, No. 852, May 6, 1968, pp. 111-112 and 115-116.

those provinces where the Revolutionary Committee (RC), the new organ of power, had been formed, military representatives constituted the backbone of the new leadership, and in others where the RC had not been set up, local PLA leaders ruled directly through a "Military Control Committee" which was virtually a military government. The PLA was thus becoming the new "establishment," even though its powers had been undercut by the April directives. At this time the "revolutionary masses" launched a new offensive against the military in various provinces. Factional struggle between opposing "rebel" groups also continued unabated, and the incidence of "struggle by force," murders, riots and disorderly demonstration increased throughout the country from April 1967 onward.

In their dilemma, local PLA commanders apparently found it necessary to rely on some mass organizations and play them off against others. On the basis of practical considerations, the rebel groups favored and supported were usually the less radical ones — those regarded by the CRG as "conservative." Conversely, the PLA tended to see the unruly anti-establishment groups as "troublemakers" and to react to their activities with hostility, while the CRG gave these "revolutionary" groups its support.

Under circumstances like these, PLA leaders in quite a number of provinces were dismissed for having "committed errors in supporting the Left."¹⁹ Their dismissal and the CRG's inclination to support "rebel" groups that challenged the PLA authorities could not but alienate many other local PLA leaders who faced the same predicament. Thus, when two Peking emissaries, Hsieh Fu-chih, a member of the Politburo and the MAC Standing Committee, and Wang Li, a member of the CRG and Acting Director of the party's Propaganda Department, arrived at Wuhan on July 18 and admonished local PLA leaders for having supported the conservative faction and suppressed the "revolutionary" faction, the military leaders were enraged into taking an extreme step. On July 20, Hsieh and Wang were kidnaped and physically abused by members of the "Million Heroes," a group they had denounced. The "Million Heroes" were supported by Ch'en Tsai-tao and Chung Han-hua, Commander and Political Commissar of the Wuhan Military Region, respectively.²⁰

¹⁹By July 1967 the military leadership of the Honan, Anhwei, Inner Mongolia, Chekiang and Tsinghai Military Districts, the Cheng-tu and Kunming Military Regions and possibly other units had been reshuffled.

²⁰"The Appalling July Meeting," *Wuhan Kang-erh-szu*, September 22, 1967; in *SCMP*, No. 4073, December 5, 1967, pp. 1-18.

MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN CHINESE POLITICS

Quickly, according to Japanese reporters in Peking, PLA paratroops were dropped in Wuhan and ten warships were sent from the East China Sea to fight against Ch'en Tsai-tao's troops and supporters.²¹ A civil war was avoided at the last minute when Ch'en capitulated and released Hsieh and Wang on July 22. The incident nevertheless stood as an overt protest by local PLA officers directed at Peking for failing to appreciate their plight and for allowing the rebels to threaten their political survival.

Immediately after the Wuhan mutiny, CRG officials openly called for the attack and overthrow of the "handful of capitalist power-holders in the Army,"²² and incited rebels to drag out "Ch'en Tsai-tao type" persons in the provinces. Rebel groups hitherto suppressed by the local PLA went on the offensive. Encouraged by Chiang Ch'ing's widely publicized July statement that "words should be used for attack and arms for defense" (*Wen Kung Wu Wei*), they raided military headquarters and seized weapons from soldiers and military warehouses. Riots, fires and armed clashes between rebels and troops were widespread throughout China, and in late July and August 1967 many provinces were in turmoil.

THE CONSERVATIVE MILITARY "BACKLASH":

THE SUBJUGATION OF RADICALS

These circumstances compelled Mao to yield to the pressure from provincial PLA leaders and change the thrust of the GPCR. In the first part of September, he toured six provinces in north, central, south and east China, where serious disturbances had occurred, to confer with the local military leadership. But the sign of changes had come earlier, after a meeting of PLA leaders in Peking at the end of August, when a "support the army and love the people" campaign was launched. The obvious purpose of the campaign was to pacify the PLA and restore its prestige and authority. For instance, the *People's Daily* editorial of August 28, 1967 stated: "Without the PLA, there would be no proletarian dictatorship; and without the proletarian dictatorship, there would be no Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. We must forever trust the PLA, support the PLA, and learn from the PLA."

In a secret speech on September 5, Madame Chiang Ch'ing tacitly admitted that advancing the slogan to attack and overthrow

²¹*Mainichi Shinbun*, July 24, 1967.

²²See editorials: *LAD*, July 26, 27, 28, 29, 1967; "The proletariat must tightly hold the gun" and "Fiercely open fire at the major enemies of the people," *Hung Ch'i*, No. 12, August 1, 1967, pp. 43-49; *JMJP*, July 31, 1967.

the "handful of capitalist power-holders in the Army" had been an error; it had generated grave consequences and antagonized the military. She also enjoined the rebels to cease raiding military headquarters and seizing arms from the PLA. The "September 5 Directive," disseminated on the same day, forbade rebels to invade the military complex or seize arms and authorized the PLA to use force to quell disobedience.

With the balance of power now shifted against the radicals, those who had played an active role in directing the assault of the "revolutionary masses" on the old power structure, including the PLA, met their downfall. In the fall and winter of 1967-1968, Mu Hsin, Lin Chieh, Wang Li, Kuan Feng and Ch'i Pen-yu — all members of the CRG and of the editorial staff of *Red Flag* — were purged. They were also accused of backing and stage-managing the ultra-left "May 16 Corps" which had fiercely attacked Chou En-lai and his top aides in the State Council, particularly Ch'en Yi, Li Hsien-nien and Li Fu-ch'un. For their own political survival, Ch'en Po-ta and Chiang Ch'ing found themselves forced to attack not only the "May 16 Corps," which had probably acted under their guidance, but also their subordinates in the CRG.²³

Moreover, *Hung Ch'i* (*Red Flag*), the trumpet of the CRG, was suspended from publication from November 1967 to July 1968, undoubtedly as a punitive action against its instigation of the rebel attack on the PLA as well as because of the purge of the polemicists from its editorial staff. Ch'en Po-ta, head of the CRG, was reported to have made a self-criticism admitting that he had "committed serious mistakes."²⁴ Chiang Ch'ing went into seclusion for seven weeks; according to Premier Chou, she was taking a "rest."

The political trend against "extreme left" tendencies and the effect of the "September 5 Directive" made the PLA the controlling political force in China. The military assumed the dominant position in all eleven provinces where the RC was established between November 1967 and March 1968; and the establishment of the new organ of power in these provinces, symbolizing completion of the "seizure of power" from provincial party authorities, undermined the cause of the rebels and further restricted their activities. At the same time, local military authorities, now with their power enhanced and position vindicated, made great efforts to impose tight control over unruly and protesting groups. They

²³SCMP, No. 4166, April 29, 1968, pp. 1-4.

²⁴Ch'en's self-criticism was publicized in a big-character poster and reported by *Agence France-Presse*, April 30, 1968.

MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN CHINESE POLITICS

sent the Red Guards and "rebels" back to schools and factories, enforced strict discipline against troublemakers, and obliged various groups to disband or join the "great alliance" with rival factions in order to break up the rebels' organizational base. Despite occasional "struggle by force" among rival groups which continued here and there in 1968, it could be said that the overall situation in the provinces was under control.

The radical elements in the Chinese leadership did regain the initiative in March 1968. This resulted in the abrupt dismissal of Yang Cheng-wu, Acting PLA Chief of Staff, and two other military figures, and in an intensive drive against rightist "opportunism," rightist "splittism" and rightist "reversal of verdict." The "rebels," fired with new zeal, also resumed their attack on the RC authorities and physical violence flared up again on a national scale. The radical upsurge led by Ch'en Po-ta and Chiang Ch'ing was short-lived, however. This was partly because the PLA in combination with the RC had already broken up or substantially weakened the organizational base of the CRG radicals and severely restricted the activities of their followers in the provinces, and partly because of disunity and increasing factional feuding among the leftist groups.

Even Mao himself reportedly became disillusioned with his vaunted revolutionary "vanguard." According to a story from Peking, he broke down and wept at a meeting with five top Red Guard leaders on July 28, 1968, bitterly condemning them for their failure to unite and their persistent squabbling. "You have let me down," Mao was quoted as saying, "and what is more, you have disappointed the workers, peasants and army men of China."²⁵ Three days after this interview, Army Day (August 1) was celebrated with strong demonstrations of support for the PLA, and the joint *People's Daily*, *Hung Ch'i*, *Liberation Army Daily* editorial hailed the PLA as "The staunch pillar of the dictatorship of the proletariat."

The Red Guards have since been consistently downgraded in Peking's official statements. An authoritative article published on August 25 in *Hung Ch'i* (which had resumed publication in July) and reprinted prominently in *Jen-min Jih-pao* the following day, laid down the new line.²⁶ Denouncing both the Red Guards

²⁵John Gittings, "Stifling the Students," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), August 29, 1968, pp. 377-378; *New York Times*, September 1, 1968, pp. 1, 10.

²⁶Yao Wen-yuan, "The Working Class Must Exercise Leadership in Everything," *Hung Ch'i*, No. 2, August 25, 1968.

and China's old intellectuals as vacillating and unreliable, it hailed the workers and peasants, acting in collaboration with the "commanders and fighters" of the PLA, as the staunchest and most dependable agents for carrying the GPCR through to complete victory.

Besides having their role devalued, the Red Guards were subjected to more concrete disciplinary measures. Worker-peasant-soldier "teams for propagating the thought of Mao Tse-tung" moved, physically, into colleges, schools and other cultural establishments to sort out recalcitrant students and intellectuals and carry out "struggle-criticism-transformation." Fresh attempts were again made to disband "illegal" mass organizations and to send students and unemployed youths to work in the countryside or in border regions.

By the early part of September 1968, more or less stable Revolutionary Committees had been established in all of China's twenty-nine province-level administrative units. Completion of the new power structure, which was somewhat ironically hailed by the official press as a "great event" in achieving the "all-round victory" of the GPCR, symbolized the end of a mass movement seeking to seize power from below and remake China's political life in emulation of the Paris Commune. It also marked the beginning of a new era of reconstruction in which the Red Guards and "rebel" activists, once the vanguard of Mao's crusade, were to be kept under firm control and the power of established authority was to be further strengthened and consolidated.

CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE PLA

As the preceding pages have shown, the pattern of military participation and the PLA's political role in the Chinese political system have changed drastically since the early 1960's, and particularly since the launching of the GPCR in 1966, with far-reaching consequences. Whereas in the 1950's the PLA could have been likened to a pressure group "lobbying" the party leadership to protect and enhance its corporate interests, the PLA-party relationship underwent a subtle but significant qualitative change in the first half of the 1960's. Under Lin Piao's stewardship, the PLA was transformed into a competitive institution, rivaling the party in prestige and political/ideological correctness, as it became the object of national emulation after 1963. It also became Mao's instrument of power, used first to apply pressure on, and then to attack the party bureaucracy. In the spring and summer of 1966, the

MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN CHINESE POLITICS

PLA was virtually a "veto group"; it participated directly and closely in the resolution of political conflicts at the highest level, and its support for the Maoist faction resulted in the defeat and displacement of anti-Maoist party leaders.

Its open and extensive intervention in the GPCR after early 1967, moreover, led to the PLA supplanting civilian party/government authorities in most provinces and taking over various political and economic functions. For more than a year, during that transition, local PLA leaders enforced direct military rule through the mechanism of the "Military Control Committee." Military predominance has continued, throughout the Red Guard episode and even after a semblance of order returned to the provinces. Thus, PLA leaders have not only dominated the RC, the new administrative structure which replaced the previous government organization in China's twenty-nine provincial-level units, but have also attained the highest position in twenty-one out of the twenty-nine reconstituted provincial Party Committees²⁷ — previously the prerogative of civilian party officials.

In the new CC elected at the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969, representatives of military-provincial forces overshadow those of other political groups. Out of the roster of 279 (170 full and 109 alternate) members, 127 (76 full members and 51 alternates) or 46 per cent are from PLA ranks; with respect to CC members' places of work, 202 of the 279 are located in the provinces, and 71 of these are PLA men concurrently holding military and civilian posts. In the 25-man Politburo (21 full and four alternate members), 13 wear the PLA uniform; provincial officials are represented by three full members and three alternates.

Furthermore, the provincial authorities have in recent years exercised considerable *de facto* control over economic activities, as was the case during the Great Leap in the late 1950's, even though no decentralization measures have been formally decreed as in 1957-1958. Many provinces have made great efforts to build up their own "independent industrial system" and are playing an important planning and production role in the drive to expand local industries. Whether such efforts are undertaken in defiance of

²⁷Military men head 21 provincial-level party committees as first secretaries; among the 158 first secretaries, second secretaries, secretaries and deputy secretaries, 95 or 60 per cent are PLA men, 53 (33 per cent) are former party and government officials, and 10 (7 per cent) are representatives of mass organizations. All of the 29 first secretaries are also chairmen of the corresponding RC's.

unified central planning, as has been hinted,²⁸ or merely reflect a deliberate central policy, attributed to Mao himself, to disperse China's productive capacity and make the provinces self-sufficient in preparation for a possible war, cannot be easily determined. In any case, the provincial authorities have clearly enhanced their economic and political autonomy and strengthened their position vis-à-vis the central leadership.

But if the decentralization of power since the GPCR resembles that of the late 1950's in many respects, it is also different in at least one important way. Whereas provincial authority in the 1950's rested pre-eminently in civilian party officials (except in outlying regions such as Sinkiang and Tibet), PLA commanders or professional political commissars now head the party and government organization in most provinces and PLA leaders provide the backbone of the administration in virtually every province. Prior to the GPCR, senior provincial or regional party bureau secretaries served concurrently as first political commissars in the military districts or military regions to provide party control over the local PLA. Today, in most provinces, this practice has been discontinued: local PLA commanders or professional political commissars are the top provincial party secretaries. The interlocking party, government and military leadership positions and the concentration of political, military and financial powers in the same hands have produced new power relationships in Chinese politics. Ultimately, the central leadership may find the new provincial forces intractable and difficult to control.

That Peking's leaders were alarmed as early as 1968 by the signs of excessive local power and political fragmentation was indicated by their criticism of manifestations of "polycentrism." In a front-page editorial, *People's Daily* emphatically stated that:

The proletarian headquarters headed by Chairman Mao . . . is the one and only leading center for the whole Party, army, nation and all the revolutionary masses. They can have only such a center and no other. . . . The so-called theory of "many centers" is a reactionary theory of the bourgeois "mountain-stronghold" mentality and individualism. It disintegrates the unity of the revolutionary ranks based on Mao Tse-tung's thought and hinders implementation of the proletarian revolutionary line. If every department and unit wanted to "make itself a center" and there were many "centers" in the country, then there would be no center at all.²⁹

²⁸See "Achieve Greater, Faster, Better and More Economic Results in Developing Local Industries," *Hung Ch'i*, No. 6, May 25, 1970.

²⁹*JMJP*, August 5, 1968, in *Peking Review*, August 9, 1968, p. 8; see also the 1969 New Year's Day editorial in *JMJP*.

MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN CHINESE POLITICS

Apparently mindful of provincial leaders inclined to look after their own particularistic concerns in disregard of central guidance and those who refused to carry out inconvenient central directives by citing special conditions of their own areas, the same editorial called for party officials to criticize and repudiate the erroneous idea of "making oneself a center," strengthen the proletarian concept of "viewing the situation as a whole," enhance the "revolutionary sense of organization and discipline" and resolutely carry out "all instructions" from the proletarian headquarters.

Despite these admonitions, the problems of "many centers" and of officials acting independently of central party policy appear to have persisted. A *People's Daily* editorial of August 27, 1971, marking completion of the re-establishment of the provincial-level Party Committees, again called for all party members and all departments to place themselves "under the absolute leadership of the Party and reject the reactionary theory of many centers, that is, the theory of no center." In light of the fact that the process of rebuilding the twenty-nine provincial committees took two years and four months, following the Ninth Party Congress of April 1969 which laid down the blueprint for party reconstruction, it seems reasonable to conclude that the Maoist leadership at the center has not been able to impose its policy on the provincial authorities and that it may not have had the final say in the selection of provincial committee officials.³⁰

THE FALL OF LIN PIAO AND REASSERTION OF PARTY LEADERSHIP

That the military would become the dominant political group in China as a result of its intervention in the GPCR was not anticipated or desired by Mao, for this mocks his dictum that the party must command the gun and the gun should not be allowed to direct the party. The crucial events that led to the downfall of China's top military leaders still remain mysterious to outside observers, but two things seem certain. The abrupt end of Lin Piao's steadily rising career appears to be related to the general trend of military domination in Chinese politics. Thus, Lin's purge represents an extreme effort by the civilian elements of the

³⁰It seems not an accident that a number of officials who had supported the Maoist seizure of power in the early stages of the GPCR and had become top officials in the RC's were dropped from the leadership of the new provincial Party Committees. These include P'an Fu-sheng, Chairman of the Heilungkiang RC; Wang Hsiao-yu, Chairman of the Shantung RC; Liu K'o-p'ing, Chairman of the Shansi RC; Liu Chieh-t'ing and Chang Hsi-t'ing, Vice Chairmen of the Szechuan RC; Li Ts'ai-han, Chairman of the Kweichow RC, and Li Yuan, Chairman of the Hunan RC.

leadership to bring the military once again under their control and reassert party authority over other groups.

In the course of the GPCR, Lin Piao had without question benefited greatly from the shakeup in the leadership structure. Not only had he replaced the disgraced Liu Shao-ch'i as Mao's successor and become the sole Vice-Chairman of the party; he had also placed many of his followers in the Fourth Field Army in key positions and substantially expanded his base of power. For example, Lin promoted fellow Fourth Field Army leader Huang Yung-sheng, Commander of the Canton Military Region (MR), to the post of PLA Chief of Staff in March 1968, bypassing many equally, if not more, qualified men including several incumbent deputy chiefs of staff. He elevated three more former colleagues to leadership positions in the central military headquarters in 1967-1968: Li Tso-p'eng (Political Commissar of the Navy), Wen Yu-cheng (Deputy Chief of Staff and Commander of the Peking Garrison) and Liu Hsien-ch'üan (Political Commissar of the Air Force). These four men plus Wu Fa-hsien (Commander of the Air Force) and Ch'iu Hui-tso (Director of the General Rear Service Department), both also from the Fourth Field Army, and Yeh Ch'un (Lin Piao's wife), controlled the Administrative Unit of the Military Affairs Commission, the regime's supreme military decision-making body.³¹ Lin also replaced military officials at lower levels with his own men and made considerable inroads into the power base of other field army systems.³²

Inasmuch as he was Mao's designated successor and many officials anticipated his eventual assumption of the supreme position in the regime, he was undoubtedly also able to wield increasing influence and speak over a wide range of issues with great authority. We need not accept at face value the explanation disseminated by the current Chinese leadership that Lin Piao had plotted against Mao's life. Yet there seems to be no question that Mao had perceived Lin's enhanced power position as undermining his own authority and threatening his leadership. Lin had become China's

³¹Since the shakeup in the fall of 1971, all except Liu Hsien-ch'üan have disappeared from public view and presumably were purged along with Lin Piao.

³²During the GPCR members of the Fourth Field Army System became commanders of the Wuhan Military Region (Tseng Szu-yu), Chengtu MR (Liang Hsing-ch'u), Sinkiang MR (Lung Shu-ching), and Canton MR (Ting Sheng, who succeeded Huang Yung-sheng). The former commanders in Wuhan and Chengtu were members of the Second Field Army System, while the former commander of the Sinkiang MR belonged to the First Field Army System. For the theory of the five "Field Army Systems" as corporate factional groups in the PLA and its elaboration, see William Whitson, "The Field Army in Chinese Communist Military Politics," *The China Quarterly*, January-March 1969.

MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN CHINESE POLITICS

equivalent to Marshal Zhukov. While the precise circumstances of his removal are still unknown, one may speculate that it was Mao who led the coalition that overpowered him and his supporters in a showdown in September 1971. The coalition may have included forces represented by Chou En-lai's government apparatus, Chiang Ch'ing's CRG radicals, and non-Fourth Field Army leaders such as Marshal Yeh Chien-ying (Vice-Chairman of the MAC), Hsu Shih-yu (Commander of Nanking MR), Ch'en Hsi-lien (Commander of Mukden MR) and Li Teh-sheng (Director of the PLA General Political Department).

Amid subsequent efforts to expose and repudiate Lin's "crimes," the Chinese leadership has also renewed an intensive nationwide campaign to downgrade the role of the military and reassert party control over all spheres of Chinese life. The arrogance and complacency of military men and their tendency as leaders in the various party and government organizations to ignore the principle of democratic centrism and rule by fiat have been singled out for attack, and the military's role has been subjected to mounting criticism and close scrutiny by civilian colleagues.³³

It is still too early to appraise the campaign's success in subordinating the military to party control. Although many provincial PLA leaders have displayed impressive conformity to various central directives, judging by reports from China in the past year,³⁴ their outward compliance may be totally misleading. Chinese officials, civilian and military alike, are known to have resorted often to "news management" and manipulation of the flow of information for their own purposes — in this case they could parrot the proper slogans and phrases stipulated in the central directives without necessarily enforcing policies contrary to their vital interests.³⁵

In the long run, it seems doubtful that the civilian elements of the party will be able to regain control of the military leaders and reduce the political role of the PLA in the system. Many of

³³See, for example, "Firmly Support Party Principles, Uphold the Party's Unified Leadership," *JMJP*, October 18, 1971; "Brief Comment" and "Uphold the Proletarian Party Nature," *Hung Ch'i*, November 1, 1971, pp. 7-10, 14-19; and the joint editorial of *JMJP*, *Hung Ch'i* and *LAD*, December 1, 1971.

³⁴E.g., Radio Nanning, January 2, 10, 1972; Radio Taiyuan, January 2, 15, 1972; and Radio Lhasa, January 6, 1972.

³⁵For a fuller treatment of Chinese officials' tactics of deception, see Parris H. Chang, "Provincial Leaders' Strategies for Survival During the Cultural Revolution," in Robert A. Scalapino, editor, *Elites in Communist China* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), pp. 512-513.

the military have now entrenched themselves in party organizations and, as a group, they have formidable representation in the CC and the Politburo. Furthermore, with the mechanisms of social and political control seriously impaired, and the party image badly tarnished in a series of sweeping purges since the GPCR, the ability of the regime to control and elicit compliance from the population has visibly diminished. Consequently, the regime must continue to resort to coercive means, and those who control the instruments of coercion — the PLA leaders — will perforce remain the dominant political power in China.

It is often argued that any generalizations about a “military takeover” or military domination must be fallacious, since all PLA leaders are also members of the CCP and can justify their right to rule and their policies only on the authority of the party. True, military leaders have invoked and will certainly continue to invoke the authority of the party or Mao, but it does not necessarily follow that the military is under party control. Prior to the GPCR, as we have noted, there was a countrywide system of civilian supervision over the military, and in the party leadership the civilian elements were generally able to overrule the military opposition and impose their policy priorities. Since 1967, however, most of the civilian party officials in the regions and provinces have been purged and the reconstructed provincial Party Committees have, with few exceptions, been headed by military commanders or professional military political commissars. The ability of the civilian leaders to control the military has therefore been substantially reduced. In fact, now that military leaders occupy key posts in the party, they are in a better position to influence the decision-making process and aggregate their policy interests. Insofar as this is true, they can also manipulate and invoke the proper political symbols of the regime and hence dress *their* policies with legitimacy.

THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN CHINA

If the purge last fall succeeded in removing an allegedly Bonapartist Lin Piao, the ouster of Mao’s formally designated successor is bound to generate a succession crisis upon Mao’s death and lead to further expansion of the military’s political role. Should Mao die tomorrow, most likely Chou En-lai would take over and fill the leadership gap. Despite his enormous prestige and great political and administrative talent, however, Premier Chou

MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN CHINESE POLITICS

clearly lacks the kind of power and authority Mao has possessed. He would have to operate on the basis of a collective leadership secured through a coalition of diverse political groups. But collective leadership, by its nature, is unstable. Even if it works in the short run, Chou, at seventy-four, may not be around too long, and an intensive struggle for succession will eventually ensue.

In such a struggle, not only is the military going to be actively involved, but several military leaders are likely to seek the top leadership position. As of now, three Politburo members, Ch'en Hsi-lien, Hsu Shih-yu and Li Teh-sheng, appear to be the stronger contenders. Ch'en is Commander of Mukden Military Region, which encompasses the whole of Manchuria, and is concurrently First Party Secretary of Liaoning; he has under his command more than half a million troops and the industrial might of Manchuria. Hsu, Commander of Nanking MR, which has jurisdiction over Kiangsu, Chekiang and Anhwei provinces, is also First Party Secretary of Kiangsu; he has close to 300,000 soldiers and the rich resources of the three East China provinces behind him. Li Teh-sheng controls the party machinery in the PLA as Director of the PLA General Political Department, and at the same time officiates as First Party Secretary of Anhwei. Due to their present positions and the corporate strength of their groups,³⁶ these men have considerable advantage in a struggle for succession. Even should they not become "candidates" for the national leadership, they undoubtedly will play the role of "kingmakers" and throw their weight into determining China's future leader.

The qualities of the contenders for national power, however, may serve to prolong and intensify the succession crisis, which in turn may deepen military involvement and expand military influence in the regime's political affairs. Men in Mao's peer group, like Chou En-lai and the disgraced Liu Shao-ch'i, Lin Piao, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and even P'eng Chen, had a distinguished revolutionary career; each, in his own right, has had great stature and has been a *national* leader of long standing. None of the future contenders possesses such credentials. All appear to lack the high personal and intellectual qualities of the old generation of top CCP leaders. While they are not exactly faceless, and some have indeed been ranking *regional* party/military leaders for more than

³⁶Ch'en and Li belong to the Second Field Army System, which has its power base in Manchuria and Southwest China, while Hsu belongs to the Third Field Army System, entrenched in East China. Members of these two groups are also represented in leadership positions in several other military regions.

a decade (e.g., Ch'en Hsi-lien and Hsu Shih-yu), they are probably better known to "China-watchers" outside China than to the rank-and-file of the CCP — let alone the Chinese masses. As they differ so little in terms of career, accomplishment and seniority, each will probably feel that he is deserving and has a right to aspire to the supreme leadership position. Should one of them come to the top momentarily, he would have extreme difficulty consolidating his position, for his coequals would not be deterred from attempts to unseat and replace him.

If the above projection has any validity, it seems reasonable to say that China will soon enter a period of transition marked by a succession crisis, instability and abrupt changes. In such a situation, the political influence of the military is bound to increase further. Not only will the military, as a group, participate actively in the resolution of political conflicts, in decision-making processes and in shaping the policy priorities of the regime, but some of its leaders who have formidable military, territorial and economic bases of power and hold interlocking party-government-military positions will also contend for China's supreme leadership position.

Reviews

SUBVERSION AS A TOOL OF STATECRAFT*

by Eugene H. Methvin

In India, around 300 B.C., a sage named Kautilya wrote a treatise on the strategy of worldly affairs and possessions entitled the *Arthashastra*, in which he counseled that a king should send secret agents to silence the disloyal among his subjects. These agents' mission should be to carry on disputations in public places on the king's shortcomings, his merits, the benefits flowing from ordered government, and the divine ordination of kings. Always they should lead those congregating around them to a conclusion in favor of loyalty to the ruler, warning that divine and earthly punishment would visit those who opposed the king.

Kautilya also advised the king to use such agents in waging foreign subversion: "When the conqueror desires to seize an enemy's village he should frighten his enemy's people by giving publicity to his power of omniscience and his close association with the gods."¹ The agents should always precede the conqueror, "sowing seeds of dissension"

among the enemy populace and otherwise dividing the target kingdom.

Thus the elite's use of planned communication with commoners to shape their attitudes and behavior for political domination appears to be almost as old as mankind's history. So also is the use of words for the purpose of social demolition, political conflict and conquest.

Yet it is strange that, while the bookshelves bend with historical tomes on rulers and their arts, there has been no history or analysis of subversion, per se, until the recent publication of *Power Through Subversion*, by Laurence W. Beilenson.

The study was worth waiting for. Within its chosen field it has a sweep and grandeur reminiscent of H. G. Wells' *Outline of History*. Hence it is an excellent point of departure for any serious student or scholar. Beilenson's range is panoramic. With equable authority he touches such episodes as Philip of Macedon's fourteen-year campaign of subversion preceding his invasion of Greece; Louis XIV's purchase of Charles II of England's neutrality from 1660 to 1680; the Russian czars' long-term subversion in the Balkans against the Turks; and Britain's support for "wars of liberation" in South America from 1790 to 1830 to weaken Spain. One of his most engrossing chapters is an in-depth examination of the duel of subversion

**Power Through Subversion*. By Laurence W. Beilenson. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1972. 299 pp. \$8.00.

¹Fourth edition, translated by R. Shamasastry (Mysore: Sri Raghuvier Printing Press, 1951), pp. 22-23, 423; cited in B. S. Murty, *Propaganda and World Public Order* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 1.

between Philip II of Spain and Elizabeth I of England in the three decades before the Spanish Armada—including some interesting observations on the schooling and tactics of the Jesuits and their foreshadowing of the modern Leninists.

Another stimulating section deals with “the Vergennes variation,” Beilenson’s label for a governmental policy of long-term support for subversive dissidents in the absence of any determinative international conflict and coincidence of interests. Until the twentieth century, such subversion was relatively rare. The label derives from the most dramatic and successful historical episode: the French government’s early decision to support the American rebels, not from sympathy with their democratic ideology, certainly, but as a calculated strategy to hasten the weakening of English power.

It will come as a surprise to most Americans to learn that French strategists were talking about an inevitable conflict at a time when Ben Franklin and George Washington had never even imagined the possibility, and Tom Jefferson was still a college boy. While Americans in the main were regarding themselves as Englishmen who had just won a war against Frenchmen, Choiseul concluded a 1765 memorandum to Louis XV by saying, “The revolution that will occur someday in America, though we shall probably not see it, will weaken England so that Europe will have no more to fear of her.” Ten years later, the French Foreign Minister, Vergennes, whom Louis

XVI named Secretary of State when he mounted the throne in 1774, presented his monarch and royal council with a recommendation for “feeding American courage and perseverance with the hope of efficacious assistance” in order to “weaken the power of England.” Vergennes, with foresight and insight rare in history, expected no great gratitude from the Americans and no immediate advantage for France—but he did see that a British Empire embracing North America would overwhelm French power on the Continent.

Beilenson’s analysis suggests but does not explore an irresistible question: that some among those American State Department and intelligence agents who forecast and promoted a Chinese communist triumph in the 1940-1949 period may have been more discerning and calculating with respect to their country’s long-term geopolitical posture than their anti-communist critics have been willing to admit. Is Soviet power in Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere likely to be more formidable with a weak and divided Nationalist Chinese regime on its Asian flank, or with a militant Maoist state? Beilenson wisely leaves the topic to other books and times. His book was published before President Nixon and Premier Chou called upon Chairman Mao and toasted and dined before a global television audience in Peking’s Great Hall of the People, causing obvious consternation in Moscow.

Beilenson devotes one chapter to demonstrating that “government is

REVIEWS

a sometime thing." In ancient, medieval and modern history, overthrow by subversive dissidents, often aided from abroad, has been more the rule than otherwise. We Americans, accustomed to the longest constitutional rule known, tend to forget this. But Hamilton, Machiavelli and Lenin did not. "Seditions and insurrections are, unhappily, maladies as inseparable from the body politic as tumors and eruptions from the natural body," Alexander Hamilton wrote in *The Federalist*, No. 28, adding that the idea of governing always "by the simple force of law," which is the sole admissible principle of republican government, belongs only in the reveries of theorists who ignore the experience of reality. Of twenty-six Roman emperors from Caesar to Maximus, Beilenson reminds us, sixteen were assassinated. Between 364 and 1453 A.D., forty-one of the 118 emperors of the Eastern Roman Empire were deposed by force. The English indulged in half a millennium of conspiracies, revolts, civil wars and regicides before developing anything like stable institutions. In Latin America Bolivia has had 180 overthrows in 144 years; and never until 1964 had Venezuela allowed a president to complete a term without being thrown out of office.

Though the occurrence of overthrows and uprisings is predictable, the time and place are not. Beilenson overwhelms the Marxist myth of economic determinism with historical evidence: the variables are simply far more complex. The French Revolution came on the

heels of record prosperity that touched all walks of life, and was as much a result of the bungling and hesitation of Louis XVI and his ministers as anything else. Irish Catholics were terribly oppressed by the British throughout the eighteenth century—but there was no revolt. All the conditions were present but one: a subverter, foreign or domestic or both. Says Beilenson: "Though the hungry and dispossessed have sometimes been more likely revolutionary recruits than men with full stomachs and much to lose, the exact reverse has also been true. Economic conditions have been only one among many underlying causes of rebellion. Others have been nationalism, race, religion, egalitarian sentiments, liberty, and most important, the desire to have power that someone else possesses." (p. 63.)

Lenin accepted this unpredictability as the point of departure for his strategy of subversion, Beilenson points out. The predictable unpredictability of mass outbursts is like the predictable unpredictability of death, fires or other casualties—and the Leninist revolutionary and his organization are like the insurance actuary and his company. They both know that the crucial phenomena of their respective businesses will happen with regularity, and they both plan their organizations to stand in readiness and "do their thing" when the unpredictables predictably occur.

II

I have but two complaints worth mentioning about Beilenson's work. One is that he frustrates me by a

misallocation of his obvious talent and grasp of subject. He becomes tedious at times, belaboring some nails with more licks than needed, while others could stand some hammering. An entire chapter, for example, catalogs the wars of Lenin and his heirs to prove that they always heeded his Strategic Rule No. 1, pronounced at the time of the Brest-Litovsk treaty: protect the subversive base at all cost, and forgo adventurous wars to that end. Yet nowhere does Beilenson devote his scholarly ability to an in-depth case study of a single subversive episode. He might have turned out a better book if he had expended some of that space and energy in investigating methods and examples of modern mass subversion. I would like to have seen a chapter devoted to, say, the communist conquest-by-subversion of Czechoslovakia or China; both episodes are thrown away in a few short paragraphs. Again, the vastly important "influencing subversion" of Stalinist agents in Washington in favor of the Chinese communists rates only a bare mention; a scholarly and objective summary would have enhanced the book's interest.

My second complaint is more serious. I believe Beilenson misses the true significance of that master innovator of twentieth-century subversion, Lenin. He comes close—but still misses. Here again, the author is handicapped (and misled) by his vast historical research. "The tactics of the tool [of subversion] and of each of its parts are the same today as they were before Lenin was born," says Beilenson.

"Lenin did not invent a new tool; he modified an old one." (pp. 89, 139.) Hence he labels his chapter on the Great Bolshevik "The Lenin Adaptation."

I would hold out for a different label: "The Lenin Invention." Indeed, that happens to be a chapter title from a forthcoming book (*The Rise of Radicalism*, Arlington House, 1973) which details my view of Lenin. This is more than a scholastic verbal quibble; it is at least a substantial question of emphasis, and possibly a matter of essence. Beilenson sees little new and creative in Lenin, and I believe he fails to appreciate the insight and creativity of Lenin's grand synthesis. One could say that the inventions of the steamboat or airplane were not creative, either, since both boats and steam engines, or gliders and internal combustion engines, had been around before. But the creativity of those who put them together must be recognized—and their inventions were totally new and revolutionary machines in human affairs.

So with Lenin. He combined the concept of schooling for professional mass propagandists (an innovation of the Jesuits in the Elizabethan era, Beilenson points out) with techniques of sloganeering and organization building and mass media; he recognized the unprecedented growth of urban mass audiences and developed a grand strategy for mobilizing them; he produced a design for "the combat party," and projected it onto a world scale, creating the first truly global political party. This was the Comintern, which Beilenson views

REVIEWS

as a "serious blunder" since it alienated other governments, but which I believe to be the most successful foreign aid organization in history, having diffused the Leninist technology of social demolition and mass hate propaganda throughout a hundred nations and tens of millions of cadres who consider themselves "Leninists." Titoist and Maoist and polyglot lunatic-fringe schisms notwithstanding, Lenin's "combat party" synthesis constitutes a massive social invention. Its impact on our lives is likewise massive. His copiers range from Mao and Mussolini and Hitler to Castro, the Tupamaros, Black Panthers, Weathermen—and the worst may be ahead in this age of "the global village," Telstar, and audiences of hundreds of millions. Thus I feel it is not merely important, but mortally urgent for all mankind, to recognize that Lenin's innovations in quantitative propaganda produce a totally new qualitative result demanding heroic responses from those who would maintain "the open society."

III

Author Beilenson came to write his book via an unusual route. Under Harold Laski at Harvard, history was his passion and he seemed destined for a professorship. But he was also enchanted with another professor named Frankfurter, and blessed with a practical mother who persuaded him to take a law degree in order to eat regularly. As a result, he wound up in Hollywood as an official representative of Marx—Groucho, not Karl; and Harpo and Chico, too. His

clients also included a militant young labor leader named Ronnie Reagan, and Beilenson became an organizer and first general counsel to the Screen Actors Guild, and later the American Federation of Radio Artists and other unions. But history remained his abiding passion and avocation, and a decade ago he "retired" from his thriving labor law practice to fifty- and sixty-hour weeks in the UCLA and other libraries.

He began his research at a time of great national self-examination and perplexity over America's global posture and performance. In Washington President Kennedy had failed at the Bay of Pigs and delivered his famous speech of April 17, 1961, vividly portraying the challenge of global communist subversion. In August of that year Khrushchev savagely shattered the nuclear test moratorium with a sixty-megaton monster blast. Washington confidently sat back expecting worldwide protest demonstrations. It got a rude shock: the protest demonstrations came only when President Kennedy began pondering whether American security required new tests. As a result, the President appointed his brother, Robert F. Kennedy, to head a cabinet-level study of the problem of subversion and the American tools of statecraft.

Against this background, Beilenson began to reread the history of the world from the standpoint of the tools of statecraft and power, seeking patterns and lessons. Astonished, he found no one had ever produced a thorough survey. His research soon grew into a trilogy.

The first work, *The Treaty Trap* (1969), demonstrates that the norm in international treaties is nonperformance, and that he gains who exploits them most cunningly and cynically and breaks them most artfully. (Not too sanguinely, I hope President Nixon and the Congress will read his first book as they move to SALT II following the strategic arms limitation agreement negotiated in Moscow last summer.) *Power Through Subversion* is Beilenson's second book, and the third, a survey of the tools of statecraft, is still in the making.

Beilenson's book and background force forward the question: Why has there been so little scholarly attention by the academic establishment, above all by political and social scientists, to the history and methodology of subversion, mass propaganda, terrorism—the whole range of political phenomena that I have elsewhere labeled “the technology of social demolition”?

Beilenson's experience parallels my own. A dozen years ago—when the Soviet-financed Tokyo riots stopped President Eisenhower's state visit—I was assigned to probe the subject of communist manipulation of riots. I consulted the State Department, law enforcement and intelligence agencies: “I'd like to interview some experts on the subject.” The response was uniform: “We have no experts on the subject.” They were not being coy or modest. A search of the Library of Congress turned up only one title—an 1881 U.S. Army manual written after the military experiences in dealing with the industrial strikes of 1876-1880. (Ludicrously, this

was the manual that was dusted off and updated in the mid-1960's to cope with the new urban riots of that era; like the Polish Army's revision of horse cavalry tactics in the face of Hitler's Panzer divisions, it proved worse than useless.) A survey of the catalogs of some four dozen accredited journalism schools disclosed that only two had formal courses dealing squarely with propaganda and psychological warfare. Of the five Washington-area universities—which school substantial segments of our diplomatic and military personnel—only one listed in its catalog a course on political and psychological warfare; the professor reported that he could not attract enough students to keep it going. Like Beilenson, I found the knowledge gap so disturbing that I felt compelled to write the book I found missing from the library shelves.

This situation shows signs of promising change. For a long time the academic establishment seemed mesmerized by the Marxist myth of proletarian “spontaneity,” a myth deliberately created by Marx who, one personal acquaintance reported, “laughs at the fools who join his proletarian litany.” It was symptomatic of the age that the Kerner Commission, appointed in 1967 to investigate the urban riots, operated on a hypothesis created by its staff social scientists that the outbursts were spontaneous responses to largely-justified grievances. The Commission reported that it had made exhaustive inquiry with all the agencies and could find “no evidence that all or

REVIEWS

any of the disorders or the incidents that led to them were planned or directed by any organization or group, international, national or local." Yet this conclusion was demonstrably false. Published hearings of the Congressional committees the Commission claimed to have consulted were replete with meticulously documented details of organized subversive activities preparing the climate for and even triggering some of the riots.

In a few short years we have seen a considerable shift of opinion. Another Presidential commission, this time investigating the rioting and murderous National Guard response at Kent State, was unable to finger specific evidence of subversion, but nevertheless smelled enough to endorse vigorous police intelligence activities on college campuses and wherever the threat of mass disorders occurs. Author James Michener, with the benefit of a less hurried inquiry, was able to come up with the detailed evidence in his *Kent State: What Happened and Why*. After Columbia, Harvard, Cornell, San Francisco State and Kent State, such intellectual leaders as President Nathan Pusey of Harvard began to speak of deliberate programming behind the outbursts.

But these were only reveille notes. Now it is high noon—and time for serious inquiry by disciplined scholars. Needed are graduate researchers and undergraduate courses in the history and technology of social demolition, strategies of subversion, and counter-strategies suitable to the open so-

ciety dedicated to constitutional institutions and ordered liberty. So Beilenson's book is extraordinarily timely. A path-breaking professor can easily build a course around it.

STRATEGY, ARMS, AND THE THIRD WORLD*

by *Geoffrey Kemp*

Wars and violent conflict in the Third World have been endemic over the past twenty-five years. The most serious ones have involved the United States and the Soviet Union, either directly or by proxy. But now, as direct American involvement in one of the biggest and bloodiest conflicts winds down, it has become fashionable to talk of a new diffusion of power and the emergence of a multipolar system based on a series of pentagonal relationships among the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Japan and the West European community. It is also suggested that even as the United States is preparing to withdraw from Southeast Asia, the Soviet Union is making a concerted effort to expand its global reach, partly for ideological reasons, partly to provide military security against its most dangerous antagonist, China.

The exact direction and pace of the changes that are occurring within the international system cannot be predicted. But it seems fair to say that some of the dogmatic overtones of the old ideological conflicts are being replaced by the more classical ingredients of great-

**The Arms Trade with the Third World*. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. New York: Humanities Press, 1971. 910 pp. \$12.00.

power interactions. Competition for scarce economic resources, especially fossil fuels, is but one example of a new emphasis on old issues. Dusty copies of Admiral Mahan's studies on seapower are being reread by those concerned about the location of offshore oil and the growth of Soviet naval strength. The importance of the population and resource issue in international affairs is now perceived to be greater than at any time since the heyday of Social Darwinism at the turn of the century; neo-Mahanist and neo-Malthusian perspectives on strategy and power politics can no longer be ignored even if they turn out to be of little long-term significance. Geopolitics, a subject rarely emphasized by the postwar generation of international relations students—with the notable exceptions of Harold and Margaret Sprout—has once more earned attention as a topic for serious study.

These changes suggest continuing conflict throughout the world, especially in the less developed areas where the residual effects of colonialism combine with growing antagonisms between rich and poor over resources. It is against this background that one must speculate about the new horizons in strategic studies that will have to emerge to accommodate the changing environment. Will the importance of regionalism grow as Europe, China, India, Japan, and possibly Brazil develop more of the accoutrements of great-power status, including improved or new nuclear weapons systems? Will the small Asian, African and Latin

American powers become pawns in regional, as distinct from global, competition? The list of questions and alternative predictions is endless. All one can say is that the winds of change are already scattering our simple models of a bipolar world dominated by Soviet and American nuclear strategy.

Yet in spite of predictions of future violence within the Third World and between the Third World and the rich countries, remarkably little has been written about the *general* strategic problems that the established governments of less developed countries face and will continue to face as they pursue their national interests. Few scholars have attempted to put forward propositions concerning the more traditional roles of force in less developed countries such as the defense of national territory. It is true that there have been numerous *specific* writings about local conflicts, particularly those between India and Pakistan, Israel and the Arabs, and the various participants in the Southeast Asian war. There have been some excellent studies on the problems of guerrilla warfare from the point of view of both insurgents and counterinsurgents. However, these studies fail to provide us with a framework from which to construct a general theory of strategy in the Third World.

Whether or not this gap in the literature is to be welcomed depends largely upon one's values and perspectives. Those who, for various reasons, wish to prevent or slow down the spread of weapons technologies to the Third World

REVIEWS

will probably shudder at the thought of a latter-day Herman Kahn or Henry Kissinger emerging in India or elsewhere—though anyone familiar with the writings of K. Subrahmanyam, Director of India's Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, may regard this proposition to be redundant. Alternatively, those who consider the continued use of force in the Third World to be inevitable, no matter what the Americans and the Soviets decide to do, can argue that Third World countries have as much right to coherent ideas for analyzing their own military needs as anybody else.

Up to now, most of the military doctrines and associated weapons systems adopted by Third World countries have originated with the industrial powers (exceptions as far as doctrine is concerned would be China, India, Israel, North Viet Nam). One of the effects of the bipolar system was that the majority of Third World states which felt a need to develop military forces generally had to turn either to NATO or Warsaw Pact countries if they wished to procure anything more sophisticated than small arms or trucks. Except on rare occasions, the weapons transferred from the industrial countries were either slight modifications of systems already in Western or Soviet inventories or older systems that had been retired from front-line service. They reflected design characteristics specified for the military environment in which Western and Soviet planners thought they would have to fight each other. For the most part, this meant Central

Europe, a milieu devoid of resemblance to most conflict areas in the Third World. It was not until the 1960's that the United States made a systematic attempt to develop force structures and doctrines specifically for Third World environments.¹ Even so, the consequence was the evolution of "rich man's" counterinsurgency capabilities which the United States has used with ambiguous results in Southeast Asia.

The relationship between the strategic doctrines of supplier nations and the force requirements of Third World recipients is one important factor to take into account when assessing the nature and direction of military sales and aid programs and their effects upon regional or local power relationships. In this context *The Arms Trade with the Third World*, published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), is a welcome addition to the sparse literature.

The book is a team effort; it is also long—over 900 pages. As a descriptive contribution to the field, dealing specifically with the arms trade with the Third World and avoiding consideration of the lucrative arms trade within the industrial world itself, it stands out as a landmark. For any scholar interested in qualitative and quantitative data on Third World conflicts, this informative and articulate study is essential. The many tables in the text and the appen-

¹See, for instance, Seymour Deitchman, *Limited War and American Defense Policy* (second edition; Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1969).

dices, which provide, among other things, a breakdown of all major arms transfers to Third World countries since 1945, alone justify its acquisition.

The study is divided into four parts. Part One consists of a general survey of the phenomenon, the main conclusions of the study, and a description of the many proposals that were made before and after World War II for regulating the arms trade. Part Two discusses the role of the major suppliers and includes some good material on U.S. legislation on the military assistance programs. Part Three includes a detailed description of the arms recipients — the presumed reasons why they have requested arms; their sources of supply; what types of arms they have received. Part Four consists of over 100 pages of reference material.

Yet the study has definite weaknesses which will be stressed in this review in the hope that a second edition of the book will eventually appear. The weaknesses fall into three categories: the bias and perspective of the study; the methods chosen for analyzing the subject matter and relating it to the study's conclusions; and the accuracy of the data as presented.

An underlying philosophy of the Stockholm Institute is that the publication of good data on matters relating to military security is of value to those who wish to prevent or regulate local, regional or international arms competition between adversaries. The purpose of this study is set out in the Foreword: "In order to throw light on the subject [the arms trade with

the Third World] but also to find out *what measures, if any, could be taken to limit this part of the global arms race*, SIPRI decided to study all aspects of the arms trade between developed and under-developed countries." (Emphasis added.)

The authors, who included researchers from both Western and communist countries, have tried hard to please everybody with their objectivity. In this connection, they are to be commended for two things. First, the study avoids being patronizing to the less developed countries. Second, it avoids the discernible anti-American bias that pervaded the first *SIPRI Yearbook on World Armaments and Disarmament* (1968/69).

Nevertheless, some minor, perhaps unconscious, discrimination can be detected. A comparison of the treatment of the Nigerian civil war (p. 631) with the ongoing conflict in Southern Africa (p. 688) reveals a marked willingness to play down the role assumed by the communist and Arab countries in the highly visible and debated Nigerian war, but to play up the role performed by the NATO countries in their arms dealings with Portugal and South Africa. It can be argued that much more data are available about Western arms transfers to Southern Africa than Soviet or East European transfers to Nigeria. But for precisely this reason the authors have to be careful in their selectivity. It is not difficult to find fault with certain aspects of Western military assistance and sales programs since there is an enormous sample of data from which to make

REVIEWS

a critical analysis of policy. It is more difficult to document a case against Soviet or East European practices.

On this point, a more serious flaw in the SIPRI study is its coy lack of criticism of the socialist governments, whose policies of secrecy it only implicitly disapproves of. For example, in discussing the availability of official data on arms supplies the authors have this to say about the Soviet Union: ". . . with the exception of a few general statements made by Soviet leaders, it is virtually impossible to find any official document explaining either the basic principles of Soviet arms supply policy or the internal machinery responsible for the execution of that policy." (p. 180.) Yet one of their tentative conclusions regarding proposals for publishing more data on arms exports is: "But it is probably fair to say that if governments were prepared to publish fuller details of their arms exports, *public pressure* would generally operate in a restrictive direction." They go on to point out that such proposals have been objected to by Warsaw Pact countries on security grounds. In the next paragraph, however, they state: ". . . there is scope in individual countries for pressure on governments to publish more information . . . the security reasons for concealing this information are weak and the *public interest* arguments for publication are strong. Electorates *expect* to be informed about treaties and alliances: equally it could be argued that they should be entitled to be informed about

arms sale." (p. 123—emphasis added.)

Anyone reading these prescriptive statements carefully must realize that they are aimed at Western democracies such as the United States, Britain and Sweden, and not the Soviet Union or East Germany. References to "public pressure" and "the public interest" and behavior that the electorate "expects" are not phrases one associates with the inner deliberations of the Central Committee. Just what "scope" is there for more "pressure" on socialist countries to publish data? If there is no possibility of getting more information, why not come out and say so? It is as though the authors were chastising the Western powers for not making enough data available while at the same time appearing reluctant to offend the sensitivities of the socialist countries by drawing attention to their singular lack of cooperation in the data-gathering process. This may be a necessary cross SIPRI has to bear, but it is an irritating compromise that detracts from the basic merit of the book.

The method of analysis chosen to "throw light on the subject" is not explained in any rigorous manner. There is a long, useful discussion in Appendix I of the sources and methods used to generate the basic statistical data. But what is lacking is a conceptual framework describing how the authors relate their basic data on arms transfers to their assessment of the "problem" stated in their conclusions—"The build-up of stocks of weapons in Third World countries is one of the new and *disturbing* features of

the post-war world." (p. 132—emphasis added.)

The authors do not specify systematically the reasons why they find this buildup disturbing. Yet, at another point in their conclusions, they state categorically why an examination of the arms trade is thought to be important. In Section V of Chapter I they write: "Ultimately, the function of weapons is their use in war. The outbreak, course and conclusion of wars will be affected by the quantity and type of weapons supplied as well as by the role of the supplying countries." (p. 59.) In a short, nine-page section on "Wars," which follows, they observe in the first paragraph that "perhaps the most important question about arms supplies is what effects they have on the development of wars—on the likelihood of wars breaking out, on the course of wars, and their general severity." (p. 73.) But at no stage in this crucial section, which should support their contention that the arms buildup is disturbing, do they attempt to draw together their mass of data and relate it to their conclusions.

The authors eventually offer five conclusions about the relationships between arms and conflict, all of which are interesting and important, none of which is subjected to even the most elementary empirical tests that could have been performed by using their own and other SIPRI data. Thus they state as a conclusion—rather than a proposition—that "where guerrilla warfare is undertaken, the outcome of wars is unlikely to be determined by the weaponry possessed

by both sides." (p. 78.) This can be treated either as a simple truism or as a proposition that can be empirically tested. As it stands, they cite the examples of Viet Nam, Southern Africa and the Middle East to demonstrate their point. Now this is difficult, because guerrilla and counter-guerrilla activity still persists in these areas and it may or may not be possible to say what effect the sophisticated weapons possessed by the United States, Israel, South Africa and Portugal have had on the political goals they seek to achieve by the use of force. But there are dozens of other examples—Biafra, Bolivia, Ceylon, Jordan, Malaya—whose examination might have suggested that overwhelming firepower and other military capabilities of government forces can contribute to the defeat of guerrillas. Since few wars of any description are won solely by weapons, one role of analysis is to see if it is possible to detect the *marginal* effects of various categories and inputs of arms into different military and political environments.

Their conclusion about the relationship between lethality and sophistication—"generally speaking the more sophisticated a weapon the more lethal power it will embody"—is not very profound and is based on a very special example, namely, the Arab-Israeli conflict. They cite as evidence the fact that there were more casualties in the 1967 June War than in the 1948-1949 war, which was not fought with advanced weapons. However, they fail to point out that there were far fewer

REVIEWS

Israeli casualties in 1967, in both proportional and absolute terms. A primary determinant of Israeli strategy since 1948-1949 has been to minimize Israeli casualties in event of war. Israel has chosen to do this by investing in high technology weapons that exploit its technical skills. Thus for Israel, advanced technology is seen as a way of *minimizing* Israeli casualties.

There are some other problems with this conclusion. Since 1967, Israel's military casualties have resulted chiefly from Egyptian artillery attacks across the Suez Canal. Does that mean that artillery falls into the "sophisticated" weapons class? The authors do not say. But the Israelis regard Egyptian artillery as "offensive" and feel that the best weapons to neutralize it are strike aircraft. Given these asymmetries, it is particularly difficult from this example to draw general conclusions about the relationships between weapons and lethality that apply in other Third World areas.

The cursory treatment of the relationship among conflict, weapons and propensities for war is a significant weakness of the book. The SIPRI team is on firmer ground when presenting descriptive data and when analyzing the reasons why industrial powers supply arms.

It is to be expected that in a book of this length there will be factual as well as typographical errors. A useful check on errors is to see whether they fit a coherent pattern. Generally speaking, the quality of the data is good. However, certain errors relating to descriptions of weapons systems do

recur. This, together with other impressions gleaned from the text, again suggests that the authors were satisfied with less than a thorough analysis of some of the basic strategic implications of the transfer process they so admirably describe. For example, on page 525, there is a reference to the transfer of Soviet SU-7 aircraft to Egypt after the Six-Day War. These are referred to as "interceptor" aircraft when, in fact, they are close support and interdiction aircraft which are totally unsuited for the interceptor mission. This may seem a pedantic observation except that the mistake has great significance: the inference is that Egypt at that time was receiving only "defensive" weapons from the Soviet Union, rather than "offensive" weapons that could be used against Israeli targets in the desert. Similarly, a few pages later (p. 532), the authors refer to the fact that Israel, unable to procure Mirage 5 aircraft from France, turned to the United States for additional Skyhawk light bombers. In a footnote they state that "The Skyhawk is older and slower than the Mirage but it carries ten times the bomb load." This is wrong. The Skyhawks Israel is receiving are the latest models; they are slower than the Mirage, but their payload is only about two times that of the Mirage. Again, this error would be less of a problem were it not that it appears in a discussion of the nuances of the Arab-Israeli balance of power.

However, such criticisms must be balanced by the simple admission that this is by far the most

thorough account that has ever appeared of the postwar arms trade phenomenon and stands as a classic in its field. The SIPRI book provides basic material from which one can explore in much greater detail the problems facing the small countries and poor countries as they plan for their security in the 1970's. It should be stressed that it avoids any attempt to tell Third World countries what they should or should not buy. Given SIPRI's mandate, this is one of the book's greatest assets. Advocacy will have to be left to others as, over the next few years, procurement options for Third World countries become a more important subject for those pondering the implications of the new international environment.

PERCEPTIONS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY*

by Robert C. Horn

In *American Images of Soviet Foreign Policy*, William Welch has set himself extremely ambitious tasks: discerning and classifying the various images of Soviet foreign policy that have been developed by the American academic community, analyzing how well founded these perceptions are, and prescribing remedies to improve them. The implication of this final task is that there are deficiencies and inadequacies in the thinking of American scholars on Soviet policy. They have fallen short, Welch believes,

**American Images of Soviet Foreign Policy. An Inquiry into Recent Appraisals from the Academic Community.* By William Welch. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970. 302 pp. \$10.00.

of "fashioning a body of knowledge firmly grounded and of wide acceptance." (p. ix.) Not only does this lack of consensus betray our questionable expertise; it also means that we are not able to supply "well based, uniform answers" to questions posed by the makers of American foreign policy about the nature of Soviet conduct. (This reviewer, for one, questions whether the proper aim for scholarship ought to be either arriving at "uniform answers" or acting as sources for policymakers.) Welch's central suspicion is that methodological inadequacies and inconsistencies are at the base of our shortcomings. It is to the confirmation of this suspicion and to recommendations for rectifying the methodology that the book is directed.

Welch begins with a survey of the literature on Soviet foreign policy produced during 1959-1968. In deciding on twenty-two books to analyze and classify,¹ chosen on the

¹Bouscaren, *Soviet Foreign Policy*; Dallin, *Soviet Foreign Policy after Stalin*; Fleming, *The Cold War and Its Origins*; Gehlen, *The Politics of Coexistence*; Goodman, *The Soviet Design for a World State*; Halle, *The Cold War as History*; Kennan, *Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin*; Kintner and Kornfeder, *The New Frontier of War*; Kulski, *Peaceful Coexistence*; Librach, *The Rise of the Soviet Empire*; Lukacs, *A New History of the Cold War*; Mosely, *The Kremlin and World Politics*; H. and B. Overstreet, *The War Called Peace*; Schuman, *The Cold War*; Schwartz, *The Red Phoenix*; Shulman, *Beyond the Cold War and Stalin's Foreign Policy Re-appraised*; Strausz-Hupé, Kintner, Dougherty and Cottrell, *Protracted Conflict*; Triska and Finley, *Soviet Foreign Policy*; Tucker, *The Soviet Political Mind*; Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*; Wolfe, *Communist Totalitarianism*.

REVIEWS

basis of being "academicians' treatments of the subject at once comprehensive and of some length" (p. 5), he provides acceptable justification for excluding from the list certain other notable works on Soviet external conduct. Those omitted, he argues, are of "insufficient generality," are documentaries or collections of articles, or were published since 1968. One might quibble mildly about some works included on his list, particularly those by the Overstreets, Schwartz, Tucker and Wolfe, all of which Welch admits have primarily an internal focus. In addition, those by the last three and by Mosely are collections of the authors' writings over various periods.

In any event, Welch makes some significant general observations from his initial examination of these twenty-two works. One is that few of them treat Soviet foreign policy "in convenient isolation," considering it rather "within the context of material of broader reference"; that is, most of the works do not focus on Soviet external conduct exclusively but treat it as one aspect of a larger concern such as the Cold War, international communism, or the Soviet political system as a whole. (pp. 12-13.) Welch also makes the point that few of the works deal with the subject over the full span of Soviet rule, although he obscures his argument somewhat by inadequately clarifying the varying figures he arrives at for defining "few." (see pp. 13, 14, 27.) Moreover, although again creating unnecessary confusion in tabulations (especially between the table on

page 12 and the text), he indicates that there is a dearth of analytical studies, most of the works being historical narratives or weakly integrated collections. Finally, he discovers that while these works "may agree on the events of the historical record," they "disagree often and strenuously on their relative weights, the relationship between them, the interpretation to be laid on them." (p. 26.) Granting that differences are natural and valuable, such wild contradictions seem extreme. All of the above Welch designates — rightly and importantly, I think — as deficiencies and problems to be overcome in American studies of Soviet foreign policy.

In Chapter Two, entitled "Major Types," he perhaps makes his most valuable contribution. Here he constructs a scheme by which to classify the twenty-two works under consideration. This is made up of two main continua, "hardness" of conduct in the aggregate and constancy in such conduct over time. The former is broken into five ranges of values ("ultra-hard," "hard," "mixed," "soft" and "ultra-soft") and the latter into three values (high, medium and low). The continuum for hardness in the aggregate then becomes a synthesis of continua of nine dimensions of conduct (discussed on pp. 38-40): expansionism of ends, expansiveness of means, militancy (addiction to force in general), militariness (addiction to violence), immorality, addiction to initiative, offensiveness of motive, malignancy of the impact on the world outside, and hardness toward those nations

whose internal structure is like that of the USSR (i.e., other communist states).

By assessing the images presented in each of these dimensions, Welch argues, one can arrive at an overall classification of any studies on Soviet foreign policy (or other foreign policies). Notwithstanding the reservations many might have about converting descriptive qualitative phrases into numerical equivalents in order to arrive at an aggregate figure, or the weighting assigned to the various dimensions, or the overlapping of certain of these dimensions — all objections of which Welch is aware (p. 42) — it would seem that he has provided an extremely worthwhile service by suggesting this relatively concrete analytical framework within which to gauge Soviet international behavior. Thus, even while recognizing that the “scientific” nature of such a methodology becomes questionable as soon as the analyst begins subjectively to characterize his interpretation of each dimension of Soviet conduct, I would contend that Welch has proposed a beginning step toward a sounder, more rigorous and less impressionistic study of writings on Soviet policy and Soviet policy itself. Indeed, his framework may serve to greater advantage as an analytical approach for use in future studies of Soviet conduct than as a tool to evaluate past studies.

From assessing some of the twenty-two works generally according to his classificatory scheme in Chapter Two, Welch proceeds to a detailed evaluation in the three chapters of Part II. This

he does by examining three studies that seem most representative of each of the three general images he has discovered: the “ultra-hard,” the “hard,” and the “mixed” (none were found on the “soft” side of the scale). The “ultra-hard” designation is well-supported, difficult to disagree with, and generally well-known. (Welch criticizes this image for its “casual ascription,” “loose association,” “selective crediting” and “selective weighting” [p. 98].) Between the other two aggregate characterizations is where most concern has recently been focused, and where, unfortunately, Welch has left questions unanswered. This reviewer was not persuaded, for example, that Shulman’s *Stalin’s Foreign Policy Reappraised* deserved the appellation “hard” in its image of Soviet policy. Also, Welch ranks this work with Kennan’s *Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin*, although they deal with separate temporal periods that overlap only slightly in Kennan’s final chapter.

The classification procedure seems still more questionable since Welch himself admits that Fleming’s *The Cold War and Its Origins* belongs on “the soft side of the scale” (p. 136) while specifically including it in the “mixed” category, along with Gehlen’s *The Politics of Co-existence*, among others. These objections or reservations may stem in large part from Welch’s choice of such highly connotative terms as “hard” and “soft,” and perhaps the analysis would be improved by the use of different terminology and/or by a breakdown into more than three images. A greater prob-

REVIEWS

lem might be that Welch, owing to the size of his undertaking, focuses on really only one point, theme or argument of each book in order to assign it a position on the aggregate scale. To draw an overall evaluation from such a narrow basis can be dangerous and may be partly responsible for the slight unease I feel with the distinctions between "hard" and "mixed."

The final two parts of the book are concerned with "melioration" and "reconciliation," that is, with a discussion of methodological differences in the twenty-two studies and recommendations for achieving greater consensus and a higher degree of "scholarship" in the field. Welch finds that only the "empirical" style — exemplified by Shulman, Gehlen, Triska and Finley (*Soviet Foreign Policy*) and Tucker (*The Soviet Political Mind*) — "approximates the requirements of the kind of high discipline that defines scholarliness." (p. 177.) This style announces the generalization or focus and attends with care to the meaning of terms, the adducing of data, and interpretation; the authors so praised also exhibit "a less strong commitment to a particular view, an inquiring spirit, a willingness soberly and rationally to engage other views, and a mind sensitive to problems of method. . . ." (p. 177.)

Beyond the "empirical" paragon, however, there exist a plurality of images, inadequately confirmed characterizations, weak demonstration, insufficient definition and differentiation of concepts, and failure to develop rules for matching these concepts to the data. Welch

sums up the deficiencies he has explicated throughout the book with the following recommendation for reform: one must exercise care in defining and differentiating concepts; in striving for conceptual clarity; in avoiding capricious sifting procedures; in assessing the complete array of data; in aggregating; and, interestingly, in not sacrificing substance to overdoing the above. (p. 208.)

In his final chapter he adds the necessity for the analyst to recognize and strive to overcome his own emotional commitment and perspective and systematically to offset ethnocentric perceptions and biases. (p. 302.)

In sum, Welch's study represents a groundbreaking effort at an overview and analysis of American scholarship on Soviet foreign policy. Any criticisms of the book ought perhaps to be put in the same perspective and should take into account the goal Welch set for himself: to construct not a "perfect scheme" but rather one "less imperfect than what is presently at hand." (p. 42.) Nevertheless, this reviewer must raise objections in addition to those discussed above. For example, Chapter Seven, which is an examination of Soviet adherence to treaties, is apparently intended to stand as an illustration of the author's view of an empirical and scholarly approach to the study of Soviet policy. Instead, the incessant counting of days of Soviet nonviolation, the failure to weight different treaties, the lack of a comparative perspective, and the fact (not explicitly recognized by Welch here) that it is still left

to the analyst to decide whether or not abrogations and violations were justified, render the chapter irritating, irrelevant, and, worse, perhaps detrimental to Welch's overall case. The author's undefended statement that the goal of American foreign policy is "a peaceful world of free and equal nation-states" (p. 38) at minimum needs elaboration. Also, it is disappointing that he begs off from a detailed analysis (justified on p. 101) of Ulam's *Expansion and Coexistence*, which, historical or not, is in my opinion one of the most valuable recent contributions to the study of Soviet foreign policy.

All in all, Welch rightly pinpoints and documents deficiencies in our various images of Soviet behavior, raises some important questions, and makes a provocative beginning toward the strengthening of the discipline. Even if many students would disagree that our goal should be to establish "uniform answers" to questions about Moscow's foreign policy, he has provided a valuable examination of the record of our effort at understanding the subject. Moreover, in the dimensions he suggests in Chapter Two for analyzing Soviet conduct, he has put forward an analytical model that merits the consideration and further study of those of us who, along with Welch, seek a higher standard of scholarship in the field.

REVOLUTION AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH: THE MEXICAN CASE*
by Edward H. Allen

Men have often sought to redress their grievances against a reluctant state through violence.

When these grievances have included economic issues, they have been stirred to revolution by the prospect of a better life in the aftermath. Critics of the revolutionary road to economic reform have claimed that revolution only slows the process. On the other hand, governments more responsive to demands for improved living conditions have invariably tried to promote welfare through state intervention in private economic life. Again, critics have voiced serious misgivings about the value of a forced-draft approach to development, noting, among other things, that state-controlled economies tend to distribute the fruits of labor inequitably.

In a precise and well-documented volume entitled *The Mexican Economy: Twentieth-Century Structure and Growth*, Professor Clark Reynolds brings modern econometric analysis to bear upon this controversy over the merits of revolution and state interference as vehicles for promoting economic reform. He discovers the proximate causes of Mexico's "balanced growth" in shifts of distribution of population, income and final demand, while finding the more profound causes in the "ethos of revolution" — a confluence of social-psychological attitudes flowing from the revolution that has nourished a new spirit of economizing.

The Mexican Revolution began with the collapse of the Díaz dictatorship in 1910 and suffered through intrigues, counter-revolu-

**The Mexican Economy: Twentieth-Century Structure and Growth*. By Clark W. Reynolds. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970. 468 pp. \$13.50.

REVIEWS

tions and anarchy. Although the violence was largely over by 1920, the countryside was not fully pacified until the 1930's. The new political system that followed, while clearly outlined once Mexico's dominant political party was established in 1929, continued to undergo significant changes well into the 1940's. Moreover, the post-revolutionary period was marked by rapid state acquisition of control over the private sector. Reynolds' study of Mexican economic history from 1900 through 1960, in which he reproduces and carefully analyzes a wide variety of partially disaggregated economic statistics, thus encompasses the pre- and post-revolutionary periods.

His first two chapters analyze the broad secular growth of the Mexican economy. He then devotes separate chapters to changes in agriculture, industry, foreign trade and public finance, and touches on the impact of the land reform and urbanization movements. The appendices, which contain valuable historical data, complement the body of the text.

As any economic historian must, Reynolds has struggled, sometimes unsuccessfully, with problems of index numbers and missing and faulty data, but he has nonetheless produced the most complete and accurate record of Mexico's economic renaissance currently available in either Spanish or English. It is to his credit that no matter how thick and dry the statistics may become, he never strays far from his central question: Was the cost of Mexico's public policy and historic disruption higher than it need have been?

Although the evidence is some-

what ambiguous and largely circumstantial, the Mexican Revolution and the governmental policies of the post-revolutionary period appear in many ways to have fulfilled the hopes of their proponents; few challenge their success. But could the current level of Mexican economic development have been attained without a revolution that probably cost more than a million lives? Reynolds' heavily circumscribed and carefully hedged answer is that, had the revolution not occurred, Mexico would not have progressed as far as it has today. "It is hypothesized here that changes in the structure of the economy were brought about by public policies. . . . These policies would have been neither proposed nor tolerated in the absence of the social and political changes accompanying the Revolution." (p. 54.)

However, it is possible to grasp the full significance of Reynolds' conclusion only if one clearly understands how he reached it. His method, adapted from previous work by the American economist Edward F. Denison, and others, demonstrates the failure of current economic theory to "explain" economic growth by such classical factors of production as labor, capital and land. The "unexplained" portion of growth, it is argued, must reside in noneconomic factors — improvements in organizational and other skills, gains from increased scale via market, social and political integration, and cultural improvements in the general social environment of the economic system.

Thus, the basic step in evaluating the benefits of the revolution

was to employ current economic theory to provide "a range of estimates of potential gross domestic product for the years 1925, 1930, and 1940 had the Mexican Revolution, post-revolutionary reforms, and associated economic disturbances not occurred. . . . The underlying assumption of the estimates was that economic conditions in Mexico would not have deviated sharply from those elsewhere in Latin America had the Revolution not occurred." (p. 315.)

Reynolds concludes from the results of this exercise that "The opportunity cost of the Revolution and reform expressed in purely economic terms — which ignores much of the agonizing social cost of anarchy, dislocation, disease, and death — was much less than one might suppose." (p. 325.) Earlier he had noted, "The economic losses that were sustained . . . were eventually recovered by an increase in the rate of growth that almost certainly would not have occurred without the Revolution." (p. 57.)

Many North American political economists seem to reject the call to insurrection implied by this interpretation of the Mexican success. Daniel Bell felt moved to conclude his essay, "The End of Ideology," with a passionately-worded deprecation of those who "justify degrading means in the name of some Utopian or revolutionary end. . . ."

Reynolds' chief weakness is his equivocation regarding the costs and benefits of alternative paths to development. On the one hand he finds economic evidence for sanctioning revolution and reform. On

the other, he seems to shy away from full certification of Mexico's economic history. Thus he writes: "Whether the benefits actually compensated for the cost cannot be resolved in this volume. Such conclusions depend upon subjective judgments about social priorities which can be reconciled, if at all, only through the political process." (p. 57.)

But in the end he concludes that such a question cannot even be answered by the Mexican political process, because "while identification of public policy with the public interest has never been unquestioned in Mexico, recent economic success has created important new . . . groups, all of which demand a greater voice in the decision-making process. Channels must be opened in the political system through which such pressures can be relieved, or economic growth may well be curtailed through political discontent. . . . It may become necessary for the government to turn from growth-promoting to political and economic redistribution programs in the near future in order to avoid a repetition of history." (p. 310.) In other words, although he carefully analyzes economic alternatives for Mexico, his cost-benefit analysis of these alternatives supplies no clear indication of what Mexico's economic goals should be or how they should be programmed. Nevertheless, Professor Reynolds' demurral, in recognition of the limits of economic science, does not diminish the stature of his book — one that will stand as a classic study of revolution and economic growth.

Books Received

NOTE—By special arrangement with the Foreign Policy Association, readers of ORBIS may obtain from the FPA's Book Center any books listed below published in the United States (except paperbacks) at the publisher's regular list price. Post free for domestic orders only. Send orders with check or money order to Desk O, World Affairs Book Center, 345 East 46th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017. (This arrangement also applies to books reviewed in ORBIS.)

I. POLITICS, HISTORY, ECONOMICS

Democracy. By Dorothy Pickles. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1970. 200 pp. \$1.65 (paper). Mrs. Pickles reviews the development of various conceptions of democracy, such as direct democracy and representative democracy, and examines some of the problems of democracy-in-practice, including difficulties associated with constitutions, elections, kinds of governmental systems, and oppositions. She argues that the greatest danger faced by modern democratic governments is a crisis of apathy, a lack of willingness to explore and if necessary change the democratic system to meet new problems.

Foreign Policy in World Politics. (Fourth edition.) Edited by Roy C. Macridis. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972. 428 pp. \$5.95 (paper). In this standard foreign policy text, now in its fourth edition, the introductory chapter by Kenneth W. Thompson and Roy C. Macridis treats of the comparative study of foreign policy. Other sections are devoted to the foreign policies of the major powers: Great Britain by Leon D. Epstein, France by Macridis, West Germany by Karl W. Deutsch, Gebhard L. Schweigler and Lewis J. Edinger, the USSR by Vernon V. Aspaturian, Communist China by Allen S. Whiting, Japan by Robert A. Scalapino, and India by Richard L. Park. Essays by Aspaturian on the Soviet Union and international communism and by Hans J. Morgenthau on the American tradition in foreign policy conclude the volume.

Games Nations Play: Analyzing International Politics. By John Spanier. New York: Praeger, 1972. 457 pp. \$12.50. Dr. Spanier, Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida and author of *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, states that "the purpose of this book is to teach the reader . . . *how to think about international politics*. . . . Its central objective is to convey to the student that there are a number of different ways to think about the subject and not just one way, not simply a 'right' way." He employs three levels of analysis: the state system, with its balance-of-power emphasis; the national system, with its domestic priorities; and the decision-making system, with its dependence both on the policymakers' perceptions of reality and on the institutions that formulate and execute policy.

Geography of World Affairs. (Fourth edition.) By J. P. Cole. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1972. 478 pp. \$2.45 (paper). This general reference work on the dimensions of the world system includes facts and figures relating to population, industry and raw materials, an analysis of individual countries in twelve regional groups, and a discussion of the major issues in contemporary international relations.

Police State. By Brian Chapman. New York: Praeger, 1970. 150 pp. \$5.00. The institutional characteristics that Chapman attributes to the police state in its traditional form are derived from the Prussia of Frederick II, Joseph II's Austria, and post-revolutionary France. In tracing the history of the police state, the

ORBIS

author is careful to distinguish between "normal" police behavior and the methods, psychology and functions of a political police force.

The Statesman's Year-Book, 1972/1973. Edited by John Paxton. New York: Macmillan, 1972. 1565 pp. \$13.95. The 109th edition of this indispensable source book on economic, political, social, military and diplomatic affairs provides accurate and detailed information on every nation and other political subdivision on the globe, and sections on the United Nations and seventeen other major international organizations.

Surviving the Future. By Arnold Toynbee. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971. 164 pp. \$5.95. The seven rambling philosophical essays in this volume contain the substance of Dr. Toynbee's responses to a series of questions put to him by Professor Kei Wakaizumi of Kyoto Sangyo University. Toynbee, at eighty-two, muses on the purpose of life, obstacles to the achievement of that purpose, modern technology, the need for religion, the role of education, society and technology, and his hopes and expectations for the younger generation. His "first advice" to that generation is to "keep the spirit of youth until you are dead."

What Computers Can't Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason. By Hubert L. Dreyfus. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. 259 pp. \$8.95. Through the use of present and contemplated computer systems and languages, an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of California at Berkeley attempts to show that artificial intelligence is logically impossible. Arguing that computer programming cannot replicate many regular, but not rule-governed, human activities, Dreyfus likens artificial intelligence researchers to the ancient alchemists. Just as a new science enabled us to realize the alchemists' dream of transmuting lead into gold, he says, the achievement of a machine with artificial intelligence awaits approaches fundamentally different from those now pursued or considered.

World Society. By John W. Burton. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1972. 180 pp. \$10.95 (\$3.75, paper). A short introductory text to the study of international relations, emphasizing modern approaches of conceptualization and the integration of relevant analytic techniques and academic disciplines. Dr. Burton concludes with a discussion of conflict resolution and a stimulation exercise.

II. UNITED STATES AND CANADA

The Modern Military in American Society: A Study in the Nature of Military Power. By Charles Walton Ackley. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1972. 400 pp. \$10.95. The author, Professor of Philosophy at California State Polytechnic College and formerly a Navy chaplain for twenty years, examines the role of the military in American life and the thinking of military men about the essence and purpose of the power they possess. The nature of his study "is not simply descriptive nor even analytical. It is, rather, moral and evaluative."

No Clear and Present Danger. By Bruce M. Russett. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. 111 pp. \$6.00. Dr. Russett challenges the necessity for American participation in the Second World War. Stimulated by his view of the U.S. intervention in Viet Nam, he finds that "American participation in World War II had very little effect on the essential structure of international politics thereafter, and probably did little to advance the material welfare of most Americans or to make the nation secure against military threats." While he concludes that this involvement was not as plainly a mistake as the Viet Nam experience, he asserts that it set some precedents for American thinking which led too easily to later interventions.

BOOKS RECEIVED

On the Democratic Idea in America. By Irving Kristol. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. 149 pp. \$5.00. In these essays, written and published during the past five years, Mr. Kristol, Henry Luce Professor of Urban Values at New York University and co-editor of *The Public Interest*, examines such topics as urban civilization and its discontents; pornography, obscenity and censorship; American intellectuals and foreign policy; restructuring the university; utopianism and American politics; and the promise and shortcomings of liberal capitalism.

Political Hysteria in America. By Murray B. Levin. New York: Basic Books, 1971. 312 pp. \$8.50. Professor Levin takes the view that periodic outbursts of political hysteria in America, such as the "Red Scare" of 1919-1920 and McCarthyism in the 1950's, are not exceptional instances. They are rather, he contends, revealing indicators of underlying dimensions of the American tradition. Using the "Red Scare" as his model, he describes the characteristics and consequences of what he calls the "democratic capacity for repression" that has developed in the United States.

The Politics of Riot Commissions. Edited and introduced by Anthony M. Platt. New York: Collier Books, 1971. 534 pp. \$3.95 (paper). This is a collection of excerpts from the reports of eight riot commissions between 1917 and 1970, together with critiques of the reports. The author argues that "riot commissions may be understood as an effort to coopt liberal reformers and professionals, to affirm the strength and flexibility of established institutional arrangements . . . and to inhibit the possibility of sudden and major change."

Spiro Agnew's America. By Theo Lippman, Jr. New York: W. W. Norton, 1972. 256 pp. \$7.95. Lippman's biography portrays Agnew as a man representative of suburban America. He describes Agnew's youth, his careers as county executive and governor, and his role in national politics.

III. WESTERN EUROPE AND ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

Beaverbrook: A Biography. By A. J. P. Taylor. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972. 712 pp. \$12.95. Relying heavily on heretofore unpublished letters and papers for his portrayal of one of the most interesting British figures of our time, Professor Taylor reveals added insights into the character of Lord Beaverbrook as a politician, newspaper magnate, historian, and high-pressure organizer. To reach the conclusion that Beaverbrook was nothing less than a phenomenon, Taylor investigates his Canadian childhood, his political intrigues, his heroic struggle against asthma which almost crippled him, his substantial achievements during the Second World War, and his intimate relationship with Winston Churchill.

Bonn's Eastern Policy, 1964-1971: Evolution and Limitations. By Laszlo Görgéy. Hamden, Conn.: The Shoe String Press, 1972. 191 pp. \$8.50. The first four chapters examine those foreign and domestic forces which were decisive in the evolution of Bonn's Eastern policy, from the cautious beginnings under Erhard to maturation under Brandt and the conclusion of the Moscow and Warsaw agreements. The next three chapters deal with the reactions of the various East European states and the Soviet Union to Bonn's overtures. The concluding chapter discusses the limitations and prospects for *Ostpolitik*.

The German Dictatorship: The Origins, Structure, and Effects of National Socialism. By Karl Dietrich Bracher. New York: Praeger, 1972. 553 pp. \$5.95 (paper). This is the paperback edition of a widely acclaimed study, originally published in 1969, on every aspect of Nazism: the philosophical, historical and political background, the German state tradition, the weaknesses of the Weimar Republic, the rise of the NSDAP, the personality of Hitler, the Nazi seizure of

power, the structure of the SS state, the roles of the bureaucracy, army, business and the church, the domestic resistance and acquiescence, the murder of Jews, the appeasement by the West, the war, the collapse of the regime, and the remnants of National Socialism today.

Pointing the Way, 1959-61. By Harold Macmillan. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. 504 pp. \$15.00. This volume of the Macmillan memoirs begins with the Conservative victory in the British general election of October 1959, which initiated his final administration as Prime Minister. It chronicles the steps toward detente with the USSR; preparations for the Paris Summit of 1960; British relations with the United States during the early Kennedy years; British considerations with respect to joining the Common Market; and Macmillan's African tour of 1960. Macmillan also comments on the relationship between the Prime Minister and the British Monarch.

Security in Europe. By Robert Hunter. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972. 281 pp. \$8.95. The author analyzes the growth of the formal European security institutions, first NATO and then the Warsaw Pact, in relation to the onset and progress of the Cold War. He discusses the political role played by each alliance; how the evolution of a strategic doctrine in the West built up tensions within NATO; and how both alliances have fulfilled important non-military needs of the countries involved. The final section of the book assesses the process of detente in Europe and speculates on the outcome of the proposed Security and Cooperation Conference.

IV. SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE

The Communist States in Disarray, 1965-1971. Edited by Adam Bromke and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972. 363 pp. \$13.50 (\$4.95, paper). The fifth in a series sponsored by the Soviet and East European Studies Program at Carleton University, Ottawa, this volume contains seven lectures originally delivered in early 1970 and nine essays written especially for the book to complete coverage of the subject. There are papers on each of the East European states; on Outer Mongolia, North Korea and North Viet Nam, and Cuba; and on polycentrism in Eastern Europe, the Sino-Soviet dispute, external forces in Eastern Europe, patterns of economic relations, and patterns of political change. Contributors include H. Gordon Skilling, Ferenc A. Vali, John C. Campbell, Andrew Gyorgy, and Paul F. Langer.

A History of Soviet Russia. (Sixth edition.) By Georg von Rauch. New York: Praeger, 1972. 541 pp. \$12.00. This sixth edition of a standard text on the history of the USSR carries the story forward from the Twenty-third Party Congress in 1966 to the aftermath of the Twenty-fourth in 1971. Professor von Rauch, one of Germany's most distinguished Russian specialists, is head of the Institute for East European History at the University of Kiel.

Realignment of World Power: The Russo-Chinese Schism. (Two volumes.) By Oton Ambroz. New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1972. 338, 406 pp. \$25.00, both. Dr. Ambroz, a veteran journalist and political analyst of communist affairs, traces developments in Sino-Soviet relations, chronicles the struggle between these two giant communist powers, analyzes the causes for it, shows how the Russians and Chinese have disliked each other for centuries on the popular and governmental levels, and assesses the impact of this rift on world affairs.

Russian History Atlas. By Martin Gilbert. New York: Macmillan, 1972. ca. 200 pp. \$4.95. This valuable historical atlas contains 146 maps of the USSR and its predecessor political entities, from an 800 B.C. map of the origins of the

BOOKS RECEIVED

Slavs to a 1970 map of the Soviet-Chinese borderlands. There are maps on a variety of topics: famine, trade, rebellion, places of exile, wars, invasions, expansion, nationalities, World War II German plans for Russia, the Cuban missile crisis, and Soviet naval strength in 1970.

The Soviet Russian State. By Robert G. Wesson. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1972. 404 pp. \$8.95. In preparing this study of the Soviet system, the author states that he found two broad themes most helpful: its multinational character which sets the Soviet realm apart from all others, especially those in the West, and its maturation from revolutionary impulses and social upheaval into a settled authoritarian state. Professor Wesson, of the University of California at Santa Barbara, discusses in chronological order the old regime, the revolutionary era, the making of the state from 1917 to 1939, and the transition from Stalinism to collective leadership. Chapters five to fourteen are devoted to treatment of the rationale of power and uses of ideology; the party's organization, management and functions; governmental structure; the economy and economic planning; the "psychocultural front," education, the arts, science, religion and public opinion; coercion and the law; the military; national minorities; relations with the bloc; and the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet system, its modernization and prospects.

V. MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

The Cameroon Federal Republic. By Victor T. Le Vine. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1971. 205 pp. \$2.45 (paper). This volume in the series, *Africa in the Modern World*, treats of the government and politics of the Cameroon Federal Republic, which has functioned as a stable federal system since 1961 while other federations in Africa have broken up. The historical background, geography, economy, social structure, educational system, and communications media are covered briefly. Major attention is given to governmental structure, political dynamics, elections, administration and local government, and to contemporary issues of national unity, economic development and foreign relations.

Conflict in the Congo. By Thomas Kanza. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1972. 346 pp. \$3.25 (paper). The author, a close friend of Patrice Lumumba and a minister in his cabinet, portrays the late Prime Minister sympathetically and reports in detail as an eyewitness on the events leading up to, and during the first year of, independence—the negotiations with the Belgian government, the triumvirate of Lumumba, Kasavubu and Tshombe, the secession of Katanga, the introduction of UN troops and mediation efforts, and the murder of Lumumba.

From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882-1964. Edited by Thomas Karis and Gwendolyn M. Carter. **Volume I: Protest and Hope, 1882-1934.** By Sheridan Johns, III. Stanford: Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, 1972. 378 pp. \$14.50. This is the first of three volumes of documents on African politics in South Africa from 1882 to 1964. The documents, consisting of resolutions, petitions, pamphlets, speeches, editorials, articles, proceedings of conferences, and calls to action, are organized for the most part chronologically and occasionally topically. Each part is preceded by introductory essays to provide the necessary setting.

My Odyssey: An Autobiography. By Nnamdi Azikiwe. New York: Praeger, 1970. 452 pp. \$12.50. This famous African elder statesman's autobiography covers his formative years up to 1947 when, at the age of forty-five, he entered politics as the President of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, the majority party of the Eastern region. He later became the first and only President of independent Nigeria before the coup of 1966.

Uses and Abuses of Political Power: A Case Study of Continuity and Change in the Politics of Ghana. By Maxwell Owusu. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970. 364 pp. \$11.60. Dr. Owusu examines the economic and social bases of political power in Swedru, the chief commercial village in south-central Ghana. His study reveals that traditional institutions failed to adapt to Euro-colonial domination, urbanization, decolonization, and the one-party state that subsequently emerged; that the control of economic resources leads to class elevation; and that the resultant struggle for economic wealth among the elites breeds revolution and communal division.

West Africa Today. Edited by Nancy L. Hoepli. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1971. 197 pp. n.p. More than forty readings on nation-building, the politics of independence, and economic development in West Africa, the Nigerian civil war, and relations between the great powers and the West African states.

VI. EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

America's Response to China: An Interpretative History of Sino-American Relations. By Warren I. Cohen. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971. 242 pp. \$7.95 (\$3.95, paper). This history of U.S.-Chinese relations focuses on the American response to China and shows how the United States, as an Atlantic-centered nation, subordinated its China policies to more pressing demands in Europe and Latin America and generally pursued inept and foolish policies toward China, especially toward Mao's regime.

China Returns. By Klaus Mehnert. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1972. 322 pp. \$10.00. An account of China after the Cultural Revolution by a German political scientist who has spent several years in China and similar lengths of time in the USSR and the United States, and whose most recent visit to China was in 1971 when he traveled through fourteen of that country's twenty-nine provinces. In the first section, he records his impressions of China, based on contact with the people. He then draws some conclusions regarding Chinese political, economic and social dynamics; describes the consequences of the Cultural Revolution; and provides introductions for sample documents from the mass of directives, homilies and other types of cultural propaganda now pouring from the presses of the Chinese People's Republic.

India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers. By William J. Barnds. New York: Praeger, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1972. 386 pp. \$12.50. In this comprehensive and dispassionate analysis of international relations on the Asian subcontinent and the involvement of the major powers, the author examines the formative period of Indian and Pakistani foreign policies; the American dilemma of trying to be friendly to both antagonistic states; the Soviet Union's decision to favor India; the spurious friendship between China and India; the Sino-Indian border war; the second Kashmir conflict; and India's ascendancy and Pakistan's worsening domestic turmoil. In a final section, Mr. Barnds, an official in the Office of National Estimates of the CIA from 1962 to 1966 and currently a senior research fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, discusses U.S. interests in the subcontinent, development prospects, the current roles of the major powers, and the defense of South Asia, and recommends guidelines for U.S. policy.

Journey Between Two Chinas. By Seymour Topping. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. 459 pp. \$10.00. Topping was a correspondent from 1946 to 1949 in war-torn China, an Associated Press correspondent in Indochina in the early 1950's, a *New York Times* correspondent in Moscow, Hong Kong and South-east Asia, and is now that newspaper's Assistant Managing Editor. In the spring of 1971, he visited Communist China, interviewed Chou En-lai, traveled

BOOKS RECEIVED

extensively, and talked to many Chinese in various occupations. Utilizing his vast experience and knowledge, he has written an eyewitness account of the collapse of the Nationalist Government, the birth of Mao's China, and the vastly changed country and people he found on his return in 1971. He also describes the collapse of the French Indochina empire and, in an epilogue, assesses the impact of President Nixon's visit to Peking.

The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970s. Edited by William W. Whitson. New York: Praeger, 1972. 390 pp. \$20.00. This collection of eighteen papers on the structure and strength of the military and its political role in post-Cultural Revolution China is an important contribution to an understanding of political dynamics in Peking. The writers maintain that the new military elite dictates both domestic and foreign policy and forecast continued domination of political commissars by military commanders, as well as the priority of conventional weapons modernization over nuclear weapons production.

The Pacific Rivals: A Japanese View of Japanese-American Relations. By the staff of the *Asahi Shimbun*. New York: John Weatherhill, 1972. 431 pp. \$10.00. Tokyo's *Asahi Shimbun*, one of the world's great newspapers, originally published these 140 articles serially in its daily editions. The correspondents, news analysts and writers of the *Asahi* newspaper trace Japanese-American relations from their mid-nineteenth-century beginnings to 1971, providing a valuable opportunity for Americans to view Japanese popular attitudes, domestic problems and foreign relations through the eyes of the Japanese themselves.

Sino-American Relations, 1949-71. Documented and introduced by Roderick MacFarquhar. New York: Praeger, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1972. 267 pp. \$8.00 (\$2.95, paper). In part one, "Breakthrough in 1971," Morton H. Halperin discusses the impact of Nixon's China policy initiative on Asia, A. M. Halpern assesses China's world outlook since the Cultural Revolution, and Donald W. Klein writes about the men and institutions behind Peking's foreign policy. Part two contains seventy-nine major documents relating to Sino-American relations since 1949, selected by MacFarquhar, who places them in historical and political perspective in seven introductory essays. In an epilogue, he relates the political struggle in China in late 1971 to the détente and examines the many obstacles that must be overcome before the two powers complete their rapprochement.

Viet Cong Repression and Its Implications for the Future. By Stephen T. Hosmer. Lexington, Mass.: Heath Lexington Books, 1970. 172 pp. \$8.50. This detailed and dispassionate analysis of the doctrine, organization and implementation of Viet Cong repression is based on the author's intensive study of the files of captured North Vietnamese and Viet Cong documents. Dr. Hosmer shows repression to be a highly organized process, directed by the powerful Viet Cong Security Service which operates throughout South Viet Nam. Its main targets are government officials at all levels, police, political leaders, military officers and NCO's, intelligence personnel, and communist defectors. In a concluding section, he examines the implications of Viet Cong repression for the future, especially the South Vietnamese leaders' perceptions of the problem and how these may affect their attitude toward a negotiated settlement.

VII. LATIN AMERICA

The Crown of Mexico: Maximilian and His Empress Carlota. By Joan Haslip. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972. 531 pp. \$10.00. This chronicle of the life and times of Ferdinand Maximilian (1832-1867), younger brother of Franz Josef of Austria and the ill-fated Emperor of Mexico, is told against the background of a revolutionary Mexico, the American Civil War, the strategy of

Napoleon III, European court and financial intrigues, and the ambitions and dreams of Maximilian's wife, Empress Carlota.

Cuban Foreign Policy and Chilean Politics. By Miles D. Wolpin. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath, 1972. 414 pp. \$15.00. A heavily documented study of the interactive relationship between Cuba and Chile, especially with regard to the impact of the Castro-Cuban revolution on the Chilean political system from 1959 to 1970. Dr. Wolpin, Assistant Professor of Political Science at St. Francis Xavier University, Nova Scotia, describes Chilean socio-economic factors and political organization and behavior; traces the efforts of Cuba to inspire Chile to emulate the revolution and the counter-efforts of the United States to diminish the appeal of the Cuban Revolution; and analyzes the responses of the Chilean Right, Left and Center political parties and forces. He includes numerous tables on attitudinal and behavioral data, and appendices on U.S. nongovernmental organizations in Chile and U.S. economic and military aid.

Soviet Seapower in the Caribbean: Political and Strategic Implications. Edited by James D. Theberge. New York: Praeger, 1972. 175 pp. \$13.50. American, Canadian and European experts examine the recent Soviet naval and maritime expansion into the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico. They assess the principal elements of Soviet seapower in the Caribbean; the expansion of Soviet and Cuban oceanographic operations in the 1960's; the progress of Soviet trade and shipping; the rise and fall of Soviet fisheries operations; Soviet military, oceanographic and fisheries aid to Cuba; the attempt to establish a strategic submarine base in Cienfuegos in 1970; and Soviet naval maneuvers since the first intrusion of July 1969.

U.S. Foreign Policy and Peru. Edited by Daniel A. Sharp. Austin: The University of Texas Press, for the Institute of Latin American Studies, 1972. 485 pp. \$10.00. This comprehensive account of the development of the Peruvian revolution of 1968 and relations between Peru and the United States resulted from an experiment in applied political science, economics and sociology that utilized effective communications between Peru and the United States at many levels during the difficult years following the revolution. The fourteen papers, plus statements submitted by the Peruvian and American governments, cover such topics as U.S. relations with the Peruvian military, the fisheries dispute, international lending agencies, agrarian reform, diplomatic protection of U.S. businesses, the status of the foreign private sector, American labor policy in Peru, U.S. church-financed missions, and U.S. aid under the Alliance for Progress.

The United States and Revolutionary Nationalism in Mexico, 1916-1932. By Robert Freeman Smith. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972. 288 pp. \$12.00. In this study of sixteen crucial years in U.S.-Mexican relations, Professor Smith assesses the reforms of the Mexican Revolution; the reactions of the U.S. government and various private interest groups, especially investment bankers and oil producers, to these reforms; and the impact of these reactions on the pattern of relations between the two states. The author, a Professor of History at the University of Toledo, treats this subject as a model, for the Mexican Revolution, the first socio-economic revolution in the Western Hemisphere, was instrumental in shaping the attitudes of North Americans toward all less developed areas and their nationalist movements.

Monographs and Reports Received

- Agnew: The Coining of a Household Word.* Edited by Robert W. Peterson. New York: Facts on File, Inc., May 1972. 181 pp. \$3.95.
- Bureaucracy and Foreign Policy.* By Francis E. Rourke. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, for the Washington Center for Foreign Policy Research, Studies in International Affairs, No. 17, August 1972. 80 pp. \$2.00.
- Czechoslovakia: Crisis in World Communism.* Edited by Vojtech Mastny. New York: Facts on File, Inc., July 1972. 392 pp. \$5.95.
- Ethics and World Politics: Four Perspectives.* Edited by Ernest W. Lefever. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, for the Washington Center for Foreign Policy Research, Studies in International Affairs, No. 18, August 1972. 99 pp. \$2.50.
- Ethiopia and Haile Selassie.* Edited by Peter Schwab. New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1972. 151 pp. \$3.95.
- Latin America: Toward a New Nationalism.* By Ben S. Stephansky. New York: Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series No. 211, June 1972. 63 pp. \$1.25.
- Major Middle Eastern Problems in International Law.* Edited by Majid Khadduri. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Foreign Affairs Study, No. 3, June 1972. 139 pp. \$4.00.
- A New Trade Policy Toward Communist Countries.* By the Research and Policy Committee, CED. New York: Committee for Economic Development, September 1972. 68 pp. \$1.50.
- The Quiet Approach: A Study of the Good Offices Exercised by the United Nations Secretary-General in the Cause of Peace.* By Vratislav Pechota. New York: United Nations Institute for Training and Research, UNITAR PS No. 6, September 1972. 91 pp. \$2.50.
- A Review of the U.S. China Policy (1949-1971).* By Kuan Chung. Taipei: World Anti-Communist League, China Chapter, Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, Republic of China, December 1971. 76 pp. 80 cents.
- Stockholm: The Politics of "Only One Earth."* By Jon McLin. Hanover, N.H.: American Universities Field Staff, West Europe Series, Vol. VII, No. 4, June 1972. 12 pp. \$1.00.
- Strategic Arms Limitation: Part I, The First Agreements.* Prepared by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. New York: Humanities Press, SIPRI Research Report No. 5, September 1972. 35 pp. n.p.
- True Facts of Maoist Tyranny.* Anonymous. Taipei: World Anti-Communist League, China Chapter, Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, Republic of China, November 1971. 115 pp. \$1.20.
- U.S. Foreign Economic Policy and the Domestic Economy.* A Statement by the Program Committee, CED. New York: Committee for Economic Development, July 1972. 17 pp. 25 cents.
- The Weary and the Wary: U.S. and Japanese Security Policies in Transition.* By Robert E. Osgood. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, for the Washington Center for Foreign Policy Research, Studies in International Affairs, No. 16, August 1972. 95 pp. \$2.00.

Contributors to this Issue

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Allan E. Goodman, Chairman, Department of Government and International Relations, Clark University; author of *Politics in War: The Bases of Political Community in South Vietnam* (Harvard University Press, spring 1973).

George K. Tanham, Vice President of The RAND Corporation; formerly, a Special Assistant to the United States Ambassador to Thailand with the personal rank of Minister; author of books on Viet Nam and Belgium.

Stephen P. Gibert, Associate Professor of Government, Georgetown University; co-author of *Arms for the Third World: Soviet Military Aid Diplomacy* (Johns Hopkins Press, 1969); formerly, Director of Georgetown University's Master of Science in Foreign Service Program.

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